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(LHA 1) operating an SH-60F Seahawk
helicopter off San Diego, California, on
29 November 2006.
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Foreword
The powerful underwater earthquake that occurred off the coast of Sumatra on 26
December 2004 generated the most destructive tsunami ever recorded, drowning more
than 150,000 people without warning in exposed littoral areas from Indonesia to South
Africa. The destruction was particularly severe in the Aceh Province of Indonesia, at
the northwestern tip of the island of Sumatra. There entire villages were destroyed
within minutes as waves of thirty feet or more advanced far inland, while destruction
of the main coastal highway made the entire region virtually inaccessible to Indonesian
authorities ashore.
In these extraordinary circumstances of human suffering, the U.S. Navy was able to
play a key role in organizing what was to become a massive, multinational humanitar-
ian relief operation, one based and executed virtually entirely “from the sea.” Working
closely with the Indonesian government and military, the Navy delivered, beginning
within days of the disaster, vast quantities of emergency food and other supplies and
provided on-the-spot emergency medical treatment to thousands of injured and dis-
placed persons along the Aceh coast.
Humanitarian relief has long been recognized as a mission of the American armed
forces and of the U.S. Navy in particular. The scale and complexity of the tsunami’s
impact, however, posed particular and in some respects novel challenges to the Joint
Task Force 536 (JTF 536) that was created to deal with the situation, not least of them
the requirement imposed on it to operate exclusively from an improvised “sea base,” to
use a term that has gained some currency in recent discussions of naval missions and
capabilities.
In Newport Paper 28, Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in North-
ern Indonesia, historian Bruce A. Elleman provides the first comprehensive history and
analysis of what would become known as Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. Elleman, a
research professor in the Department of Maritime History at the Naval War College,
has produced a valuable and indeed unique study, one that makes use of a variety of
internal Navy documents, oral histories, and interviews with a number of senior naval
officers, including the then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark. It is to be
hoped that it will prove of immediate benefit to planners in the naval and joint worlds
of the U.S. military, as well as to those of other nations potentially interested in
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exploiting its lessons to improve their own capabilities in this frequently neglected yet
vital—indeed, life-saving—military mission.
Thanks are due to many persons in and outside the Navy who have given some of their
time to assisting with this project. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the exten-
sive support provided Professor Elleman by the Naval Historical Center in Washington,
D.C., as well as the continual encouragement and help of Professor John Hattendorf,
chairman of the Maritime History Department at the Naval War College.
C A R N E S L O R D
Director, Naval War College Press
Newport, Rhode Island
vi T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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Preface
From our own experiences, we know that nothing can take away the
grief of those affected by tragedy. We also know that Americans have a
history of rising to meet great humanitarian challenges and of providing
hope to suffering peoples. As men and women across the devastated re-
gion begin to rebuild, we offer our sustained compassion and our gener-
osity, and our assurance that America will be there to help.
GEORGE W. BUSH, 3 JANUARY 2005
The 26 December 2004 Southeast Asian earthquake and the ensuing tsunamis de-
stroyed cities, towns, and huge coastal areas in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, India,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Bangladesh, the Andaman and Nicobar islands, the Maldives, the
Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Kenya.1 The U.S. Geological Survey has estimated
the human toll at 157,577 people killed, 26,763 missing, and 1,075,350 displaced.2 In
terms of lives lost, it was recorded history’s most devastating tsunami.
The day the tsunamis hit, President George W. Bush expressed “his sincere condolences
for the terrible loss of life and suffering caused by the earthquake and subsequent tsu-
namis in the region of the Bay of Bengal.”3 U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) immediately
established an Operations Planning Team (OPT) at PACOM Headquarters at Camp
H.M. Smith in Honolulu, Hawaii. On 28 December it formed Joint Task Force (JTF) 536
to plan and execute Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. According to the Pentagon: “The
focus of the mission will be to prevent further loss of life and human suffering by expe-
ditiously applying resources to the overall relief effort.”4
Indonesia was hit hardest; its death toll soon exceeded a hundred thousand people,
with the highest mortality rates in northern Sumatra. High mountains cut off Aceh
Province from the south, which made the use of sea basing, forward sea-based logistics,
helicopter access, communications, and shipboard medical care in the relief effort
especially appropriate. The earthquake and subsequent tsunami eliminated the coastal
road, thereby cutting off over 110 miles of coast from supply by land;5 accordingly, air
access was crucial to the humanitarian response in Indonesia.6 Admiral Thomas Fargo,
commander of PACOM, emphasized the value of “helicopter vertical lift” to the success
of the U.S. Navy’s humanitarian mission in Indonesia.7
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During UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, sea basing proved to be a culturally sensitive and politically
flexible response to a natural disaster in a region dominated by Muslims and the scene of
an active domestic insurgency. “Hard power” assets, like the aircraft carrier and support
ships provided by the U.S. Navy, in conjunction with air support and personnel from the
Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force, provided tremendous “soft power” effects. This
operation produced enormous goodwill, in particular when compared to the experience
of other powers in the region—like China—that could not send similar forces.
Notes
1. The term “tsunami” is composed of the Japa-
nese word tsu, which means “harbor,” and
nami, meaning “wave.” The often-seen term
“tidal wave” refers to astronomical tide
waves and so does not adequately describe
all forms of seismic events that can lead to
impulse wave generation, including earth-
quakes. In 1963, the term “tsunami” was
adopted by the International Union of Geod-
esy and Geophysics (IUGG) conference to
describe these phenomena, and it has re-
mained in general use ever since. The epi-
graph is quoted from President George W.
Bush, “Continuing Support for Tsunami Re-
lief,” 3 January 2005, available at www
.whitehouse.gov/infocus/tsunami/.
2. U.S. Geological Survey Earthquake Report,
“Magnitude 9.1: Off the West Coast of
Northern Sumatra,” available at earth-
quake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/eqinthenews/2004/
usslav/#summary.
3. Mike Allen, “Flooded Nations Get U.S.
Help,” Washington Post, 27 December 2004.
4. “U.S. Waits to Hear If Troops Needed in Tsu-
nami Area—CNN,” Wall Street Journal, 28
December 2004.
5. Mark S. Leavitt, Jeffrey M. Vorce, and
Michael M. Hsu, “For Compassion and
Country: Unified Assistance,” U.S. Naval In-
stitute Proceedings 131, no. 4 (April 2005),
pp. 44–49.
6. Ralph A. Cossa, president of Pacific Forum
CSIS, “U.S. Military Provides ‘Logistical
Backbone’ for Tsunami Relief,” eJournal
USA: Foreign Policy Agenda 9, no. 3 (Novem-
ber 2004), usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2005/
Mar/05-433015.html.
7. “Navy, Marines Deploy to Southeast Asia for
Tsunami Disaster Relief,” Inside the Navy, 10
January 2005.
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The Tsunami Disaster and the U.S. Political
and Military Reaction
Words can not adequately describe the physical damage and human suf-
fering brought by this [tsunami], one of the worst natural disasters the
world has seen.
ADMIRAL THOMAS FARGO, USN
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, 20 JANUARY 2005
The earthquake that created the 26 December 2004 tsunamis measured just over 9.0 on
the Richter scale and was centered under the Indian Ocean floor just to the west of
Indonesia.1 The amount of energy released is thought to have been somewhere between
0.25 and 0.8 gigatons of TNT. Put another way, the U.S. Geological Survey has esti-
mated that the tsunami released energy equal to approximately twenty-three thousand
Hiroshima-type atomic bombs.2
Tectonic plate shifts displaced tremendous quantities of water along a long underwater
rift, creating enormous tsunamis in every direction. Within hours tsunamis had struck
the coastlines of over a dozen Indian Ocean countries. Some waves reached fifty feet in
height, inundating tourist beaches, destroying businesses and homes, and drowning
entire families, including a high percentage of women and children. Hours later, the tsu-
namis reached eastern Africa, where they produced further devastation and loss of life.
Many relief agencies reported that up to one-third of the dead were children. More
girls than boys perished, and as many as four times more women than men died; in Sri
Lanka, women and children accounted for many of the thirty thousand deaths. The
tsunamis disproportionately impacted beaches, where they killed many foreigners.
Early estimates of dead or missing included as many as nine thousand mainly Euro-
pean tourists, who were vacationing at resorts throughout Southeast Asia during one
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The Location and Timing of the Indonesian Earthquake and Tsunamis
At 7:58 AM local time (00:58:53 UTC) on 26 December 2004, a 9.15-magnitude earth-
quake struck off the west coast of the Indonesian island of Sumatra. It led to fifteen
smaller earthquakes across the region. Altogether these seismic events lasted for ten min-
utes and produced several massive tsunamis that killed over a hundred thousand people
in Indonesia, mainly in the northern province of Aceh (see map 1). These tsunamis were
so powerful that they killed one person on Blue Horizon Beach, Port Elizabeth, South
Africa, some twelve hours later and over five thousand miles away.
According to seismologists, the earthquake’s epicenter was approximately a hundred
miles west of Sumatra and almost twenty miles below sea level. This point is at the
extreme western end of the so-called Ring of Fire, a zone that accounts for about 80
percent of the world’s largest earthquakes. Because of the location, reports referred to
the “Indonesian” or “Sumatran” earthquake. Others have used the year or the date, call-
ing it the “26 December 2004” earthquake. Because it was still Christmas Day in the
United States, some call it the Christmas earthquake, just as many in Britain and many
former British colonies refer to it as the “Boxing Day” earthquake.
2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
MAP 1
Aceh Province, Humanitarian Reference Map
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The earthquake that produced the destructive
tsunamis affected some 750 miles of faults where
the Indian Plate and the Burma Plate meet. On
this occasion these plates slid along each other in
two major movements over several minutes. Seis-
mographic and acoustic data show that during
the first phase the rupture was about 250 miles
long and sixty miles wide, located almost 18.6
miles beneath the seabed; it was the longest plate
rupture ever recorded due to a single earth-
quake.3 It moved at a speed of 1.7 miles per sec-
ond, or 6,300 mph, progressing northwest for
about two minutes. After a short delay the plates
moved again, this time due north, in the direc-
tion of the Andaman and Nicobar islands. In
addition to plate movement to the northwest and
north, the seabed also rose vertically by sixteen
feet in some places, displacing an estimated seven cubic miles of water. It was this water
displacement, not horizontal movement, that triggered the devastating tsunamis.
The 26 December 2004 earthquake was one of the largest ever recorded. It produced an
oscillation of the Earth’s surface of eight to twelve inches; the initial shock wave was
noticed by seismic stations as far away as Oklahoma, which recorded vertical earth
movements of about an eighth of an inch. Overall, the Earth’s surface moved vertically
by an average of up to one centimeter, or about a third of an inch. But as powerful as
the earthquake was, the uniqueness of the tsunamis was related less to the earthquake’s
size and location than to its exact seismic sequencing. For example, because the second
tectonic shift occurred more slowly than the first, at about 4,700 mph, the second set of
tsunamis, which traveled to the north, were significantly smaller than those that trav-
eled to the east and to the west.
Even more importantly, the earthquake produced an average thirty-three-foot horizon-
tal movement and a thirteen-to-sixteen-foot vertical movement along the fault line.
These shifts changed the geography of the entire region. For example, the Andaman
and Nicobar islands seem to have moved thirteen feet toward the southwest, several
small islands near Sumatra sixty-six feet, and Sumatra’s northern tip as much as
118 feet. Vertical movement was also substantial, creating new hills and depressions
both on land and under the ocean. As a result, some coastal areas of Indonesia are now
below sea level and may be so permanently.
W A V E S O F H O P E 3
Tsunami-ravaged coastline, Sawangbatee, Aceh
Province, Sumatra, Indonesia.
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Unlike many other large tsunamis throughout history, the Sumatran waves did not
originate from a single point source but radiated outward along the entire 750-mile
length of the fault. The rupture’s size, in turn, greatly increased the geographical area
over which the waves were observed. Tsunamis reached as far as South Africa to the
west, Mexico and Chile to the east, and the Arctic Ocean to the north. Sensors recorded
the tsunami all over the world, from the North Pacific to Antarctica, including most of
the recording sites in the Kuriles, the Aleutians, Alaska, British Columbia, California,
Mexico, Peru, and Chile.4
The height of the individual tsunamis differed radically from area to area, depending on
the direction the shoreline faced and the depths of the surrounding waters. For example,
along Sumatra’s northwestern coastline some waves were over thirty feet high, while in
Sri Lanka and Thailand the average wave height reached twelve to fifteen feet. While most
of the worst wave damage occurred in areas closest to the seismic ruptures, this was not
always the case. Because of the east-west direction of the underwater movements, some
waves that hit the Seychelle Islands and Somalia, on the far side of India, reached
approximately sixteen feet in height. A full sixteen hours after the earthquake, a final
five-foot wave crashed into Struisbaai, South Africa, over 5,300 miles away from the
earthquake’s epicenter.5
Tsunamis throughout History
Although tsunamis are perceived as being extremely rare, they actually appear regularly
in all parts of the globe, including the Indian, Pacific, and Atlantic oceans. During the
past century alone, many large ocean tsunamis were triggered by earthquakes near
Indonesia and Pakistan, and in the Bay of Bengal. The review that follows of eight
major tsunamis during the past two and a half centuries gives some idea of their
potential destructiveness.6 In most of these cases, coastal populations were caught
unaware, which increased the impact enormously.
On 1 November 1755, one of the largest earthquakes reported to that time occurred in
the Atlantic Ocean just off the coast of Portugal. The earthquake reportedly lasted ten
minutes and has since been estimated at 9.0 on the Richter scale. The tremors them-
selves destroyed most of downtown Lisbon. About thirty minutes later, an enormous
tsunami struck Lisbon’s harbor and traveled far into the city. Tsunamis later hit the
coasts of Spain, France, Belgium, Holland, England, and Ireland. It is estimated that
over a hundred thousand people perished in all. In Lisbon, over one-third of the popu-
lation reportedly died.
On 26 August 1883, Krakatoa’s volcano exploded; the island quickly sank into the
ocean, triggering large tsunamis, some over 120 feet in height. Since Krakatoa was
4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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uninhabited, it is thought that no one died in the explosion, but the resulting tsunamis
reportedly killed over thirty-six thousand people. The islands of Java and Sumatra were
struck the hardest. A number of towns, including Telok Batong on Sumatra and Sirik
and Semarang on Java, were completely destroyed. One heavily populated area on the
southwestern tip of Java was never resettled; to this day the Ujung Kulon region of Java
is part of the Krakatoa nature preserve. Java and Sumatra sustained most of the dam-
age, but tsunamis were reported in the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, along the
American west coast, and in South America. Higher than average waves were reported
even in the English Channel.
On 15 June 1896, a Richter 7.2 earthquake centered off the Japanese coast near Sanriku
triggered a massive tsunami that devastated the city and killed over twenty-six thou-
sand people. The height of some tsunamis reportedly reached eighty feet. Tsunamis
were also observed across the Pacific Ocean as far away as California; on 16 June 1896
the San Francisco Chronicle reported ten-foot-high waves.
On 28 December 1908, an earthquake created a tsunami that struck Messina, Sicily, and
the province of Reggio di Calabria in southern Italy. Estimates of the dead ranged as
high as two hundred thousand. Coincidentally, the U.S. Navy’s “Great White Fleet” was
passing through the Mediterranean at the time. Having already responded to the 1906
San Francisco earthquake, the fleet now rushed to the scene of the disaster to provide
aid. Experts later disagreed about whether this humanitarian assistance really made a
difference, but the mayor of Naples complimented the Navy “for the tactful manner” in
which supplies had been placed at the disposal of the Italian government.7
On 22 May 1960, a 9.5 earthquake, widely considered the largest recorded earthquake
in history, struck Chile. Earthquake-triggered tsunamis damaged the Chilean coast,
killing some two thousand people. Tsunamis also spread out across the Pacific Ocean.
Fifteen hours later, thirty-foot-high waves hit Hilo, on the island of Hawaii, resulting in
sixty-one deaths. Twenty-two hours after the earthquake, ten-foot tsunamis struck
Japan, causing two hundred deaths. Tsunamis struck as far away as the Marquesas, in
Samoa, and in New Zealand.
An enormous tsunami popularly called the “Good Friday” tsunami hit the west coast
of North America on 28 March 1964, following a 9.2 earthquake centered near College
Fjord in Prince William Sound, Alaska. This earthquake lasted almost five minutes; the
resulting thirty-eight-foot-high tsunami swamped the small Alaskan coastal communi-
ties of Girdwood, Portage, and Valdez, killing 106 and making this tsunami the most
devastating ever to hit the continent of North America. Tsunamis also affected British
Columbia and the west coast of the United States; in Crescent City, California, eleven
people perished in high waves. Tsunamis also caused damage in the Hawaiian Islands.
W A V E S O F H O P E 5
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On 16 August 1976, a 7.6 earthquake struck in the Moro Gulf, in the Philippines, only a
few miles from Mindanao Island. The earthquake created widespread damage, and tsuna-
mis engulfed numerous coastal communities of the Sulu Archipelago and southern
Mindanao, including Zamboanga City and Pagadian City. The tsunami inundated four
hundred miles of coastline bordering Moro Gulf in the North Celebes Sea, with over five
thousand people killed immediately and thousands more reported missing.
On 17 July 1998, a 7.1 earthquake centered about fifteen miles from the coast of north-
ern Papua New Guinea triggered an undersea landslide that in turn created tsunamis
reaching forty feet high. An enormous tsunami hit the Papua New Guinea coastline
only ten minutes later, destroying the villages of Arop and Warapu. An estimated 2,200
people died.
These historical cases show that devastating tsunamis are in fact not rare, especially in the
Pacific Ocean. The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration estimates that
there are an average of two tsunamis each year that cause damage to people or property
and that every ten to twelve years a tsunami causes widespread death and destruction.8
The 26 December 2004 tsunamis in Southeast Asia were just such an event.
Tsunami Destruction in 2004
The widespread destruction associated with the Indonesian earthquake was the result
not just of the earthquake per se but of the enormous tsunamis it created. These waves
radiated outward in all directions from the rupture. As we have seen, because the seis-
mic events were sequenced, so too were the tsunamis. Some areas received not just one
but multiple waves, separated by several minutes. Many people who survived a first
wave assumed that the worst had passed, only to be swept away by a second, often
larger, wave that arrived a few minutes later.
High mortality rates were exacerbated by the low level of tsunami awareness among the
population. In many low-lying areas people did not respond adequately either to the
earthquake or to the arrival of the first tsunami. There were some exceptions, however,
particularly in rural communities: “In a few cases, particularly in Indonesia and Thai-
land, isolated communities had retained an ancestral memory of similar disasters and
had fled to higher grounds when alerted by the initial tremors.”9
Many relief agencies reported that up to one-third of the dead appear to have been
children, some of whom had been attracted toward the water by the unusual
expanse of sea bottom exposed by the lower than average intertidal zone (the area
between low and high tides) that preceded the waves. Overall, many more girls
than boys seem to have perished. Several factors could explain this disproportion.
First, more girls would have been trapped indoors, since the waves hit just around
6 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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8 AM in Indonesia and just
after 10 AM local time in
both Thailand and Sri
Lanka; more boys than
girls were probably out-
side playing.10 Second,
boys were more likely than
girls to react to the arrival
of the waves by running
away, climbing trees, or
scaling the outside of
buildings. Finally, more
boys than girls probably knew how to swim and so had a better chance of reaching
safety after the waves hit.
Gender played a role too among adults. In some locales as many as four times more
women than men were killed; in Sri Lanka it is thought that women and children
accounted for the majority of the over thirty thousand tsunami-related deaths.11 Such
differences may be attributable to the fact that many of the men were outside working,
either on the water as fishermen (the tsunamis would have rolled harmlessly beneath
their boats) or in urban areas farther from the coast and where concrete buildings
could better withstand the destruction. By contrast, many women were caught inside
their homes when the waves struck.
In some countries, for example Sri Lanka, women do not normally learn how to swim
or climb trees. Also, their long hair and saris made it harder for them to escape the ris-
ing waters. According to one account by a young girl who watched her thirty-six-year-
old mother drown, “The water came with a huge force, moving like an angry monster
across the sand and into the home. My mother helped my younger brother to tear off
[sic] his shorts to swim away, but she didn’t follow. She was just too modest to remove
her clothes to escape.”12 Many other women hesitated to leave their homes unescorted
by men and so refused to leave and seek higher ground after the first tsunami hit; a sec-
ond wave swept them away a few minutes later.
As for the many foreign tourists killed by the tsunamis, Scandinavian countries appear
to have been hardest hit, with Sweden alone accounting for over five hundred of the
more than 2,400 foreign deaths.13 American casualties, by contrast, were small. From an
original number, in early January 2005, of four thousand Americans missing, by mid-
February the State Department was reporting that only thirty-three Americans had
died or were presumed dead as a result of the tsunamis.14
W A V E S O F H O P E 7
Tsunami damage at Pasi, northwest coastline of Aceh Province.
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Measured in lives lost, the Indonesian earthquake and tsunamis collectively qualify as one
of the ten worst disasters in recorded history. In terms of dead and missing together, how-
ever, the tsunamis alone represent the single worst tsunami event, specifically, in known his-
tory. It is important not to equate the two categories. The press has widely misreported the
26 December 2004 tsunamis as the world’s worst disaster ever, an incorrect impression that
may have been prompted by the high numbers of Western tourists involved, the presence of
radio and television stations near the disaster sites, and the high speed at which footage
from the disaster reached the Internet and global television.
Actually, many nineteenth- and twentieth-century disasters killed far more people. For
example, in 1887, China’s Yellow River broke through its banks and killed an estimated
two million, and then again in 1931 and 1938, producing four million and one million
more estimated deaths, respectively.15 In 1970, over three hundred thousand people
were killed in Bangladesh when a cyclone with winds of 130 mph swept away entire vil-
lages.16 Finally, in 1976, an earthquake located in Tangshan, China, killed anywhere
from 242,000 to 750,000 people, with 665,000 a widely accepted estimate.17 So, while
the December 2004 event was unquestionably the world’s worst recorded tsunami, it
was far from being the world’s worst recorded disaster of all time.
The American Response
When the news of the Sumatran earthquake and tsunamis reached PACOM headquar-
ters at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, its commander, Admiral Thomas Fargo, set up an opera-
tions planning team. On 26 December the international press reported slightly over ten
thousand casualties throughout the entire region, a figure suggesting that a small
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operation might be sufficient. Over the next
three days, however, PACOM constantly updated and expanded the scope of what
became known as Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE.
PACOM was able to respond quickly, since just a few months earlier the Joint Intelligence
Center Pacific (JICPAC) had created the Contingencies Operational Intelligence Cell, a
“fully manned, all-source operational intelligence capability specifically structured to
respond quickly to emerging crises within the theater.”18 On 28 December PACOM estab-
lished Joint Task Force (JTF) 536 under the command of Lieutenant General Robert R.
Blackman, Jr., commanding general of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force. PACOM
changed the task force’s name on 3 January 2005 to Combined Support Force (CSF) 536,
to reflect the multinational nature of an operation that by then included not only U.S.
military forces assisting Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand but also forces from a coali-
tion of Australia, Japan, Singapore, Russia, France, and Malaysia.
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By mid-January 2005 Australia had more than nine hundred troops in Aceh Province;
Japan had deployed two ships with 350 troops; and Singapore had sent the tank landing
ship Endurance, supported by helicopters, as well as troops; while Germany, Britain, and
China had each sent medical teams.19 The Australian Defence Force began its humanitar-
ian response on 28 December 2004;20 on that day the first Australian C-130 transport air-
craft landed at Banda Aceh airport.21 The first Singaporean relief flight to Aceh Province
arrived on 30 December 2004, when a Republic of Singapore Armed Forces Chinook
helicopter delivered water, food, and medicine to the people of Meulaboh; Endurance
arrived on 2 January 2005.22
Lieutenant General Blackman first stood up JTF 536 at Utapao, Thailand, at the Royal
Thai Navy Base, known as “Camp Red Horse.” Blackman readily acknowledged that he
had “really very little information on the extent of the disaster and the unique require-
ments of each of the three primary countries that we’re conducting relief operations
in.”23 Utapao, however, was an obvious choice for his headquarters, since it had been
the focus of numerous combined U.S.-Thai exercises in the COBRA GOLD series, a fact
that allowed U.S. forces to “come in here to Utapao at a tremendous comfort level”;24
the advance team for that year’s COBRA GOLD, usually held in May, simply needed to
speed up its arrival.25 Blackman’s choice facilitated a rapid military response also
“because of the expeditionary forces and forward-based forces here in the region.”26
On 28 December the first elements of JTF 536 began to arrive in Utapao to set up the
Forward Command Element. By the 29th the first disaster relief assessment teams, des-
ignated DRAT-Thailand and DRAT–Sri Lanka, had already arrived in their respective
countries, while DRAT-Indonesia did so the following day. Also on 29 December, the
first P-3 reconnaissance flight took off, and the first C-130 arrived at Utapao. On 30
December, the first C-130 relief flight brought supplies into the region, while by 31
December the first helicopter relief flight was operational.
On 2 January 2005, Lieutenant General Blackman and the main body of his JTF 536
team arrived in Utapao to take charge of the operation, followed by the arrival of
PACOM’s Multinational Planning Augmentation Team. MPAT specialists trained in
international disaster response helped set up JTF 536’s Combined Coordination Cen-
ter. Soon they began to receive updates from JICPAC. The “interagency partnership
between the theater intelligence center and national intelligence agencies ultimately
resulted in the highly successful delivery of information to forward-deployed forces.”27
If C-130s were in the air first, by 5 January 2005 the Air Mobility Command, a compo-
nent of U.S. Transportation Command, was supporting the operation with six larger
C-5 aircraft flying from Kadena Air Base in Japan and four McChord Air Force Base
C-17s staged out of Utapao. Another C-17, from Charleston Air Force Base, South
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Carolina, departed for the region on 4 January 2005.28 Unlike the Vietnam War, when
the runways at Utapao “rumbled and roared with the takeoffs of massive B-52 bombers
heading east on bombing runs,” this mission soon ran “on cell phones, e-mail, Web
pages and paperless offices.”29
On 29 December 2004, President George W. Bush pledged $35 million in relief assis-
tance; by 31 December he had increased this commitment to $350 million. Land forces
were to assist Thailand and Sri Lanka; the U.S. Navy’s primary mission was in northern
Indonesia. A strike group led by the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) quickly
left Hong Kong, and a seven-ship expeditionary strike group led by the helicopter/dock
landing ship USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) proceeded from Guam. On 1 January
2005, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) activated the hospital ship USNS Mercy,
which departed San Diego on 8 January. By 5 January 2005, only ten days after the
earthquake and tsunamis, UNIFIED ASSISTANCE included over twenty-five U.S. Navy
ships, forty-five fixed-wing aircraft, and fifty-eight helicopters. By this point American
forces had already delivered more than “610,000 pounds of water, food and other sup-
plies to the region.”30
* * * * * * *
While the 26 December 2004 disaster was not the worst ever in world history, it produced
the single worst tsunami crisis ever recorded; the resulting catastrophe certainly qualifies
as one of the ten worst in recorded history. Perhaps due in part to the foreign presence,
the global awareness of this disaster was both rapid and extensive. As will be seen, within
minutes e-mails reported the tsunamis, and within hours the Internet was full of pictures
and even home movies showing the widespread destruction. This in turn would prompt
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The Military Sealift Command hospital ship USNS Mercy operating with the USS Abraham
Lincoln on station near Banda Aceh.
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the United Nations to establish a relief operation, which the UN has since declared to be
the costliest ever undertaken. The tsunami hit Indonesia particularly hard; President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono would tell Secretary-General Kofi Annan that full recovery
might take parts of his country “five to ten years.”31
By chance, many U.S. Navy Force Elements were already in East Asia, and these ships
almost immediately were diverted to the disaster area. But it took several days for the
first of them to arrive from Hong Kong and many more days for other naval assets to
travel from Guam, Hawaii, and the continental United States to Southeast Asia. None-
theless, by 5 January 2005, only ten days after the earthquake and tsunamis, 13,435
American military personnel were involved in UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. To support this
effort, PACOM assigned the Abraham Lincoln and Bonhomme Richard groups.
The American response is particularly striking in that during the first day or two after
the disaster most news reports did not indicate the true severity of the damage or even
hint at the large number of casualties. Estimates of dead and missing ranged only in
the low thousands, up to a “high” of just over ten thousand. The local destruction had
in fact been so great that only two or three days later did the true extent of the catastro-
phe start to become apparent.
Notes
1. Epigraph from Admiral Thomas Fargo,
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Media
Roundtable Transcript, Kuala Lumpur, Ma-
laysia, 20 January 2005, available at www
.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2005/050119
transcript.shtml.
2. “The Deadliest Tsunami in History?” Na-
tional Geographic News, 7 January 2005,
available at news.nationalgeographic.com/
news/2004/12/1227_041226_tsunami.html.
3. National Science Foundation, “Analysis of
the Sumatra-Andaman Earthquake Reveals
Longest Fault Rupture Ever,” 19 May 2005,
available at www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ
.jsp?cntn_id=104179.
4. Fisheries and Oceans, Canada—Pacific Re-
gion, “Tsunamis and Tsunami Research: De-
cember 26, 2004 and March 28, 2005 Indian
Ocean Tsunami Events,” www.pac.dfo-mpo
.gc.ca/sci/osap/projects/tsunami/tsunamiasia
_e.htm.
5. Ashfak Mohamed, “Freak Waves Hit SA as a
Result of the Tsunami,” Cape Times, 28 De-
cember 2004.
6. For more information on these and other
tsunamis see “Tsunami History of Tidal
Waves,” www.important.ca/tsunami_history
.html.
7. James R. Reckner, Teddy Roosevelt’s Great
White Fleet (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1988), p. 148.
8. “Physics of Tsunamis,” National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration,
wcatwc.arh.noaa.gov.
9. United Nations, Report and Summary of
Main Conclusions, Regional Workshop on
Lessons Learned and Best Practices in the
Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami,
Medan, Indonesia, 13–14 June 2005 (New
York: Office for the Coordination of Hu-
manitarian Affairs, 5 July 2005), available at
www.reliefnet.int.
10. Sri Lanka is an hour behind Thailand, but it
was also farther away from the epicenter, so
W A V E S O F H O P E 1 1
T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NP28\Printer\NP28.vp
Tuesday, January 23, 2007 3:08:16 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
the two countries experienced tsunamis at
the same time locally.
11. “UNICEF Says 12,000 Children Died in Sri
Lanka,” CBC News, 2 January 2005, at
www.cbc.ca/world/story/2005/01/02/
srilanka050102.html; Sarala Emmanuel, “Sri
Lankan Women’s Small but Significant Gains
in the Post Tsunami Reconstruction Process,”
Suriya Women’s Development Centre, Sri
Lanka, n.d., at www.apwld.org/tsunami_
reconstruction.htm.
12. Suvendrini Kakuchi, “In Tsunami, Women
Put Modesty over Survival,” Womensenews
.com, 23 February 2005.
13. “Swedes Mark Tsunami Anniversary,” BBC
News, 26 December 2005, available at news
.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4560468.stm.
14. Glenn Kessler, “White House to Seek $950
Million for Tsunami Aid,” Washington Post,
10 February 2005.
15. “Dealing with the Deluge,” Nova, available at
www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/flood/deluge.html.
16. “Crisis Prevention and Recovery: Bangla-
desh,” United Nations Development Pro-
gram, www.unpd.org.
17. “1976: Chinese Earthquake Kills Hundreds
of Thousands,” BBC News, available at
news.bbc.co.uk/.
18. David J. Dorsett, “Tsunami: Information
Sharing in the Wake of Disaster,” Joint Forces
Quarterly 39, available at www.dtic.mil/doc-
trine/jel/jfq_pubs/0539.pdf.
19. Denis D. Gray, “Indonesia Denies U.S. Pilots
Use of Airspace; Carrier Leaves,” Washington
Times, 13 January 2005.
20. “Indonesia: Operation Sumatra Assist,” www
.defence.gov.au/our_people/op_sumatra
_assist/index.cfm.
21. Brigadier Dave Chalmers, “Operation
SUMATRA ASSIST: A Command
Perspective,” Defence (November/December
2005), available at www.defence.gov.au/
defencemagazine/.
22. “Case Study: Singapore Armed Forces
(SAF),” in Tsunami; Magnitude of Terror, li-
brary.thinkquest.org/04oct/01724/relief
_saf.html.
23. Lieutenant General Robert R. Blackman,
commander of Combined Support Force
536, “DoD Briefing on Operation UNIFIED
ASSISTANCE, the Post-Tsunami Relief Ef-
fort,” Utapao, Thailand, 7 January 2005,
available at www.pacom.mil/speeches/
sst2005/050107tsunami.shtml.
24. Kathleen T. Rhem, “‘Conditions for Transi-
tion’ Met in Thailand, Sri Lanka,” American
Forces Press Service, 15 January 2005.
25. Matt Pottinger and Barry Wain, “U.S. Mili-
tary Ties to Region Allowed Faster Re-
sponse,” Asian Wall Street Journal, 10
January 2005.
26. Blackman, “DoD Briefing.”
27. Dorsett, “Tsunami.”
28. “AMC Aircraft, People Support Tsunami Re-
lief Operations,” Defense Transportation News
9, no. 1 (January 2005), available at www
.ndtahq.com/download/0105NDTAGRAM
.pdf.
29. James Brooke, “Ad-hoc Planning Goes into
Marine Aid Effort,” New York Times, 6 Janu-
ary 2005.
30. Jim Garamone, “More Ships, Helicopters Ar-
rive to Aid Tsunami Victims,” American
Forces Information Service, 5 January 2005,
available at www.defenselink.mil/news/
Jan2005/n01052005_2005010509.html.
31. “Tsunami Recovery Could Take Ten Years, Will
Cost Billions,” Environment News Service, 7
January 2005, available at www.ens-newswire
.com/ens/jan2005/2005-01-07-02.asp.
1 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NP28\Printer\NP28.vp
Tuesday, January 23, 2007 3:08:16 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
Tsunami Warning Delays and Media
Reporting Inaccuracies
I’ve been in war, and I’ve been through a number of hurricanes, torna-
does and other relief operations, but I have never seen anything like this.
COLIN POWELL, U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, 6 JANUARY 2005
Soon after the 26 December 2004 tsunami struck, news of the disaster began to trickle
out in the international press and over the Internet.1 On 27 December 2004, official
estimates of the dead were comparatively low, with some reports suggesting upward of
13,500 people. These reports were provisional, however, and were expected to rise as
relief and rescue workers combed through the wreckage.
The December 2004 tsunami was the first major one to hit Southeast Asia or the sub-
continent in over a hundred years, since the tsunami caused by the 1883 explosion of
Krakatoa. Many people were simply not aware that an earthquake could create a lethal
tsunami. Thousands of lives could have been saved if local governments had taken
immediate action to alert the most vulnerable areas to the possibility of seismically cre-
ated waves. However, because there was no regional tsunami disaster system in place,
the governments of these endangered countries were unaware that lethal tsunamis
might be heading their way.
After the tsunamis struck, the same poor communications that had contributed to the
disaster conditioned the underestimations of the true scale of the damage. Unreliable
communications meant that initial death tolls were vastly underreported and, accord-
ingly, that foreign aid did not begin to flow to the region as quickly as it might have
otherwise. Only belatedly did the governments in the affected areas announce that they
were unable to cope by themselves, and only two or three days after the tsunamis struck
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Tsunami Warning
The Pacific Ocean region has the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) at Ewa
Beach, Hawaii, providing tsunami warnings to most countries in the Pacific Basin;
there is no similar warning system for the Indian Ocean. Dr. R. S. Dattatrayam, director
of seismology at the India Meteorological Department, later explained to the Times of
India that his team had detected the quake but could not predict the tidal wave: “We
had indications pretty early in the morning, almost soon after it [the tsunami] origi-
nated [in Indonesia]. But we were not prepared to gauge it. We don’t have warning
facilities for tsunami. We knew something would be hitting us, but couldn’t tell the
time, the location and the intensity.”2
Such limitations affected not just the local countries but the PTWC and the Pacific
Ocean as well. Following the earthquake, Charles McCreery, director of PTWC, know-
ing that the earthquake might create tsunamis, transmitted warnings to the U.S. Navy
and U.S. State Department, the government of Australia, and the American military
base on the British-controlled island of Diego Garcia.3 The State Department report-
edly passed it on to India, but Indian government officials later denied that they had
received any such warning, leading some to suspect a cover-up.4
But the tsunami center in Hawaii could not get warnings through to the Southeast
Asian governments. Professor Michel Chossudovsky, director of a globalization insti-
tute at Ottawa University, later argued that with modern communications “the infor-
mation of an impending disaster could have been sent round the world in a matter of
minutes, by email, by telephone, by fax, not to mention by satellite television.”5 How-
ever, even if a tsunami warning had been pushed downward into the region, there was
no way of ensuring that it would reach the right people. In fact, any such warning
might have easily been diverted to the wrong people or ignored completely as a hoax.
The main problem was that there was no regional tsunami disaster system in place.
Even had individual countries issued their own tsunami warnings, there was no guar-
antee that the average person would have heard of them in time. In the case of Indone-
sia, the total time available would have been only fifteen to thirty minutes, clearly
insufficient to evacuate so many people. So, with no widespread and comprehensive
warning system in place, most of the population could not have been notified of the
approaching waves.
To help remedy this situation, on 29 December 2004 President Bush declared American
support for the construction of a worldwide system for such natural disasters. On 9
February 2005, Bush pledged $35 million to help build a tsunami early warning system
in the Indian Ocean, earmarking $23 million to improve the international and U.S. tsu-
nami early warning system, and $12 million to enhance tsunami early warning and
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disaster mitigation in the affected countries. The Southeast Asian system was to be
modeled on the 1949 system built by the United States, Japan, and other Pacific coun-
tries; it would include a secure communication network to notify the countries of
Southeast Asia of an impending disaster from the sea.
The First Stage of International Reporting
The tsunami disaster and the relief effort it generated show how the international press
has become an integral factor in understanding and responding to natural disasters.
The size and scope of the disaster were at first unclear in part because the global media
was not represented in the most affected regions. As a result, the international response
to the earthquake and resulting tsunamis was similarly sporadic and uncoordinated. It
would take several days, and in some areas almost a week, before a true picture of the
devastation was available.
In the wake of the tsunamis, local relief and rescue efforts, limited to begin with, were
quickly overwhelmed. Local governments were simply not prepared for a disaster of
such proportions. Emergency workers were hampered by shortages of equipment and
supplies, as well as by poor transportation. Many major roads, railroads, and docks had
been destroyed by the earthquake and tsunamis. In Indonesia, President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono quickly declared a national disaster and promised aid to the vic-
tims, but there was no way to deliver it.
As was generally the case, very few international organizations understood during the
first day or two the actual magnitude of the disaster or how many people had perished.
Even though Indonesia was the primary focus of the earthquake and tsunamis, the
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) initially put the official death toll at only
4,500, and identified most of the victims as coming from Aceh Province, at the north-
ern tip of the island of Sumatra. Of this number, at least three thousand of the deaths,
or almost three-quarters, were reported to have been in the provincial capital of Banda
Aceh. In fact, throughout northern Sumatra entire villages had been wiped out. Ini-
tially, Australian Broadcasting Company news could only speculate about widespread
reports of collapsed buildings in the area; it acknowledged that there were no reports
from Aceh’s west coast, closest to the earthquake’s center, where damage would proba-
bly have been most severe.6
Other countries in South and Southeast Asia were also cautious in their casualty esti-
mates. Early reports from Thailand stated that at least 310 people had been killed,
including victims at several southern tourist resorts, such as the island of Phuket. More
than 1,300 others had been injured in six provinces. “We are in chaos,” Somsak
Sunwansujarit, deputy director of the county’s disaster department, admitted.7 In
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Malaysia, at least fifty-three people were immediately reported dead and another thirty-
four were reported missing after fifteen-foot waves struck the coastline. The government
of the Maldives declared a state of emergency after the tsunami swept over the islands
and flooded two-thirds of the capital. However, it placed the death toll at only fifteen. As
later events were to show, such estimates were far below the actual numbers.
The Sri Lankan defense ministry quickly confirmed the deaths of 2,484 people, but
unofficial estimates offered a higher figure, around five thousand. For example, the ini-
tial death toll for Amparai was nine hundred, for Batticaloa three hundred, and for
Trincomalee three hundred. But residents of another village, Saindamarudu, were say-
ing that the true number was much higher, anywhere between three and four thousand.
The capital, Colombo, lies on Sri Lanka’s west coast, away from the earthquake, but the
tsunamis “ricocheted” off the east coast of India and hit Colombo hard, inundating as
well a number of coastal areas nearby. President Chandrika Kumaratunga returned
from a trip to Britain, quickly declared a “state of disaster,” authorized the use of the
military, and appealed for international aid.8
The Sri Lankan government eventually estimated that over a million people, perhaps 5
percent of the entire population, had been directly affected by the disaster. Hundreds of
international tourists had also been affected. The seventy-four-year-old former Ger-
man chancellor Helmut Kohl was in Sri Lanka at that time. Kohl watched from his
third-floor balcony as the tsunami crashed into his hotel: “The sea had swallowed up
everything. Visions of the war which I experienced as a boy came to mind. It looked
like it used to be after a bombing raid. . . . We saw dead people.” Kohl elected to remain
in Sri Lanka to help with the relief efforts.9
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Flooded inland plain near Keude Panga, Aceh Province.
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Early reports from India stated that at least three thousand people had been killed in
southern India, the state of Tamil Nadu accounting for over 1,700 dead. In the state
capital of Chennai the official toll stood at 131, but the newspaper Hindu reported that
hundreds of fishing boats had been destroyed or washed out to sea, which suggested a
larger disaster.10 According to the Associated Press, P. Ramananmurthy in the town of
Kakinada explained: “I was shocked to see innumerable fishing boats flying on the
shoulder of the waves, going back and forth as if made of paper. Many boats were
upturned, but fishermen were still holding onto them. They also were pushed into the
sea. I had never imagined anything like this could happen.”11
In the meantime, the fates of the Andaman and Nicobar islands were still unknown.
Because of their location and the extreme damage they had suffered, local and foreign
reporters could not get there and communications were cut off. These islands had not
only been directly in the path of the tsunami but had also been shaken by a major
aftershock. As S. B. Deol, inspector general of police, told the Indian press: “The situa-
tion is very grim. The death toll will go up to at least 1,000.”12 As later reports would
reveal, even this seemingly large number was a gross underestimate.
International Reactions
News of the earthquake and tsunamis first appeared in the United States on Sunday,
the day after Christmas. Estimates of just over ten thousand deaths throughout the
region were common, and the international press’s underreporting on this day in par-
ticular of the death and destruction was to have serious repercussions. Early reports,
placing the number of dead per country in the low thousands instead of the tens of
thousands—awful enough but a tenth or even a fifteenth of the true number—muted
the international reaction to the crisis.
The main problem appears to have been that seasoned international reporters went out
of their way not to exaggerate their estimates, reporting thousands of dead when the
real figure was well over a hundred thousand for Indonesia alone. Undoubtedly, and
understandably, these journalists were concerned that overreporting casualties might
lead to accusations of sensationalism. But their reaction gave a falsely reassuring
impression to the rest of the world.
Given the comparatively low mortality estimates in the international press, it should not
be surprising that the initial reaction of official Washington, D.C., which was in its
Christmas to New Year’s break, was at first apparently lackadaisical. Also, although it was
Saturday, 25 December 2004, in Washington when the earthquake struck, news began to
trickle in only on Sunday—and of all Sundays of the year, perhaps the worst in which to
find anyone on duty. In fact, most of the main decision makers in the White House,
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Congress, and the Pentagon were away from their offices. Many government officials, like
President Bush, who was spending the Christmas vacation at his ranch in Texas, were not
even in Washington. Reliance on press reports, then, for accurate estimates of the extent
of the damage was probably greater than normal. As Senator Sam Brownback (R-Kan.)
commented, because of the timing of the disaster “there [was] just not the level of com-
munication you would normally have on something like this.”13
Nonetheless, Admirals Thomas Fargo, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, and
Walter Doran, commanding the Pacific Fleet, both in Honolulu, were quickly authoriz-
ing the movement of ships toward the disaster scene. The fact that Washington deci-
sion making had ground to a standstill over the holidays proved on this occasion a
boon for Admirals Fargo and Doran, for nobody was trying to look over their shoul-
ders and second-guess their decisions. Though not yet sure which countries had sus-
tained the most damage, they ordered all available naval assets to begin to flow toward
Southeast Asia.14
As news reports about the tsunami began to appear, starting on the Internet, with
graphic pictures of the destruction, and a day or two later in the world press, Pacific
Command planners scrambled to overcome the widespread misapprehension that this
disaster was isolated geographically and relatively small in scope. Then the first news
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Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Walter
F. Doran, speaking to members of the Institute
for Continued Learning at the University of
California in San Diego, Calif.
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reports came out of Aceh Province, and it finally became clear that Indonesia was the
true focus of the catastrophe.
The Second Stage of Reporting
By 27 December more reliable estimates of the earthquake and tsunami-related
destruction were available. For example, the official death toll in Aceh Province jumped
from around four thousand to over seven thousand people, and Vice President Joseph
Kalla was warning that it might soon exceed twenty-five thousand. But news reports
from northern Indonesia were still largely confined to Banda Aceh. Because of wide-
spread infrastructure damage, it took two days for Indonesian military aircraft to sur-
vey the Sumatran west coast. What they discovered was widespread earthquake and
tsunami damage affecting some five million people. According to one estimate, 1,556
of Aceh Province’s 5,862 villages, over a quarter, had been completely destroyed.15 Most
of these much more negative reports only began to circulate a day or two after the tsu-
namis, mostly from the 28th and well into the New Year. On 29 December, however, the
situation in Aceh still “remained a mystery, U.N. officials said.”16
In Thailand the official death toll stood at 1,520, but at least 1,400 others were reported
missing. The hardest-hit areas were the seaside resorts of Phuket and Phang Nga, where
many foreign tourists had perished. Media reports showed chaotic scenes of thousands
of foreigners gathered at the airport trying to leave or looking frantically for missing
family members. Meanwhile, such basic necessities as water, electricity, and shelter were
either unavailable or in short supply. According to a senior health official, Vichai Tian
Thavorn, “The main problems [were] the spread of disease, sanitation, respiratory and
skin diseases, [and] hygiene for people dealing with the bodies.”17
In Sri Lanka, the official death toll more than tripled, from a low estimate of around
five thousand up to 18,700 and then later still to 37,300 people killed or missing, plus
15,196 injured. Meanwhile, another 444,000 people were relocated to temporary refu-
gee camps because their homes had been destroyed. The tsunami had devastated Sri
Lanka’s maritime and fishing industries, destroying an estimated 65 percent of Sri
Lanka’s fishing vessel fleet, some 29,700 vessels.18
In the north and east of Sri Lanka, the extent of the damage remained unclear, particu-
larly in areas controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). But in Trinco-
malee, an estimated thirty thousand people were homeless and there was no sign of
refugee shelters promised by the government. In Batticaloa, a local member of parlia-
ment, S. Jeyanandamoorthy, told the Tamilnet website, “The newly built government
hospital, public buildings, schools, LTTE political offices, homes, churches and temples
have been completely destroyed by the sea.”19
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In India, the official death toll quickly increased to 11,500, more than half of them on
the low-lying Andaman and Nicobar islands. According to the Sydney Morning Herald,
at least seven thousand people had died there and as many as thirty thousand people
were still unaccounted for. Later, a report described how on the Nicobar island of
Chowdra a thousand of the 1,500 inhabitants had perished. Meanwhile, the death toll
on Car Nicobar—a ten-square-mile atoll with a population of forty-five thousand—
was thought to exceed ten thousand. On the Indian mainland, the southern state of
Tamil Nadu experienced widespread damage. One day after the tsunamis, at least 3,720
bodies had been recovered. One fisherman told the press, “I was with my wife, my
daughter, my father, my sister picking the small fish from my nets. Then the waters
came. Now my family is gone.”20
Reports from other countries in the area were more limited but sent the same message.
At least sixty-five people were reported dead in Malaysia, ninety in neighboring Burma
(Myanmar). In the tiny island nation of the Maldives the official death toll rose quickly
to fifty-five. All the way across the Indian Ocean, at least 122 people were thought to
have perished from the tsunamis in Somalia, Tanzania, and on the Seychelle Islands.
One person had died as far away as South Africa. This second stage of international
reports helped to clarify the extent of the disaster and the scope of the humanitarian
disaster relief program that would be necessary for the survivors.
The International Community Finally Takes Note
It was late in the day on Monday, 27 December, then, that American newspapers and tele-
vision stations began to report the true scope of the tsunami disaster. It was at this
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point—with U.S. Navy ships already on the move toward Southeast Asia—that President
Bush authorized the Pentagon to initiate a humanitarian disaster relief operation.
New information now flowed into Washington and other world capitals but did not
keep up with the rapid increases in casualty figures. By 29 December the estimated
Southeast Asian death toll had jumped from 13,500 to the much larger, although still
wildly inaccurate, estimate of sixty thousand.21 This number was expected to rise even
further, however, as rescue workers combed through the wreckage. The World Health
Organization (WHO) warned that it could double, unless emergency supplies of
food, water, and medicines reached the devastated areas. Throughout the region,
relief workers warned that there were severe shortages of these necessities. David
Nabarro, head of WHO’s crisis operations, stated: “There is certainly a chance that
we could have as many dying from communicable diseases as from the tsunami. . . .
The immediate terror associated with the tsunami and the earthquake itself may be
dwarfed by the longer-term suffering of the affected communities.”22
In the three countries that were hardest hit and that would soon become the foci of
American relief efforts—Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand—numerous corpses were
still being washed ashore or uncovered as the waters receded. Transportation and com-
munications were severely disrupted, especially in rural villages; aid workers could not
travel to many areas; four days after the tsunami emergency teams had yet to reach
many remote villages.
Due to the misleading early reports, major foreign donors, including the United States,
the European Union, Australia, and Japan, were slow to react, initially pledging only
U.S.$100 million in special relief aid. However, as the second stage of news reporting
began to appear in the global media and the scope of the disaster became clearer, dona-
tions increased rapidly.
By then, however, Jan Egeland, the UN’s emergency relief coordinator, had issued, the
day after the tsunamis, a severe rebuke that for many helped clarify the true situation
for these donor nations: “It is beyond me why we are so stingy. Really. Christmas time
should remind many Western countries at least, how rich we have become. . . . There
are several donors who are less generous than before in a growing world economy.”
Egeland estimated that the world community needed to donate at least $15 billion to
deal with what he described as “the worst natural disaster in recent history.”23 Egeland
later denied that he had specifically meant the United States. Nonetheless, in an
attempt to blunt the perception that the U.S. government did not care, Secretary of
State Colin Powell quickly rebutted the imputation that Washington had ignored the
disaster: “The U.S. is not stingy,” Powell declared. “We are the greatest contributor to
international relief efforts in the world.”24
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It was in this setting that President Bush made his first public statement and pledged
$15 million in aid. Unfortunately, by this time, the 29th, the magnitude of the disaster
was far better understood within the region, and his offer was widely derided in the
international media; one commentary from the French newspaper Le Figaro noted that
it amounted to half the cost of a single F-16 fighter.25
Soon after Bush’s announcement, the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) added another $20 million, bringing the American aid package to $35 mil-
lion. Secretary Powell commented, “I think we’ve responded rather aggressively and
appropriately. And the American people should be pleased and proud of the way we’ve
done it.”26 Bush reiterated the point: “What you’re beginning to see is a typical response
from America. First of all, we provide immediate cash relief, to the tune of about $35
[million]. And then there will be an assessment of the damage. . . . I just got off the
phone with the President of Sri Lanka, she asked for help to assess the damage. In other
words, not only did they want immediate help, but they wanted help to assess damage
so that we can better direct resources. And so our government is fully prepared to con-
tinue to provide assistance and help.”27
The president now revealed for the first time that the U.S. military would be assisting
the victims of the earthquake and tsunami: “We’re dispatching a Marine expeditionary
unit, the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln, and the maritime pre-position squadron
from Guam to the area to help with relief efforts. . . . It takes money, by the way, to
move an expeditionary force into the region. In other words, we’re diverting assets,
which is part of our overall aid package.”28
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The press generally ignored the president’s offer of military assistance. The New York
Times criticized the higher number of $35 million and the promise of long-term assis-
tance as “a miserly drop in the bucket.”29 However quickly the Bush administration
adjusted to new casualty numbers, it always seemed too little, too late. As one commen-
tator later put it: “The United States may not have been ‘stingy,’ as a United Nations
official charged, but the administration missed an opportunity to show the nation’s
generosity.”30 This put the U.S. government in the uncomfortable position of having to
justify its extremely good humanitarian response. The early American relief response
was “scaled up as the scale of the disaster became more widely known,” Powell said on
CNN’s Late Edition. “We have nothing to be embarrassed about,” he told NBC’s Meet
the Press.31 However, as further news reports listed ever higher casualties, even $35 mil-
lion soon appeared paltry; on 31 December Bush announced that the United States was
pledging $350 million in relief assistance, a number that included dispatching the air-
craft carrier Abraham Lincoln, the maritime prepositioning squadron at Guam, and an
amphibious ship carrying a Marine expeditionary unit.32 When these assets arrived in the
theater, they focused their initial relief measures on emergency assistance, including pro-
viding much-needed fresh water, food, and medicine. According to Army colonel Gary
Keck, a Pentagon public affairs officer, this contribution was not cheap, ultimately six
million dollars per day. The price tag “cover[ed] a U.S. contingent of about 13,000 mili-
tary personnel, of which about 12,000 are aboard 17 Navy ships in the region hit by the
Dec. 26 earthquake and resulting tsunami.” This made the American military’s contribu-
tion to the humanitarian effort quite possibly the “largest in history.”33
* * * * * * *
The lack of a regional tsunami warning system, coupled with widespread underestima-
tions by local governments and the international press of the true casualty rates,
resulted in what many have criticized as a slow U.S. response. One contributing factor
was that local governments restricted media and aid access to some areas. Despite grave
conditions in many parts of Aceh Province, for example, the Indonesian army lifted the
ban on foreign aid workers only several days after the tsunami. Thereafter media
reports from Banda Aceh described the local response to the catastrophe as limited,
unplanned, and in some cases completely lacking.
After an initial donation of $15 million and then $35 million, by February 2005 USAID
and the Defense Department would spend an estimated $346 million for immediate
relief aid. As State Department spokesman J. Adam Ereli explained on 30 December 2004,
“Moving a carrier strike force and a Marine expeditionary unit within 72 hours should
not be considered dilly dallying. The planes are on the ground in Indonesia tonight.”34
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Throughout this period, Washington had to fight a largely uphill media battle to prove
that it properly understood the scale of the disaster and was reacting adequately to it.
Meanwhile, however, having perceived the true nature of the disaster, Admirals Fargo
and Doran were responding quickly and massively, eventually deploying over two
dozen warships and over a hundred aircraft.
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Preparing the U.S. Navy Operation
The Value of Sea Basing
In one of the most complex relief operations ever attempted. . . . [n]aval
forces are able to arrive with critical mass quickly, commence relief sup-
port immediately, and substance those operations indefinitely . . . by es-
tablishing a sea base as close to the operation as possible.
NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, 2005
On 12 January 2005, only two weeks after the enormity of the tsunami crisis had
become clear, almost fifteen thousand U.S. military personnel were providing humani-
tarian relief throughout the affected region.1 These American servicemen and service-
women were supported by twenty-five U.S. Navy ships and one Coast Guard cutter
acting as temporary sea bases for forty-five fixed-wing aircraft and fifty-eight helicop-
ters. By this point in the mission, the U.S. military had delivered 2.2 million pounds of
relief supplies to the worst-hit nations, including sixteen thousand gallons of water,
113,000 pounds of food, and 140,500 pounds of other relief supplies during the previ-
ous twenty-four hours alone. Because of the extent of the local devastation, including
the destruction of roads, bridges, and docks, sea basing was critical to the success of
this humanitarian mission.
Several geographical and organizational factors proved critical, in turn, to the sea-
basing effort: where the U.S. Navy assets had been when the tsunami disaster occurred,
what exactly the Navy’s orders were, when those orders were transmitted, and how
quickly the ships responded. There was no significant delay between when President
George Bush announced that he had authorized a relief operation and when the first
U.S. Navy ships appeared offshore in the crisis area, because PACOM had sent move-
ment orders to units involved two days before.
The U.S. Navy was particularly well positioned and equipped to react to this humanitar-
ian crisis, it was ordered to respond as soon as the true magnitude of the tsunamis and
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receiving orders, and they were authorized to use maximum safe speeds. Few surface
ships then in existence could have reached the disaster area more quickly than they did.
Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE in Sri Lanka and Thailand
When news of the Sumatran earthquake and tsunamis first reached PACOM headquar-
ters at Camp Smith in Hawaii, Admirals Fargo and Doran quickly decided to send all
available ships to Southeast Asia.2 But as discussed in the previous chapter, the local
governments were not yet able to estimate the true numbers of casualties, whereas the
international press was reporting only slightly more than ten thousand victims in all,
which suggested that a small HA/DR operation might be sufficient. Conditions in Aceh
Province were particularly unclear. Over the next three days, therefore, as estimates of
the real extent of the crisis continued to rise, PACOM needed constantly to update and
change the scope of what it would soon call Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE.
A liaison officer was requested from USAID, and “over the next 24 hours communica-
tions were established with foreign military commanders to assess their requirements.”3
Admiral Walter Doran also quickly called on a classmate, Admiral Arun Prakash, who
had become the Indian navy’s Chief of Naval Staff that July, and the two men agreed to
an informal partnership.4 Within a day or two of the disaster, these two old friends
were able to discuss where the Indians would be operating and where the American
forces could make the best contribution.5
On 28 December 2004, Admiral Fargo established Joint Task Force (JTF) 536, to be set
up in Utapao, Thailand. Thailand was perfect, because the series of six-week-long U.S.-
Thai joint/combined COBRA GOLD exercises had laid the foundation for emergency
cooperation: “Our large multinational exercise that we conduct every year in Thai-
land,” commented Admiral Fargo, “is specifically pointed toward humanitarian assis-
tance, disaster relief and peacekeeping, and of course it brings a large number of the
nations of the region together to work in this same manner. . . . So you can’t point
yourself toward a specific catastrophe like this, but you can put in place the basic train-
ing, the habitual relationships and, as I pointed out, the standard operating procedures
that apply to a wide range of contingencies and crises.”6
While the Marines constructed JTF headquarters from scratch, General Blackman established
three combined support groups, in Medan, Indonesia; Galle, Sri Lanka; and Phuket, Thailand.
Blackman assigned CSG-Indonesia to Brigadier General Christian B. Cowdrey, USMC, of the
3rd Marine Division; and CSG–Sri Lanka to Brigadier General Frank A. Panter, of the 3rd
Force Service Support Group; he absorbed CSG-Thailand into his own III MEF staff.7 On 3
January 2005, the increasing importance of coordinating these efforts with international
partners was reflected in a redesignation of JTF 536 to Combined Support Force (CSF) 536.
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Both PACOM’s and CSF 536’s
“Operating Principles” for
planning Operation UNIFIED
ASSISTANCE (or OUA) were
quite clear and concise: they
included specific goals for
tempo, leadership, unified
action, coordination, priorities,




tance to the governments of
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and other affected nations to mitigate the effects of the
recent earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean. Conduct of operations is in support of
USG [the U.S. government] lead agency [USAID], and in coordination with international
organizations, non-governmental organizations and partner nations.” The CSF 536 mission
statement was similar but further made clear the voluntary nature of the American pres-
ence: “On order, transition U.S. Military HA/DR activities to designated agencies and/or
Host Nations, in order to facilitate continuity of relief and redeployment.”8
To accomplish these tasks expeditiously, CSF 536 had to be prepared to work closely
with both interagency relationships and with the many nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), international organizations, and other groups. These variously included,
but were not limited to, UNICEF, WHO, Save the Children, Medicins Sans Frontières,
and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as well as the
local and international press. The very complexity of these interagency and NGO rela-
tionships (see figure 1 for U.S. interagency relationships) made CSF 536’s task an
extremely sensitive and difficult one.
On 2 January 2005, Brigadier General Panter arrived in Colombo to establish Com-
bined Support Groups–Sri Lanka. He immediately set up a civil-military operations
center, called a combined disaster relief center, in order to facilitate the distribution of
supplies and serve as the “central coordination point” with respect to other external
organizations.9 Two days later, an advance contingent of seventeen Marines landed at
Colombo airport, supported by thirty Air Force communications and technical
experts. Eventually Panter deployed 1,500 troops around Sri Lanka—mainly in the
south, so as to avoid rebel strongholds in the north.10
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During the first week, they helped deliver approximately thirty-one thousand pounds of
food, water, and medicine throughout southern Sri Lanka, mainly by HH-60 (Pave
Hawk) helicopters from the 33rd Rescue Squadron, based in Kadena Air Force Base, on
Okinawa.11 In response to this influx of aid, the Sri Lankan foreign minister, Lakshman
Kadirgamar, said: “I can say honestly and sincerely that the response has been over-
whelming, beyond our expectations.”12
In addition to providing aid, American Seabees and other engineers helped clear dam-
age in Galle, one of Sri Lanka’s seven “world heritage sites.” They demolished two dam-
aged buildings and moved 250 cubic yards of rubble at a women’s college in Galle to
clear space for future construction. These teams also cleared debris at several schools
and at a Sri Lankan army base. “We’ve seen an immediate effect through our efforts,”
said LT Jorge Cuadros, the air detachment officer in charge of Navy Mobile Construc-
tion Battalion 7, from Guam: “Within two days of clearing the demolished schools,
children were back to their classes learning.”13
During the second week, the supplies delivered by U.S. forces increased to fifty thou-
sand pounds as CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters from the 15th Marine Expeditionary
Unit, sent from Iraq, flew a total of thirty-five missions. By week three, the 15th MEU
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had been replaced by Marine Corps and Coast Guard C-130s, and approximately forty
thousand pounds of supplies were being flown into affected areas every day. By the end
of January 2005, over six hundred thousand pounds of HA/DR supplies had been dis-
tributed—146,000 pounds of food, 124,000 pounds of medicine and other supplies,
and 8,500 gallons of water .14 By the middle of January, Lieutenant General Blackman
could optimistically report that the Sri Lankan government was “meeting or exceeding
the minimum needs of internally displaced persons.”15
In Thailand, where the local government officials responded quickly to the disaster, spe-
cific requests for American assistance included a POW-MIA team from the Joint Pris-
oners of War/Missing in Action Accounting Command.16 Meanwhile, the U.S.
government deployed several eight-member forensic analysis teams, each team including
civilian forensic anthropologists, dentists, mortuary affairs experts, and forensic photog-
raphers.17 These groups recorded where victims’ bodies were found, determined their
identity, and organized proper disposal of the remains: “Mortuary Affairs are a special
breed of soldiers,” said Sergeant 1st Class Ronald E. Holliday; “We are trained more so
than the average soldier to deal with the rigors of death.”18
Meanwhile, at the air base at Utapao, U.S. Navy personnel were busy setting up the
main logistics headquarters. According to Commander Russ Thompson, at the begin-
ning there were only three buildings and a handful of people at the headquarters, but
when he left on 6 January 2005 there were “over 900 to 1000 people at the center.”19 Not
only did the airfield at Utapao serve as a major gateway for bringing humanitarian aid
into the theater, but the CSG-Thailand staff in Phuket organized engineering teams to
help with the cleanup. With American assistance, the most serious damage was
repaired quickly, after which Thai military engineers continued to receive support from
American engineering support teams under the auspices of the Joint U.S. Military
Assistance Group.
By 15 January 2005, General Blackman had determined that U.S. assistance was no lon-
ger necessary in Sri Lanka and Thailand, since these countries were “beyond the stop-
the-bleeding phase.” Accordingly, he reported, “The conditions for transition from U.S.
military to host-nation military control of operations in these countries have been
met,” and “within the next week or two” the U.S. military presence in these countries
would “evolve into a more-normal theater-security support posture.”20 On 22 January
CSF 536 concluded operations in Thailand, and a week later, on 28 January, it ended
the humanitarian mission in Sri Lanka. However, the mission in northern Indonesia,
the hardest-hit area of Southeast Asia, was far from over.
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Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE in Indonesia
Because of the almost total destruction experienced in Aceh, sea basing was required.
Admiral Fargo tapped naval assets that were already in the Pacific theater but were not
part of operations in Afghanistan or Iraq, including USS Abraham Lincoln, visiting
Hong Kong, and USS Bonhomme Richard, conducting exercises near Guam. “You’re
never going to have the whole picture right off the bat,” Admiral Fargo later explained,
so it is necessary to “posture for the worst and then ramp up capacity” (see table 1).21
The official CSG-Indonesia headquarters was in Medan, where Marines and naval per-
sonnel could coordinate directly with local authorities, including the governor of Aceh.
But Rear Admiral Douglas Crowder headed the naval force in Indonesia in his capacity as
the commander of Carrier Strike Group 9, the Abraham Lincoln group, which arrived off
the coast of Banda Aceh on 1 January 2005. Because Crowder had the best situational
awareness, he was for all practical purposes in charge of the operation in Indonesia.22
The breadth and complexity of PACOM’s and CSF 536’s goals, the principles under
which UNIFIED ASSISTANCE was to operate, and the diversity of organizations involved
made the sea-basing aspect of the operation particularly challenging. Communications
discussing a possible humanitarian relief mission began to circulate the day after the
Sumatran earthquake and tsunamis. On the night of 27 December Rear Admiral
Crowder received a call from Pacific Command about the assignment. It was confirmed
on the 28th that he and his carrier strike group would head toward Thailand rather
than, as had been planned, to Korea. According to Crowder, this was a groundbreaking
event, because it was a real “emergency surge operation rather than an exercise.”23
During these first few days, the new assignment generated numerous additional
tasks for the strike group staff and the flagship. Captain Raymond Ginetti, navi-
gator of Abraham Lincoln, learned only after leaving Hong Kong that they were
heading for Phuket, Thailand. Current charts for the waters off Thailand had to be
broken out and corrected. Then, on 30 December, as more accurate information on
the scale of the disaster became available, Abraham Lincoln’s destination changed
again, this time to northern Indonesia, requiring further navigational preparations. A
day later, as Abraham Lincoln steamed through the Malacca Strait and along the coast
of Sumatra, the size of the catastrophe became vividly manifest: “bodies could be
seen floating as far as 20 miles out to sea.”24 Abraham Lincoln arrived off the coast of
northern Indonesia on 1 January.25
The bulk of the strike group learned of the mission long after their departure from
Hong Kong, since for some time it was uncertain whether the operation would obtain
Washington’s approval.26 One officer on board first heard about the tsunami disaster
from his wife. At that point, however, most of the early news focused on Thailand; the
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tsunami’s impact on Indonesia did not then seem significant. 27 Only two to three days
later, after departing Hong Kong, the president and the Pentagon having given the
operation a green light, did Rear Admiral Crowder inform the strike group about the
goals and the extent of UNIFIED ASSISTANCE.28
The reaction of the U.S. Navy to the situation was as unconventional as the disas-
ters that struck Southeast Asia had been unexpected. The USAID administrator,
Andrew Natsios, commented, “In all my years in this line of work, I have never
before seen a disaster that affects 12 countries, as this earthquake and tsunami have
done. The velocity and force of the tsunamis that struck communities along the
coast were ferocious. 150,000 or more people are dead. More than 1.5 million peo-
ple are homeless or displaced.”29 However, as soon as the Abraham Lincoln group
left Hong Kong the complicated planning process began, with consideration of
how best to assist countries affected by the earthquake and tsunamis. Only after the
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CARRIER STRIKE GROUP (CSG)
USS Abraham Lincoln
(CVN 72) CSG
USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72)
USS Shiloh (CG 67)
USS Benfold (DDG 65)
USS Shoup (DDG 86)
USS Louisville (SSN 724)
USNS Rainier (T-AOE 7)










EXPEDITIONARY STRIKE GROUP (ESG)
USS Bonhomme Richard
(LHD 6) ESG
USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6)
USS Duluth (LPD 6)
USS Rushmore (LSD 47)
USS Milius (DDG 69)
USS Bunker Hill (CG 52)
USS Thach (FFG 43)
USCGC Munro (WHEC 724)
HMM-165
OTHER U.S. NAVY SHIPS IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS
USS Swift (HSV 2) USNS Watson (T-AKR 310) WestPac Express
MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND SHIPS IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS
USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) MV 1st Lt. Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011) SS Maj. Stephen W. Pless (T-AK 3007)
MV Cpl. Louis J. Hauge Jr. (T-AK 3000) MV Pfc. James Anderson Jr. (T-AK 3002) MV 1st Lt. Alex Bonnyman (T-AK 3003)
USNS 1st Lt. Harry L. Martin (T-AK 3015) USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199) USNS John Ericsson (T-AO 194)
USNS San Jose (T-AFS 7) USNS Mary Sears (T-AGS 65) USNS John McDonnell (T-AGS 51)
USNS Concord (T-AFS 5) USNS Niagara Falls (T-AFS 3)
TABLE 1
List of U.S. Naval Units Active in Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE
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force was formally ordered to assist, of course, could detailed planning for the
actual relief operation begin.
Setting Up the Joint Planning Group
Because local information on the disaster was so unreliable, it was difficult to know in
advance exactly what conditions would be faced. In the meantime, one of the first
things Rear Admiral Crowder did was set up what was known as the Joint Planning
Group (JPG) to coordinate all the elements that make up a humanitarian relief mis-
sion. According to Captain Kevin Campbell, Admiral Crowder’s Assistant Chief of Staff
for Plans, the Joint Planning Group met for the first time on 28 December 2004. Twice
a day, until the ships reached their destination, the JPG met to envision the various
contingencies involved in a humanitarian relief mission. Because guidance from
PACOM was incomplete—the ships had merely been ordered to the general area to
assist—the JPG had to try to take into account the many possibilities that might arise:
“Plans and thoughts included helicopter operations, amphibious ships, everything that
could happen, including what and where.”30
Lieutenant General Blackman later described this process as “planning your family vacation
while you are packing the car”—that is, simultaneously “planning, executing and deploy-
ing.”31 For the planners in Utapao, this included making contact with supporting units in
Singapore, flying advance teams to the mission area to decide how to get supplies from the
carrier to the beach, and determining how to fly C-130s into the worst-hit areas near Banda
Aceh airport.32 Within a few days an Air Force team certified this airfield for C-17 cargo
planes, which could carry almost five times the load of a C-130.33 On 11 January 2005, the
first C-17 landed at Banda Aceh carrying over eighteen thousand pounds of rice, twenty-
two thousand pounds of water, a pickup truck, and floodlights for the airport.34
Meanwhile, CDR Vince Quidachay, director of logistics for the carrier strike group, was
concerned that the force’s logistical train was still heading for Korea. The flagship sent
immediate requests for oilers to refuel the strike group. In effect, the JPG had to reor-
ganize almost overnight a logistics schedule that is normally planned three or four
months in advance.35
One result of the JPG’s insights was that Joint Task Force 536 was changed to Com-
bined Support Forces 536 (CSF 536), in order to allow the naval force to coordinate
directly with all of the regional liaison officers (LNOs). Commander, Carrier Strike
Group 9 would also direct all of the major units in the immediate area, including Air
Force elements operating in support, and naval forces in Indonesia, as well as Com-
mander, Task Force 76 (CTF 76), at White Beach Naval Facility, Okinawa, Japan. This
was certainly “not typical operations for [a] carrier flight group.”36
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Creating Crisis Action Teams
Another of the Joint Planning Group’s first decisions was to create crisis action teams
(CATs) to organize specific aspects of the mission. The CATs assumed responsibility for
many day-to-day activities, including finding qualified personnel to join shore parties
that would be sent into the disaster zones, organizing the teams’ daily work, and keep-
ing statistics. When a helicopter from Abraham Lincoln crash-landed at Banda Aceh
airport, a CAT organized the cleanup and repairs.
The shore parties were staffed by volunteers. The CATs did not take just anybody for this
duty but sought people with relevant experience, such as responding to other natural
disasters, like hurricanes or tornadoes. Very quickly, between 1,300 and 1,400 crew mem-
bers volunteered.37 Many were eager to help rebuild Banda Aceh, “including plumbers,
welders, electricians and other technicians who could help repair infrastructure.”38
Once volunteers had been assessed and those with the required background selected,
doctors prepared them to go ashore. All of the volunteers had to receive new immuni-
zations, including malaria boosters.39 There was also concern that sunscreen and mos-
quito repellent would run short; the CATs had to locate additional supplies. Finally,
every day about two hundred volunteers participated in classes and screening. Training
in the Advance Trauma Lifesupport System and in field conditions was provided dur-
ing the transit for all shore party volunteers.40 Also during this period helicopter pilots
and crews went through their own refresher training courses on cargo handling,
including first aid and CPR refreshers. Meanwhile, maintenance crews modified heli-
copters to carry emergency supplies rather than people. This required removing most
of the passenger seats to make room.41
A final element was cultural training. Indonesia is the world’s largest Islamic nation;
about 88 percent of its 238 million people are Muslims.42 During the transit, the ship’s
chaplain assembled a slide show on what the shore parties might expect, along with a
“culture brief ” on Banda Aceh.43 Cultural training included possible friction points,
and a Muslim sailor on board talked to the volunteers on “how to behave so not to
appear as [an] ugly American.”44 To reduce the likelihood of problems with locals,
some American cultural habits had to change. One female commander assigned to the
USNS Mercy later recalled, “One adjustment was to not make eye contact with men as
women are not considered equals in Banda Aceh. At first, there was an adjustment
period for them to get comfortable with us and for us to get comfortable with them.”45
According to Chaplain Tom Walcott, the air wing chaplain, the CATs also would have to
monitor stress levels arising from working in an area that had experienced widespread
death and destruction. The helicopter crews in particular were to see numerous dead
and injured.46 Lieutenant General Blackman ordered that mental health counseling be
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offered to all service members, and that it be provided “earlier, rather than later.”47
Before leaving Thailand after the contingency, for example, most military personnel
met with a chaplain to discuss their experiences. In Hawaii, Captain James Danner, the
Pacific Fleet and Pacific Command chaplain, continued to provide counseling after the
operation ended.48
The Joint Planning Group’s decision to set up crisis action teams took the best possible
advantage of the transit period: locating suitable volunteers for the shore parties, train-
ing them, giving them all full medical checkups and a cultural awareness course, and
making provision for possible side effects. Later, when relief operation missions began
in Indonesia, the CAT cells were seen “as the admiral’s command center of sorts” and
were the “main POC [point of contact] for those calling in to Strike Group,” including
LNOs, government officials, and others.49
Force Protection and Cultural Fears
Throughout the humanitarian mission, U.S. forces dealt with force protection on an
ongoing basis.50 In Sri Lanka, for example, Marines were careful to stay out of the north
and east, so as to avoid the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; Indian forces were
assigned to work in areas controlled by the guerrillas.51 In Indonesia, to avoid similar
problems with the FreeAcehM ovem ent(the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM), the
U.S. government promised that troops would not set up base camps on Indonesian ter-
ritory but would remain sea based.52 The need for this assurance reflected, in part, deep
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cultural fears among Indonesians, in particular that Christians within the American
military would try to convert them, or that the force was actually planning to stage an
invasion, as Iraq had been invaded the year before. All of these sensitivities were
assuaged by keeping the majority of U.S. forces offshore on board ship.
Nonetheless, it was the ongoing insurgency in Aceh that made force protection a top
priority. A cease-fire had been declared on 27 December, but during early January there
were reports of open fighting between government forces and insurgents from the Free
Aceh Movement, blocking a relief convoy for eight hours.53 Indonesia’s state-run news
agency on 21 January quoted the army’s chief of staff, Ryamizard Ryacudu, as saying
that the army had killed at least 120 rebels in the previous two weeks.54 Force protec-
tion was also made potentially troublesome by the large numbers of refugees. As one
American military civil-affairs officer acknowledged, “Restless refugee-camp males are
the prime breeding ground of some of these insurgencies.”55
In early January 2005, it was reported that members of the Laskar Mujahidin organization
had been sent to Aceh Province in the wake of the disaster. This group had been founded
during the 1990s and was at one point headed by Abu Bakar Bashir, an Islamic cleric who
was in December 2004 on trial as a leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, which had suspected links
to al-Qa‘ida. Laskar Mujahidin’s greatest concern was that the foreigners in Aceh would
attempt to convert Muslims to Christianity. Jundi, one of the Laskar Mujahidin members in
Banda Aceh, declared, however, that his group would not interfere if UNIFIED ASSISTANCE
remained strictly a humanitarian operation: “We are here to help our Muslim brothers. As
long as they are here to help, we will have no problem with them.”56
Amien Rais, the head of Indonesia’s legislative body, took the same view: “If the United
States and Australia act beyond their humanitarian task, then we have to resist. But if
otherwise, we ought to thank them.”57 To help reassure the Indonesians that conversion
was not part of their mission, when the hospital ship USNS Mercy deployed in early
January 2005, it had a Muslim naval chaplain onboard: “We demonstrated that as
Americans we value religious freedom.”58
Fear of conversion attempts was also a major concern for many ordinary Muslims in
Indonesia. Dien Syamsuddin, secretary general of the Indonesian Council of Ulemas,
or religious scholars, warned all “nongovernmental organizations, either domestic or
international, with hidden agendas coming here with humanitarian purposes but
instead proselytizing, this is what we do not like.” He condemned reports that the U.S.-
based WorldHelp had “planned to adopt 300 Acehnese children orphaned by the disas-
ter and raise them in a Christian children’s home.” This group immediately dropped its
proposal when local Muslim groups opposed it.59
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For its part, the Indonesian military had its own concerns about plans to land Marines
from Bonhomme Richard. Positioned off the city of Meulaboh, where only several thou-
sand residents had survived out of an original population of sixty thousand, this ship
had landing craft ready to put about a thousand Marines ashore. This movement was
delayed, however, because it might appear to be an invasion. Aceh Province had been
under the control of the Indonesian military, and it was thought that televised images
of U.S. landing craft heading for the Acehnese coast “could touch a raw nerve with the
proud and suspicious Indonesian military.”60
Finally, on 10 January 2005, a U.S. Navy LCAC—air-cushion landing craft—went
ashore with thirty pallets of food and water. Only a few dozen personnel on Bonhomme
Richard were allowed to go ashore each day. Also, instead of driving vehicles themselves
to deliver aid—and risking traffic accidents that might spark anti-American anger, as
had happened in places like South Korea—the Marines left final distribution of the
supplies mainly to the Indonesian military.61
Some Indonesians were suspicious of American surveying and reconnaissance mis-
sions. Captain B. Junair, an Indonesian helicopter pilot, was skeptical about the true
motives behind these missions, in which P-3 Orion reconnaissance planes flew from
bases in Thailand to photograph large swaths of Aceh. American officers explained that
the aircraft were mapping the destruction of roads and bridges, and using infrared sen-
sors to locate refugees in the mountains. But Captain Junair was suspicious that such
information could be equally useful during a military invasion: “That will be helpful
for them in the future.”62
It would not be an understatement to say that many Indonesians were nervous at
the Americans’ arrival. Ariso Agus, a thirty-six-year-old construction worker, said,
“We have some concerns. I don’t agree with the American occupation of Iraq. And
I don’t agree with American morals, like men and women sleeping together in the
same bed. We don’t want any of that. . . . If the Americans are coming, they shouldn’t
stay long.”63 However, Zulbahri, thirty-eight, a carpenter in Banda Aceh who had
lost his wife and three sons, appreciated help from abroad: “We are here in difficul-
ties. If the U.S. comes, it is good. But please don’t bring any other interests like reli-
gion and politics.”64
* * * * * * *
Given the ever-present force protection and cultural concerns, the U.S. Navy’s ability to
remain offshore of Aceh on sea bases decreased the American footprint, reduced fric-
tion, and so greatly facilitated achieving the mission’s objectives. Sea basing helped
eliminate unwanted accidents or incidents, even as U.S. Navy assets off Indonesia
relayed ashore over four hundred thousand gallons of fresh water, over ten million
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pounds of food and supplies, and the treatment of thousands of patients.65 This sea-
based operation proved to be especially successful in fostering unparalleled coopera-
tion between Christians and Muslims.
While American military forces remained at sea, American civilians worked on land. To
support the sea-based capabilities provided by Abraham Lincoln and its strike group,
USAID mobilized its civilian staff of 150, including members of the Office of U.S. For-
eign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), to cooperate with the U.S. military. Army colonel Doug
Wallace, a civil affairs officer assigned to the Combined Support Force 536, explained that
while the mainly civilian OFDA specialists had the local expertise and so could handle the
land component, the military could offer “depth of staff, and planning, logistical and
communications capabilities” at sea, which is why a “close working relationship between
OFDA and the military is typical during humanitarian relief operations.”66
This teaming of civilian experts with the military made possible the rapid delivery of life-
and-death aid to Aceh Province. It was arguably the first practical use for civilian pur-
poses of a strategic concept—sea basing—that had originally been created for military
purposes. U.S. Navy assets off Indonesia supported the delivery of fresh water, food, and
medicine. In early February 2005, when the USS Abraham Lincoln and Bonhomme Rich-
ard redeployed, they were replaced by the USNS Mercy, supported by helicopters working
off USS Essex (LHD 2) and LCACs from the dock landing ship Fort McHenry (LSD 43).
As this operation proved, sea basing’s greatest single advantage lay in coordinating
throughout the operation the enormous logistical flow into the affected areas.
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Replenishment and Sustainability Issues
Logistics as Leverage
The U.S. Military there has been the backbone of the logistical opera-
tions providing assistance to all afflicted after the disaster.
JUWONO SUDARSONO, MINISTER OF DEFENSE,
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, 16 JANUARY 2005
Sea bases provided enormous logistical capabilities, the power and utility of which
immediately became apparent in Aceh Province, where much of the road system had
become impassable.1 A study of Operation SEA ANGEL in Bangladesh during May
1991 referred to the U.S. Navy’s supply system as “logistical leverage.”2 In Indonesia,
sea-based U.S. Navy ships leveraged their capabilities as logistical hubs, providing
substantial supplies from their own stores as well as coordinating delivery by special-
ized supply ships and cargo planes directly to Banda Aceh airport and to other tem-
porary points of distribution.
Sea basing’s logistical leverage was magnified by the fact that tsunamis followed on the
heels of the earthquake. This meant that while the low-lying areas were hit with waves,
many mountainous regions had already suffered earthquake damage. In some areas of
Aceh Province, the earthquake destroyed over 70 percent of the bridges and collapsed
large sections of roadway. Such widespread damage posed a major logistical challenge
to relief efforts and hampered the entire region’s economic recovery.
Logistical supplies destined for Banda Aceh came from a variety of places, including
U.S. Navy ships, vessels of U.S. Transportation Command’s Military Sealift Command
(MSC), Air Force C-130s, C-5s, and C-17s from Utapao and Singapore; USAID; dozens
of countries; NGOs; and the Indonesian government. No matter where supplies came
from, however, it was generally the sea-based U.S. Navy ships that became responsible
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Onboard Stores
One of the best early sources of supplies was the ships themselves. As soon as the USS
Abraham Lincoln arrived off northern Indonesia, sailors stacked fresh water, protein
drinks, and bags of rice on helicopters to be flown to shore.3 The carrier itself produced
in its distilling plants up to eight hundred five-gallon jugs of fresh water per hour.4 To
maximize the amount of fresh water available to tsunami victims, sailors cut their
water usage, reportedly even forgoing showers.5
When it came to logistics, “flexibility was the key to supporting the needs of the mis-
sion.” Abraham Lincoln spent well over $150,000 from its operational funds to renew
its rapidly depleting stores. For example, the ship soon ran low on bottled water and
fresh food, as well as fresh linens, pillows, and cots, all of which were needed to
house official guests, representatives from NGOs, and the press. Also, every day
throughout most of January 2005 the galley staff had to make over five hundred box
lunches for the shore parties alone.6
Meanwhile, when the USS Bonhomme Richard stopped in Guam on its way to Indone-
sia, its supply personnel purchased necessities at a local hardware store: “The mission
began when Marines went into Ace Hardware—an American do-it-yourself chain—
near the U.S. naval base on the Pacific island of Guam and bought more than £50,000
worth of timber, plastic sheeting and other supplies on a credit card.”7 Within half a
day, the supplies had been trucked back to the ship and loaded aboard.
Onboard medical supplies, however, were not specifically intended for a natural disas-
ter. When in early January the USNS Mercy was quickly loaded in San Diego with three
hundred pallets of supplies, it all had to be inventoried, pallet by pallet, so the supply
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clerks could check with the Medical Department to determine what was missing. How-
ever, since nobody knew exactly what the mission would entail, even the Medical
Department did not know what it might need to accomplish the as “yet to be deter-
mined mission.”8
A second medical problem was the short shelf life of blood, plasma, and immuniza-
tions. Such medicines had to be purchased, shipped, and stored. Timing when to order
those types of medical supplies was critical, however, since they might otherwise be
wasted. The type and length of the impending HA/DR mission were unknown, so the
quantity of different medicines that might be needed could only be guessed at.9
Finally, there was the problem of having the right supplies on hand at the right time.
The biggest challenge was that Mercy’s normal medical inventory was intended mainly
for combat scenarios; there were no, for example, pediatric or geriatric medicines.
Since Mercy’s pharmaceutical supplies were primarily tailored for trauma, the ship had
to order specialized HA/DR pharmaceuticals, including strong antibiotics for treat-
ment of “tsunami lung,” an aspiration pneumonia due to bacterial or fungal infection.10
Such special-purpose medical supplies were ordered and stocked on the basis of the
best information available, and later additional supplies were loaded at Guam.
Over the course of its mission in Indonesia, Mercy received and processed over 1,800
additional pallets of supplies.11 Although it was a challenge to switch so quickly from
trauma care to a humanitarian mission, in the end the ship adapted and utilized its
own medical supply inventory while effectively ordering, receiving, and consuming
enormous quantities of additional medical supplies during the deployment.12
The Military Sealift Command Lends a Hand
The U.S. Transportation Command quickly authorized the MSC to send ships to the
scene of the disaster. According to Brigadier General Paul J. Selva, TransCom’s opera-
tions director, it was the “biggest natural disaster response in the command’s history.”13
Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron 3 provided six of its thirteen ships. MV 1st Lt.
Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011), SS Maj. Stephen W. Pless (T-AK 3007), MV Cpl. Louis J.
Hauge Jr. (T-AK 3000), MV Pfc. James Anderson Jr. (T-AK 3003), and MV 1st Lt. Alex
Bonnyman (T-AK 3003) sailed from Guam, while USNS 1st Lt. Harry L. Martin (T-AK
3015) sailed from Korea.14
To provide food and fuel to the sea-based ships, the MSC also sent two oilers, USNS
Tippecanoe (T-AO 199) and John Ericsson (T-AO 194); one combat stores ship, USNS
San Jose (T-AFS 7); and one fast combat support ship, USNS Rainier (T-AOE 7). Later,
the large roll-on sealift ship USNS Watson (T-AKR 310) deployed to Sri Lanka to pro-
vide support, while WestPac Express, a high-speed vessel, departed Okinawa under
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charter on 5 January 2005, carrying supplies to Thailand; it was designated as the “III
MEF standby delivery vessel.”15 Finally, HSV-2 Swift, a second high-speed chartered ves-
sel, left Ingleside, Texas, on 3 January, arriving in Southeast Asia late that month.16
For the next three months, MSC ships like San Jose acted as a “sea base for HA/DR
material and a key logistical link” for the Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group, as well
as the Bonhomme Richard expeditionary strike group, and replenished at sea the French
frigate Georges Leygues (D640) and the Australian amphibious ship HMAS Kanimbla
(L-51). San Jose was also the last T-AFS on station at the end of the operation, provid-
ing helicopter and supply support to Mercy.17
During the next two months, San Jose delivered over two thousand pallets of provi-
sions, mail, repair parts, and other essential supplies to ships that were involved in this
operation. Another seven hundred pallets of HA/DR materials, including food, water,
and medicines donated by Project Hand-Clasp, were cross-decked to other ships to be
transferred ashore or were taken directly ashore by San Jose’s two MH-60 helicopters.
Additionally, over two hundred helicopter sorties were flown from San Jose to Banda Aceh
and other hard-hit coastal areas, transporting hundreds of passengers, including aid work-
ers, Mercy medical teams, and patients. Commander Tae Lee was to recall that “although
most of us did not get to see the people we were helping, we were nevertheless highly moti-
vated because we realized that each HA/DR pallet coming off our deck provided a lifeline to
those who were in desperate need . . . and that in itself is reward enough.”18
Lastly, two MSC oceanographic ships were initially ordered to conduct hydrographic
surveys of the ocean bottom where the 9.0-plus-magnitude earthquake had occurred.
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American and Indonesian armed forces personnel transferring supplies to a
waiting U.S. Navy helicopter.
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USNS Mary Sears (T-AGS 65) and John McDonnell (T-AGS 51) sailed from Sasebo,
Japan, for that purpose. When Mary Sears returned to regular duties, John McDonnell
remained and continued to survey near the affected area.
Thailand and Singapore as Logistical Hubs
In addition to supplies delivered by ship, many early supplies delivered to Banda Aceh
came by air, via the airfield Utapao, where work parties set up in a soccer field adjacent to
the main airstrip.19 For supplies delivered by sea, Singapore played an especially impor-
tant role, processing millions of pounds of materials. The U.S. government’s strong rela-
tions with Thailand and Singapore proved critical to the success of the mission.
In Utapao, there were initially only a couple of old buildings to work from. However,
as described by Lieutenant Commander Scott Murdock, it was “amazing to watch
Marines build up Camp Red Horse, from Vietnam area when Navy [sic] had a base
there.” On 1 January 2005 there were less than a hundred people on the base, but for
the next month it never stopped growing. Eventually, Camp Red Horse had its own
SIPR (classified Internet) “café,” complete video-teleconference facilities, and other
necessary communications equipment.20
Much of the aid shipped by water originated in Singapore. The Logistics Group West-
ern Pacific and the Naval Regional Contracting Center Singapore were in charge of
moving HA/DR supplies to sea-based ships. Rear Admiral Kevin Quinn, Commander,
Logistics Group Western Pacific, would recall: “My goal was to rapidly establish a logis-
tics capability that allows us to process much larger volumes of cargo than we normally
do.” During the first two weeks of the operation, about two million pounds of cargo
were processed in Singapore alone.21
As the main provider of Navy logistics throughout Southeast Asia, Singapore already had
a robust at-sea logistics capability, augmented by logistics and operations experts and
assisted by specialists from the MSC and the Naval Oceanographic Office. Because their
focus was resupplying U.S. Navy ships at sea, humanitarian assistance intended for tsu-
nami victims could most quickly flow from Singapore to ships and then be flown by heli-
copter to Indonesia. During the first days of the crisis the Logistics Group Western Pacific
began to analyze ways to move supplies directly to such countries as Indonesia and Sri
Lanka, as well as by means of the Abraham Lincoln and Bonhomme Richard groups.
Within days, representatives from all the military commands in Singapore, as well as
experts from a variety of agencies, including the Defense Logistics Agency’s Emergency
Supply Operations Center, Naval Expeditionary Logistics Support Force, and the Fleet
and Industrial Supply Center, began meeting to coordinate their logistical needs.
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One early decision was that the Naval Regional Contracting Center would begin pur-
chasing in Singapore more than $250,000 in relief supplies, including bottled water,
food, and medicine. Many of these supplies were loaded onto MSC supply ships, passed
on to the Abraham Lincoln strike group, and then delivered by helicopter directly to the
worst disaster areas. All of these supplies were delivered in conjunction with, and in
addition to, the ships’ normal replenishment needs. As Quinn noted, “It’s a very effi-
cient way of doing business.”22
Meanwhile, the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center provided manpower to assist with
the logistics operation. According to Rear Admiral William Kowba, commanding the
Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers, “Our FISCs were uniquely positioned and
equipped for this humanitarian mission. We have a global presence and a trained team
of military and civilian logistics professionals. The dedication and hard work displayed
by our team at FISC San Diego, FISC Pearl Harbor and its detachment in Guam, and
our forward FISC in Yokosuka, validated the COMFISCS vision.”23
Through mid-January 2005, more than two thousand pallets of relief supplies were
loaded in Singapore onto USNS Concord (T-AFS 5), San Jose, and Niagara Falls
(T-AFS 3), as well as the fleet replenishment oiler Tippecanoe, for delivery to the
frontline ships. Captain David Fitzgerald, the Naval Regional Contracting Center’s
commanding officer, said at the time, “It’s been an all-hands effort from our military,
civilian and host nation staff,” purchasing relief supplies, storing them, inventorying,
and then moving supplies to the ships and aircraft that would deliver them to the
areas in need.24
Singapore was also designated the regional mail center for the operation. In addi-
tion to U.S. government supplies, individuals could also help, through the regular
mail service. For example, a volunteer on the USNS Mercy asked a local doctor
what he needed and immediately e-mailed the list to his wife back in the United
States, who bought the items and put them in the mail.25 The volume of mail sky-
rocketed from a norm of about ten thousand pounds of mail per fleet delivery to
forty thousand. Singapore’s post office staff of four quickly grew to fifteen. Early in
the operation the carrier USS Kitty Hawk provided four carrier onboard-delivery
aircraft to deliver supplies, mail, and personnel directly to Abraham Lincoln.26
Engineering and Rebuilding
While other U.S. services were delivering supplies, Seabees and the Army Corps of
Engineers began the task of rebuilding basic infrastructure—roads, bridges, docks, and
water, sewerage, and electrical services—which would help the local economy and mar-
kets to recover. Of the $950 million in aid that would eventually be pledged by the
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United States, more than a third—$339 million—was “devoted to constructing roads,
schools, water-distribution systems and other projects.”27
Early in the mission, engineers on Abraham Lincoln responded to unusual logistical
demands by designing a water manifold that filled containers automatically. Overnight,
ship’s technicians built a prototype that could fill seven to eight hundred five-gallon jugs
per hour. Several other units were quickly built and given to other ships.28 As Captain Ray-
mond Ginetti put it, in Iraq the “bombs stacked up. . . . [H]ere the water stacked up.”29
Relief efforts were hampered by the widespread destruction of roads, ports, and air-
fields, particularly in northern Sumatra: “There is nothing left, to speak of,” said Lieu-
tenant Commander Jeff Vorce: “Villages, one after the next, were obliterated. Concrete
foundations were all that remained of most structures. Only a few mosques remained
intact, surrounded by wasteland. Thousands of emerald green rice paddies had been
peeled away, replaced by fetid swamps, mangled tree trunks and sea slime.”30 According
to Senior Chief Jesse Cash: “In my 17 years of service, I have never seen such devasta-
tion, and I hope that I’ll never see such again in my life.” In Lam Jamek, road condi-
tions were so poor that refugees used an elephant to pull a car to Banda Aceh.31 For
such reasons the roads and airports in northern Sumatra could not keep up with the
logistical demands. To the south of Banda Aceh, in Medan, a virtual mountain of rice,
instant noodles, and crackers sat waiting on the airfield, their delivery hampered by the
small size of the airport and limited infrastructure, as well as by poor coordination and
communications. Major Dwight Neeley, USMC, could only scratch his head when he
saw a C-130 land at the adjacent commercial airport, far from the cargo and supply
dumps at the military base: “This is the kind of stuff we have to deal with.”32
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By late January Martin Unternahrer, spokesman of the International Committee of the
Red Cross, reported that Red Cross ships were on their way to Indonesia, where they
would begin to bring supplies to tsunami victims. According to Col. Mark Schissler,
commander of the Air Force forces forward and the expeditionary wing commander,
the transition from the military to the Red Cross would be delicate: “The further from
the crisis you get, you want to be more deliberate about how you distribute. They need
to be fed systematically. [And] you have to support local markets.”33 Trevor Rowe,
spokesman for the UN World Food Program, emphasized the point: “The important
thing is that the United States military was right there at the beginning and made a
huge difference. They had the logistical prowess . . . and without that we would not
have been able to distribute to the remote areas.”34
The engineering and repair work by ship’s crew members helped to reopen Aceh Prov-
ince’s transportation system and commercial networks. As the mission passed the criti-
cal stage, local governments could once again undertake the task of rebuilding their
own infrastructure, with UN support. Supplies were once again flowing normally into
the area. To help people rebuild their lives, it was crucial for the region’s long-range
recovery that distribution of the goods be assumed by local markets.
Accidents and Logistical Bottlenecks
Senior Pentagon and military officials were especially concerned “to open up logistical
bottlenecks and begin ferrying water, food, medical supplies and shelter.”35 Accordingly,
a great many ships, people, and fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters moved supplies.
Accidents were inevitable, and when something went wrong it could all too easily shut
down the logistical flow. At least one fixed-wing airplane and one helicopter crashed
during UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, and on both occasions only rapid response on the part of
sailors and Marines kept the supply lines open.
One example of a potential logistics nightmare was the crash of a Tri-MG Boeing
737 into a water buffalo while landing at the Banda Aceh airport. Salvage engineers
immediately contacted Boeing representatives, but the derelict plane had shut the
airport down, and no further humanitarian supplies could be shipped in until it
was moved.36 The accident happened at night; early the next morning crewmen from
Abraham Lincoln were flown in by helicopter to try to help move the Boeing off the
airstrip. Their biggest problem was that none of the airport equipment could lift
something so heavy. A UN-provided forklift was rated at thirty tons, but the aircraft
weighed almost 150. Using a truck to drag the Boeing, two forklifts to steady it, and
an airbag set that had been flown in from Singapore, the team from Abraham Lincoln
finally managed to “crib” the plane off the runway. In the end, this task proved to be
truly international; all the represented nations had to work together. As soon as the
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salvage teams had cleared the tarmac civilian aircraft started warming up, and twenty
minutes later they began to take off.
The entire operation, once all necessary equipment had been assembled, lasted from
three o’clock in the afternoon to 5:30, and by 6:40 the crews had managed to return to
their ships in time for dinner. Since the Banda Aceh airport was the sole aerial port of
debarkation, if the team had not been able to move the airplane by evening, no supplies
could have come in that night. An American military spokesman, Captain Matt Klunder,
told CNN, “Fortunately we had enough aid and supply gear that we were not set back,
[but] tomorrow would have been an horrendous problem.”37 As three members of the
Abraham Lincoln crew later recalled, “Using a motley collection of equipment—including
an aircraft tractor, two forklifts, and a specialized dolly—they removed the airplane from
the runway, reopening the sole lifeline of relief supplies into the region.”38
Another logistical problem was the helicopter fleet itself, which grew to fifty-eight dur-
ing the course of the operation. The aircraft were kept flying almost constantly, often
loaded to capacity with personnel and supplies.39 There was only one serious helicopter
mishap, however: a SH-60 helicopter that crashed in a rice paddy adjacent to the air-
port at Banda Aceh.40 When the crash occurred, on 11 January 2005 at 7:15 AM, hun-
dreds of people, including crew members from the first C-17 to land at Banda Aceh
airport that day, went running through the paddy to the downed chopper.41 According
to Captain Jeremy Boyd, thirty-three, a pilot of a KC-135R refueling craft and one of
the first on the scene, a team of Australian medics even scaled a barbed-wire fence:
“The Aussies did an outstanding job, really fast.”42
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After landing at Banda Aceh airport, cargo planes unloading at adjacent aid station.
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A medevac team was immediately called in. No serious injuries had been sustained by
the ten passengers and crew, but the helicopter was a total loss.43 Helicopter pilots and
crew took such occurrences in stride. According to Air Force master sergeant Richard
Inman, forty, of Ithaca, New York, “The U.S. military is in the business of taking risks
and that’s one of them. It’s an important operation bringing relief to hundreds of
thousands of people.”44 Later, a board investigated the crash and determined that it had
been due to a tail-rotor malfunction.45
Like the Boeing accident, the helicopter incident could have delayed supplies for days,
since all airport operations had to be suspended.46 The wreckage had to be recovered
rapidly. Special salvage teams from Abraham Lincoln and Bonhomme Richard were sent
to the site. First, the salvage team had to right the aircraft. Bonhomme Richard sent a
Marine recovery team to do so; one Marine volunteer completely submerged himself in
the mud to wrap a rope around the helicopter’s tail. Meanwhile, members of the
Abraham Lincoln crew made a helicopter sling, similar to those the Army used for
recovering downed Blackhawks. Once the wrecked helicopter was upright and the sling
put on, another helicopter picked it up and moved it to dry land, where it was reslung
for the longer flight back to the ship.
Both of these accidents were relatively minor—remarkably so, considering the magni-
tude of the relief operation—but if not quickly resolved they might have produced
logistical bottlenecks. That this did not happen was mainly due to the rapid response
by U.S. military personnel. In both cases, once the wreckage was cleared away the air-
field at Banda Aceh quickly resumed operations. Logistical lines were reestablished, and
humanitarian supplies once again began to flow.
* * * * * * *
Throughout UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, the movement of supplies was the highest priority,
with U.S. Navy ships and MSC prepositioned ships providing the first wave of water,
food, and medicine. The air links from Utapao and air and sea links from Singapore
came next; fixed-wing cargo aircraft, including C-130s, C-17s, and C-5s, flew 1,300-
plus missions into the affected regions.47 During this period, the movement of supplies
was largely organized by Abraham Lincoln.48 According to Lieutenant Commander
Michael Hsu, “planning was for all militaries,” but in this case “Lincoln had control.”49
It was especially important to coordinate relief efforts with groups ashore. Every eve-
ning at seven o’clock a person from Abraham Lincoln attended a two-hour meeting to
determine what supplies were needed and where they had to go on the following
day.50 Every morning on board the carrier the day’s flight schedule was distributed
outlining the whole day. Once everyone was in place, they started “to fly as many
missions as was possible.”51
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Planned goals were often exceeded, after which operations became more like “freelanc-
ing.”52 As a result, Rear Admiral Crowder directed that execution be totally decentralized
and empowered people to make decisions on the spot. In essence, he gave his crew a job
and charged them to do it as “safely as possible.”53 Crowder’s hands-off methods worked
especially well when combined with the flexibility provided by helicopter-assisted access.
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U.S. Navy On-Site Delivery
Helicopter-Assisted Access
Helicopters are invaluable, especially helicopters coming in from the sea,
where they can be refueled and resupplied out on our carriers, and are
not taking up space at airfields or putting a logistics base at airfields.
COLIN POWELL, U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, 3 JANUARY 2005
Sea basing proved essential both to organize and later to coordinate the arrival of
humanitarian supplies.1 However, as Rear Admiral Crowder acknowledged, no matter
where the supplies came from, “Helicopters provided [the] last link in the chain as the
only way to get the supplies to those in need.” When the helicopters went inland, they
would first locate survivors. Landing on an undamaged section of road or in what was
left of a village square, they would hand out supplies as quickly as possible before being
completely swamped by people. Five or six days after the tsunami, some of the victims
had become so desperate that they would rush even airborne helicopters.2
As later events would show, the sequencing of the arrival of warships proved ex-
tremely important, with Abraham Lincoln arriving first, followed several days later by
Bonhomme Richard, and later still by Essex. The crew of Abraham Lincoln was most
concerned with providing immediate aid, especially food and water, in the hardest-hit
areas of Aceh Province, leaving Bonhomme Richard and Essex to focus on the most effi-
cient dispersal of supplies.3 The exact methods utilized to make deliveries were gener-
ally left to those on the spot.4 But as Rear Admiral Crowder explained, because so many
bridges had been destroyed and many major roads were impassible, the “missing ele-
ment” was what Abraham Lincoln could provide—helicopters.5
In addition to the cooperation of all the ships under the commanders embarked respec-
tively on board Abraham Lincoln, Bonhomme Richard, and Essex, the mission in northern
Sumatra also required coordination with civil affairs groups (CAGs) in Indonesia, a flow
of materials through Thailand and Singapore, and on-site, day-to-day, sea-based com-












Tuesday, January 23, 2007 3:09:02 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
importantly, it required direct air access from the ships to the shore, which was made
possible only by the fact that Abraham Lincoln was carrying extra Seahawk helicopters.
The B2C Helicopter Program
Abraham Lincoln had been involved in a proof-of-concept program, known as “Bravo
to Sea,” or B2C, designed to improve the integration of helicopters into carrier flight
operations. As a result, the carrier had an unusually large number of helicopters on
board. Its helicopter crews were largely integrated into the air wing and had received
additional flight training in carrier operations.6 The program was part of Navywide
preparations for a rotary-wing operational reorganization.7 In September 2004, three
months before the tsunami disaster, technicians had tested Abraham Lincoln for static
electricity discharges that could adversely affect helicopters during refueling. In early
December 2004, further tests helped the refueling needs of the additional helicopters.
Abraham Lincoln was the first carrier strike group to deploy with a light helicopter
antisubmarine squadron, HSL-47, with eight capable H-60 Seahawks in its air wing.
This was more HSL aircraft than in “any other strike group prior to this.”8 By using
helicopters intead of S-3 tankers as antisubmarine warfare platforms, the ship “went
from 7 to 17 helicopters. OUA made it a perfect match.”9
After the tsunamis hit, the Indonesian government had only two helicopters on the
entire island of Sumatra.10 Later, the USS Bonhomme Richard brought another twenty-
five helicopters, including CH-53s and CH-46s. Air Force C-17s also quickly delivered
six HH-60 helicopters and two more CH-46 helicopters.
As UNIFIED ASSISTANCE continued, it became clear that “Lincoln Strike Group was per-
fect for this mission as extra helicopters and pilots were embarked.”11 Indonesian mili-
tary spokesman Ahmad Yani Basuki complimented the helicopter access: “They’ve
helped us reach places we have not had the time, or manpower, or equipment to go to.
It really speeds up the distribution of aid.”12
Aceh Province
The geography of northern Sumatra made sea basing, forward sea-based logistics, and
especially helicopter access crucial. The earthquake and tsunami damage was most
extreme in this region, since it had been closest to the seismic epicenter. The loss of
communications between the rural areas and the capital at Banda Aceh was almost
total, and for several days there were no reports. All of the land routes were damaged,
and many were completely impassable; the survivors could be assisted only by air. Fur-
ther, air access from the sea proved particularly useful, since along Aceh Province’s
northwestern shoreline is a largely impassable mountain range. Only a single north-
south road served the entire coastline from the northern tip to the coastal city of
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Meulaboh, where a small road cut east across mountains to the larger city of Medan.
When the earthquake and tsunamis almost completely destroyed the coastal road, over
a hundred miles of coastline were cut off from the interior.13
Even before Abraham Lincoln arrived, Rear Admiral Crowder had ordered his Civil
Affairs Group to coordinate with the Indonesian authorities. Once the ship reached
Banda Aceh, the group was the first on the ground, making contact with local govern-
ment officials. The governor of Aceh Province was supposed to be in touch with local
representatives in Banda Aceh, but in practice communications were poor, and “heli-
copters arrived with no one to unload the supplies.” Eventually, Indonesian general
Bambang Darmono ended up personally coordinating the effort, “so things started get-
ting done in a way that was constructive.”14 Meanwhile, Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe and
the American embassy in Jakarta became an important “hub of all information,” and
were responsible for direct coordination with the Indonesian government.15
The first helicopter-related mission facing Abraham Lincoln entailed scouting out the
area and linking up with the local and other foreign aid workers. Commander Ted
Williams, a fixed-wing pilot, became liaison officer to the foreign aid providers.
Beginning on 1 January 2005, for example, he worked with Australians at Banda Aceh
airport to overcome difficulties delivering supplies from an Australian C-130 to
W A V E S O F H O P E 5 7
Improvised landing zone at Kreung Raya, Aceh Province.
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outlying areas.16 Over time the number of foreign nations represented increased, mak-
ing liaison work more and more important.
The first day of the mission was perhaps the busiest: locating appropriate landing
zones, determining how many boxes could be carried on each flight, and setting up the
landing zones. In order to ensure a rapid learning curve, the same officer and crew
remained together throughout this ramp-up phase.17 As Commander Dan Boyles
recalled, “With all the devastation, the mosques appeared to be the only thing left
standing.”18 Therefore, mosques often became the focus for helicopters trying to find
landing sites to distribute water and food, although sports fields, sections of roadway,
dry fields, and even concrete home foundations were used as landing sites.19
It was important that the mission be both joint and combined, and that Indonesian
representatives be acknowledged clearly as in charge. When flying into a new area, each
helicopter would take a member of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia, the Indonesian
military, and leave him to organize survivors to unload supplies.20 There was a con-
scious effort to make even loading supplies onto helicopters ashore a combined effort.
Boxes would be passed down a long line like fire buckets, with the men positioned by
nationality, “one Indonesian soldier, then one American.”21
Efficient distribution also required understanding the local geography. Each evening
the Indonesian officials in Banda Aceh created and distributed an air tasking order list-
ing supplies and passengers to be moved, the numbers and types of helicopters needed
for particular tasks, and the landing locations. Often the landing points were described
only by latitude and longitude; sometimes pilots would report, “That location is
underwater,” so enormous had been the topographical changes caused by the disaster.22
Developing a New Flight Routine
Every morning at sunrise the Seahawks took off from the carrier with shore teams for
Banda Aceh, returning only to refuel or swap crews, which they were required to do
every eight hours. Most of the day the helicopters were kept busy flying supplies to out-
lying areas, picking up stragglers on the return trips and flying them directly to Banda
Aceh. According to Lieutenant Scott Cohick, one of the Seahawk pilots, the damage was
overwhelming: “You see these places that used to be villages. And now there’s only a
mosque and lines that used to be streets.”23
The first supply helicopter mission from Abraham Lincoln took place on 2 January 2005.
In response to the “desperation on faces of survivors,” one helicopter squadron increased
its flight tempo, flying “4 missions first day, then flew all aircraft until they couldn’t be
flown any more.” Hangar crews had to work especially hard to keep the helicopters func-
tioning properly; Commander Michael Horan, commanding Helicopter Antisubmarine
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Squadron 2, commented in particular on the “herculean effort from maintenance
crews.”24 According to Commander Jon Ross, this meant that everyone worked three-day
rotations, amounting in practice to little more than “organized chaos.”25
Helicopter pilots later recounted both the joys and the difficulties of this new flight
schedule. Commander Boyles flew about seventy hours total, while the air wing
accounted for 1,200 hours of flying time, equivalent to the flight time in the first three
months of a normal deployment. For many, however, it was a dream come true: Boyles
considered the relief mission the “most fun flying in 18 years, no rules . . . no airspace
issues, only our own aircraft deconfliction. License to fly within safety limits of plane.”26
It was not all fun and games, however. Crowds often rushed the helicopters as they
landed, and if the helicopter crews were not careful, men would overpower women and
children to get to the food and water.27 During aid drops in Lamno and Calang, villag-
ers swarmed the helicopter, forcing the pilot and crew to dump the boxes of aid as fast
they could: “We have to close the windows or they’ll climb through them. They’ll come
right in. They’ll climb on the helicopter.”28 According to Commander Boyles, the dan-
gers of landing near desperate refugees caused the missions to be changed; helicopters
began to fly to areas with fewer people “but more crowd control.”29 Communications
with refugees was initially difficult, because there were not enough translators to
explain the dangers of helicopters.30 Later, local translators were assigned by the
Indonesian government to fly with each helicopter. They used large cardboard placards
to warn refugees away from the rotor blade dangers.31 The translators would also tell
the crowds to back away so that the helicopter could land safely.32
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The delivery of fresh water remained one of the highest priorities throughout the oper-
ation. Food can be packaged and dropped from the air, but water, because of its weight,
cannot be without bursting its containers. But food without water merely leads to
dehydration, so the helicopters had to transport both. Helicopter crews would set aside
boxes of bottled water in case they ran across isolated refugees. If they did, they would
land at the next suitable location, fly back to the refugees, and direct them to where the
water had been placed.33
To begin with, the helicopter crews carried whatever food rations the ship had to spare.
As the logistical train from Utapao and Singapore became more reliable, requests for
types of food became more specific. For example, the Indonesians politely declined
Abraham Lincoln’s offer of canned fish, probably because it was packed in unfamiliar
oils or tomato paste and so was considered difficult to incorporate into the locals’ regu-
lar diet. In any case, within a couple of days of the tsunami fishermen were once again
going out to sea and fresh fish became more widely available.34
As soon as the mission got well under way, the airport at Banda Aceh became a primary
hub of the relief operations ashore. Fixed-wing aircraft, including C-130s and C-17s,
would bring in supplies, which would then be offloaded into waiting trucks. Trucks
transported the supplies to the helicopter landing zones, where “lines of sailors trans-
ferred supplies from trucks into waiting helicopters as the pilots determined the maxi-
mum cargo they could carry to their assigned destinations.”35
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Helicopters were not initially allowed to pick up refugees; the Indonesian government
wanted to keep additional injured out of the overcrowded capital. But early in the
operation pilots began to disregard the government demand not to rescue injured vil-
lagers.36 Locating and airlifting injured Indonesians to the hospital at Banda Aceh
became an important task of helicopter pilots and their crews. To prevent overloading
the civilian facilities, however, a field station staffed by Navy medical personnel was
hastily set up at the airport. Triage separated those who needed to be transferred to
hospitals.37 One injured boy brought in by helicopter was vomiting sand, proof that he
had been submerged for an extended period. Lieutenant Lisa Peterson, a doctor from
Abraham Lincoln, reported, “We are seeing a lot of broken legs, a lot of lacerations, a lot
of pneumonia from all the salt water—about three quarters of the patients have pneu-
monia, among other things.”38
Sea-based helicopters proved absolutely crucial in delivering humanitarian supplies
and moving injured people to hospitals. Helicopters were the only way to move sup-
plies efficiently from the logistical ports of entry at Banda Aceh and Meulaboh to the
“more than 60 villages and camps of displaced persons along the coast.” In the early
stages of the operation, these tasks fell primarily on Abraham Lincoln’s seventeen heli-
copters: “While only a few of these aircraft were specifically designed for logistics, they
served capably in their life-saving role.”39
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The Impact of Air Access on the Media and NGOs
Sea basing and helicopter access helped the media and international aid groups carry out
their work in northern Indonesia. Abraham Lincoln prepared in advance to receive the
press, having an additional public affairs officer (PAO) assigned temporarily from the
carrier USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) to assist.40 This PAO explained the process of working
with the media and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and helped delegate their
representatives to particular helicopters. The arrival of the media in particular could not
help but affect the primary humanitarian mission; shuttling the news teams back and
forth did not compromise the mission, but it did significantly reduce the number of heli-
copter flights available to deliver supplies.41 The trade-off, from the Indonesians’ point of
view at least, was that international donations and humanitarian aid grew quickly as tele-
vised pictures of the tsunami damage appeared around the world.
The appearance of NGOs and other international groups sometimes threatened to
undermine the smooth working of the relief mission. Reportedly, some 109 such
groups were eventually represented in Banda Aceh, and there was significant “rivalry
among NGOs to try to get aid to everyone.”42 According to one pilot, “Lots of media
and politics involved so that became more aggravating to helo crews. Media in general
were not bad but they took up space.”43
An additional PAO was soon flown in to help with the media and distinguished visi-
tors. Normally PAOs handled all press interactions, but there were so many that this
proved difficult.44 Lieutenant Commander Jason Salata, a Public Affairs Officer
attached to the American Embassy in Jakarta, emphasized the importance of making a
U.S. Navy PAO available to work with the embassy early in the mission, to help answer
military questions and interact directly with other PAOs assigned to the disaster area.45
As a matter of policy, the U.S. Navy went out of its way to assist the media in any way that
it could. CNN may have broadcast the images and reports, but few reporters could have
arrived on location to collect them without the help of the helicopters.46 According to
Lieutenant Commander John Daniels, the media rush began on 2 January 2005, when
Dan Rather showed up with his 60 Minutes team. To begin with, the international media
had little choice but to use footage prepared in advance by the Navy PAOs: “Some of the
first video was shown by CNN and CBS from that shot by the crew.”47
Aboard Abraham Lincoln, many of the crew members who could not go ashore did
their part by assisting the press, health assessment teams, or United Nations coordina-
tors by providing berths, laundry service, and food. In particular, Abraham Lincoln
assisted the UN assessment teams traveling around Sumatra to determine the extent of
the damage. According to Rear Admiral Crowder, the UN assessment as to which areas
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in Sumatra required long-






of NGOs and the UN. They
would provide escort to the
helicopters, arrange rooms
for charts, and assist with
setting up “photo ops.” To
many crew members of
Abraham Lincoln it seemed
like a huge publicity coup for the Navy, since these outside groups provided a “higher level
of awareness” about how well OUA was progressing.49 Very soon, images of American heli-
copters delivering supplies became a regular feature on Indonesian television. This positive
press helped change local attitudes toward the United States “for the better.”50 One poll con-
ducted by the Indonesian Survey Institute in February 2005 concluded that 65 percent of
Indonesians now had a more favorable view of the United States.51
Nonetheless, and although working with them was mostly a positive experience, the
sheer numbers of NGOs and other international groups trying to help Aceh Province
threatened to undermine the relief mission. Australia decided not to work with them at
all but only with the host country in disbursing its aid. According to the Australian for-
eign minister, Alexander Downer, “That is a much better outcome than pushing money
through international organizations.”52 The U.S. government, however, welcomed the
participation of NGOs and other aid groups, generally maintaining good relations with
them, on the theory that when the U.S. Navy withdrew private groups could help pick
up the slack. To assist the NGOs in their interaction both with the U.S. military and
with each other, the crew of Abraham Lincoln created a management information center
in a rented house in Banda Aceh.53 This center assisted the aid organizations to find out
what was happening locally, regionally, and in other areas affected by the tsunamis. It also
helped relieve the helicopter pilots and crews of constant demands to assist the NGOs.
High Stress Levels
The helicopter pilots and their crews were faced with an enormous task. Commander Frank
Michael later stated that the January flying average was twenty hours more per pilot than
normal, effectively similar to wartime: “Take in supplies, load up victims, do debrief later.”
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Rear Admiral Douglas Crowder, Lincoln strike group commander, with Dan Rather,
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To keep up the tempo, they “agreed to fly all
helos all the time and only layup as needed.”
The result: “flight deck crews worked 24/7, usu-
ally 12–14 hour days each.”54
During the first two weeks of the mission, the
weather was especially bad. Under normal
conditions, helicopters would probably not
have been allowed to fly at all, but the mis-
sions came first.55 Day after day, week after
week, the helicopters were in the air on a
daily basis moving personnel to and from
shore, carrying much-needed supplies to
those areas that needed them the most, and
taking sick and injured to hospitals.
Helicopter crews were usually unarmed and
often far from their sea bases. One pilot deliv-
ering supplies thought that a disgruntled
Indonesian was attacking his helicopter with an upraised machete but then realized
that the man was merely hacking through brush and debris to reach the aircraft.56 Once
an Indonesian soldier firing into the air in an attempt to control two dozen refugees
scrambling for supplies almost hit a helicopter’s rotor blades.57 Even children could be a
problem; some devised a dangerous game of jumping up close to the moving rotors
and allowing themselves to be blown backward on the rotor wash.58
The normal routine became for each helicopter first to fly several trips carrying passen-
gers from the ship to Banda Aceh. Once all of the shore working party was in place, the
helicopters would conduct humanitarian flights for the rest of the day. Concerns with
security and the lack of proper housing facilities meant that the helicopters had to
bring everyone back to the ship; nobody stayed ashore at night.59 Helicopter-capable
ships handled as many as ninety landings per day, mainly to refuel helicopters, and air-
craft maintenance crews worked long hours in hot and humid conditions.
For the helicopter pilots, stress levels were high, especially in developing appropriate
landing and take-off procedures on land. According to Lieutenant Commander Joel
Moss, “Challenges included following rules verbatim or not following rules” at all. Once a
person on the ground threw an empty box into rotor blades just to see it being torn to
shreds, which could have seriously damaged the helicopter. One helicopter was forced to
lift off with desperate survivors hanging on; the pilot was “concerned over safety of crew
so [the] choice was to lift off.”60 Faced with the possibility of damage and rightly
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concerned about the safety of the people below, sometimes pilots decided that it was not
safe to land. Because they were not equipped with hoists to lower supplies to the ground,
this meant that supplies were not delivered. It was several days before the desperation of
the survivors lessened to the point where helicopter missions could become routine.
Because the physical limitations of sea basing made helicopter access absolutely
essential, and in particular because of the enormous volume of logistical supplies
that had to be transported, the helicopter pilots and crews experienced some of the
highest workloads of any personnel involved in UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. Nonetheless,
the majority of the helicopter pilots were later to recount how remarkable the
experience had been for them. As Lieutenant Commander Jason Carter put it, OUA
was a “typical navy response, as [we] weren’t sure what the mission would be but
we’d do it when we got there.”61
* * * * * * *
Direct sea-to-land access provided by helicopters during operation UNIFIED ASSIS-
TANCE made the fundamental difference.62 Because of the B2C program, Abraham
Lincoln arrived off Aceh Province with a much stronger helicopter force than normal;
several days later, this was augmented by the even more robust helicopter fleet of
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Bonhomme Richard. Former Indonesian prime minister and social welfare minister
Alwi Shihab, observing a line of U.S. Navy Seahawks carrying food and water to victims
of the tsunami, declared, “Isn’t it incredible?”63 Even so, the first days of the relief mis-
sion were quite difficult, especially for the helicopters and their pilots. The U.S. Navy
had to coordinate with the local government, PACOM, task force headquarters in
Utapao, and many other foreign countries as well. With many international bodies
competing to assist the tsunami victims, it was to prove particularly difficult to agree
on any one set of rules or operating procedures.
According to Commander Ron Hughes: “No JFAC [Joint Force Air Component] [was]
needed but this was a CFAC [Combined Force Air Component].”64 Coordination with
Australian, Singaporean, Japanese, German, and French ships grew quickly; foreign
navies were added to the coalition and furthered the humanitarian mission in numer-
ous ways. Abraham Lincoln assisted by refueling helicopters; also, for periods of twenty-
four hours at a time, the ship was “designated ‘ready deck’ and could not do mainte-
nance.”65 Coordination between the different ships was carried out mainly by phone
and e-mail.66 However, there were so many ships with helicopter assets that “cognizance
of all helos was imperative,” especially when the foreign helicopters were “allowed to
land on the ships” to obtain fuel.67
Perhaps it was more a “collection” than a “coalition,” but there was close cooperation
nonetheless. During one episode a medical team included American pilots and med-
ics, an Australian coordinator, doctors from China, and Indonesian soldiers, all
working side by side. The international language was often the “thumbs up,” as two
“Indonesians, an American and an Australian held the four corners of a stretcher
with an injured boy and lifted it carefully from one of the helicopters.”68 Reliable
ship-based communications proved to be the best way to integrate all of the many
countries and their disparate missions.
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Communications at Sea
Integrating the Collective
We’ve got a bizillion dollars of satellite communications suite here in the
strike group, but we are not so good with how to communicate from the
ship, where the helicopters are, to the beach, where the supplies are, three
miles away from each other.
REAR ADMIRAL DOUGLAS CROWDER, LINCOLN STRIKE GROUP COMMANDER
20 FEBRUARY 2005
In addition to sea basing, logistics, and helicopter access, communications was vital,
both vertically up the chain of command and horizontally among the commands and
units in the theater.1 Throughout UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, Lieutenant General Blackman
warned that reliable communications was key to the success of the operation. He com-
pared the “fog of relief ” to the “fog of war,” emphasizing “strong communication
among all parties” as the only possible solution.2
Efficient communications systems, then, were essential, especially among the various
countries cooperating to provide aid. On the ground, small groups known as “spark
teams” provided communications between the ship and shore and among various shore
parties. According to Commander Dan Verheul, the spark teams helped “provide the
energy to make things happen.”3 Described by one source as a “clearinghouse for infor-
mation,” they also helped to overcome differences in hardware, software, and bandwidth
between military and civilian participants.4 This was particularly important since inter-
national aid workers, military personnel, volunteers, and government officials were all
competing for access into the area.5 The ability of these small teams to coordinate com-
munications on the ground helped make the humanitarian effort a success.
For many sailors in USS Abraham Lincoln there seemed to be little or no reason to
direct mission-oriented information first to Utapao and only then to Pacific Com-
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touch with PACOM proved to be relatively easy, especially via the Navy’s satellite e-mail
network, but communications were shaky both within the chain of command and
between the different nodes of the command and control structure.6 It took many days,
in some cases weeks, to fix all the regional communications problems.
Difficulties with Ship-to-Shore Communications
When Abraham Lincoln arrived off Aceh Province, ship-to-shore communications
became especially critical to the success of the operation and so proved to be the “big-
gest challenge.”7 Once proper landing zones had been located ashore, crew members
rigged radio communications with the ship. One of the greatest challenges for the crisis
action teams was maintaining constant communications with the personnel working in
Banda Aceh. Often it was easiest to use e-mail to communicate with the “away” teams,
but for a number of reasons some locations could “not receive data.”8
Commander Ted Williams later recalled that there were “no comms [on the] first day.
Handheld radios came second day so things worked much better.”9 The Marines helped
solve this problem by providing their cell phones.10 Motorola walkie-talkies used by the
explosive ordnance demolition teams proved especially useful, since they could func-
tion as ship-to-shore communicators. Munitions disposal in connection with humani-
tarian missions had been “non-existent before this operation. Then they became
invaluable to the missions.”11 However, not only did their HF communications have to
be “in-tune with weather” but rotor wash from helicopters could take down antennas
and disrupt signals.12
Early in the mission, it was suggested that acquiring cell phones might provide the easi-
est solution. A team was sent in to perform a site survey but found that it would take
too long to get a new system operating.13 The Nortel Company at one point promised
free cell phones, but the Navy’s Judge Advocate General considered them “gifts” that
could not be accepted.14 Iridium satellite phones were also an option, albeit more
expensive and difficult to use.
Abraham Lincoln spent most of the time on the west coast, from where the high coastal
mountains blocked direct communications with the east side. To overcome this handi-
cap, strike group ships were spread up and down along the coast to act as communica-
tions relays.15 There was some horizontal communication and cross-talk among
Abraham Lincoln, Bonhomme Richard, Fort McHenry, and Essex, when the latter arrived,
but each had its own zone so that there was relatively little need for coordination. Due
to “strike group–centric” thinking, there was not enough integration among different
assets in the theater.16
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From time to time, Abraham Lincoln also developed serious satellite communication
difficulties, especially when the satellite was directly overhead and an antenna experi-
enced “block zones.” Overall, however, satellite communications were reliable, and the
shore parties “couldn’t have managed without Satcoms and portable communications
equipment.”17 The availability of global communications was to have an especially sig-
nificant effect. As Kevin Parra noted, “Satcoms was the mission. Control element for
ship and coordination of flights from ships, tracking food, medevacs, staging area.
Backpacks were used and batteries were backups.”18
To resolve communication and other problems, every night a meeting, called a “hot
wash,” was chaired by Rear Admiral Crowder or the deputy carrier air group com-
mander, Captain Matthew Klunder. One issue addressed by these meetings, according
to Captain Klunder, was difficulty in scheduling, including delays getting the work par-
ties ashore or back to the ship.19 Another was keeping track of personnel ashore; all vol-
unteers were put into a database and assignments were distributed so “all aboard ship
had an opportunity to participate.”20
SIPRNET versus NIPRNET versus CENTRIXS Problems
One constant problem during UNIFIED ASSISTANCE was that the U.S. Navy ships were
connected to the classified SIPRNET, not the unclassified NIPRNET (essentially the
civilian Internet), which CSF 536 headquarters in Utapao was initially set up to use.
One former submariner ruefully described how difficult it was to go from a ship that
was trying to be stealthy to one that was trying to transmit as much as possible.21
Lieutenant General Blackman wanted to keep everything unclassified, so he could
W A V E S O F H O P E 7 1
The amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard off the coast of Aceh Province.
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work easily with coalition partners and with NGOs. This cut Utapao out of much of
the early decision making by the naval forces.
The commanding officer and embarked staff in Abraham Lincoln faced a difficult prob-
lem. An aircraft carrier is “geared to work on the Secret level, and is not set up to work
with unclassified” material. It is difficult to downgrade material from secret level to
unclassified, so much crucial information appeared only at the secret level. Utapao was
“cut out from all of this information” and so often operated “in the dark.” As an expe-
dient, most of the flag staff members were using unclassified e-mail accounts, which
were not safe from an operational security perspective. Utapao acquired SIPRNET on 7
January, but it did not have many accounts. Also, its SIPRNET computers were housed
separately from the rest, and there were not many of them, with the result that people
did not monitor them “twenty-four/seven.”22
To communicate from ship to ship, the top choice was chat rooms, which used
SIPRNET almost exclusively. No similar architecture was available on NIPRNET, which
made it more difficult to communicate with foreign navies. Also, the cost of using
SIPRNET was high; it would normally be considered “too expensive” to use as a chat
server.23 Further, the U.S. Navy often used Internet Relay Chat, which was text based
and often left Utapao out of the loop. Utapao needed to be able to use the same chat
rooms as the ships but for several days nobody from Utapao was even visiting them.
One prime example of the disconnect between Utapao and Abraham Lincoln was the
question of what to do with Bonhomme Richard when it arrived in the area. Rear Admi-
ral Crowder’s Joint Planning Group originally planned to use amphibious ships to set
up a second sea-based logistical hub farther south,
near Mulaboh. From there, it could use its helicop-
ter force to transfer supplies. This would have
been an efficient use of air assets. However, Utapao
countermanded this plan and sent Bonhomme
Richard instead to Medan, where it quickly over-
loaded the airport, virtually shutting it down.
Only a few days later was Bonhomme Richard redi-
rected to Mulaboh.24
A second major concern was communications
among different members of the coalition.
According to Ralph A. Cossa, president of the
Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, country-to-
country communications at the very top worked
well: “The relief operations also demonstrated the
7 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
Offload at Lamno, Aceh Province.
T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NP28\Printer\NP28.vp
Tuesday, January 23, 2007 3:09:54 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
merits of the Pacific Command’s Asia Pacific Area Network (APAN). The APAN mis-
sion is to share unclassified information electronically in order to facilitate regional
understanding, build confidence among Asia-Pacific neighbors and enhance security
cooperation. APAN was used extensively by Britain, Canada, Australia and the affected
Asian nations while coordinating relief efforts.”25 Within the region, however, the U.S.
naval forces had to coordinate not only with each other but with other foreign aid
countries. Additional helicopters were soon provided by Britain, Switzerland, France,
Japan, Germany, and Malaysia. Australian air traffic controllers helped direct the more
than 350 helicopter landings at Banda Aceh airport each day.26
Although a “combined coordination cell” was created to coordinate the twelve main coun-
tries involved, including Thailand, connectivity remained the “biggest challenge.”27 Had
there had been a formal coalition, the Japanese and Australians would have wanted to use
the Collaborative Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) to com-
municate. But as it was, nobody wanted to use it, since it was difficult to operate and far
too many participants did not have CENTRIXS terminals. The Global War on Terror
“enclave” might have been better for this type of mission, but it could not be used for
OUA. What was needed instead was a general HA/DR enclave for CENTRIXS, which
would have made the operation look more like a coalition. In the end, it did not really
matter, since “it wasn’t really a coalition environment.”28 The spark teams did what they
could to improve communications between the countries providing aid.
Throughout the operation, even simple communications between national partners
remained a major problem and were inevitably handled in informal ways. For example,
to get a helicopter to deliver ten tons of hospital equipment to a German field hospital
near Teunam, about eighty miles southeast of Banda Aceh, a German Red Cross
worker, Ina Bluemel, simply walked up to an American pilot “asking for a helicopter.”29
The pilot agreed and delivered the supplies. This was perhaps the most typical form of
coalition communications during the operation.
Another problem with communications concerned bandwidth allocation. Much of the
equipment was not designed to allow changing the bandwidth, with the result that far
too much was permanently allocated to equipment that was unused. The U.S. Navy
allocated approximately half of all of its bandwidth for telephones, but the average
usage was low. It would have been much more efficient if bandwidth could have been
reallocated as needed: “Don’t need to buy more satellites, just need to allocate band-
width where it is needed. Connectivity needs to be given top priority.”30
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The Impact of the Media and Global Communications
Another side of the communications question was the transmission and reception of
outside information, particularly to and from the foreign press, over the Internet, and
with e-mail. In general, this worked out in a positive way. From the beginning, the U.S.
Navy’s skill in conducting humanitarian relief operations was favorably commented on
by the international press. Abraham Lincoln also served as an important base of opera-
tions for international film crews and newsmen, including, as noted, 60 Minutes. While
the film content of CNN reports was generally gruesome, showing dead bodies and the
general devastation, in the midst of it a news clip would show U.S. helicopters deliver-
ing aid. In other words, when Lincoln arrived, America was there.
To assist in filing video reports, the ship used fast file transfers over the SIPRNET, since
this was least restricted for those with the right clearance. Although this was expensive
equipment and was not normally used so regularly, it proved to be the best way of get-
ting video out quickly. Still, there were notable backlogs. Lieutenant Commander John
Daniels later recalled that because of the enormous amount of information being
transmitted, “stacks of email and phone were never answered because traffic and
requests were just enormous. Tremendous push to get video out.”31
Captain Bob Aronson recalled the effect on morale of the first CNN reports on UNIFIED
ASSISTANCE: it was “a great boost to see this report on TV after the horrific sights and
smells they encountered the first day they arrived.”32 Most of the ships were able to receive
satellite TV and so could watch the media reports on television within minutes of seeing
the reports being filmed; this provided an immediate sense of accomplishment among
the ships’ crews and shore parties. Access to e-mail, to keep in touch with family as well as
colleagues not assigned to
UNIFIED ASSISTANCE,





feedback, in turn, moti-
vated them to work even
harder to assist victims in
the devastated areas.
There was a potential
downside, however, in the
fact that crew members
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could write personal e-mails and even Weblogs from the ship. Media reports quoted from
such sources private criticism of the various groups of aid workers, one “blog” denounc-
ing them as a traveling circus who wasted valuable helicopter time being ferried to shore
and then back to their guest quarters.33 Such opinions, while representing a minority
view, tended to undermine the image, carefully crafted by the PAOs, of unconstrained
cooperation between U.S. Navy personnel, media, and civilian aid workers.
Vertical and Horizontal Communications Challenges
Due to the particular joint task force structure adopted during the first days of the
operation—Utapao, not the Carrier Strike Group 9 staff or USS Abraham Lincoln,
was designated as the headquarters—communications between Utapao and Abraham
Lincoln time and time again proved to be a stumbling block. When the carrier arrived
off Indonesia on 1 January 2005, it became the main communications hub linking
Utapao and Honolulu, all the major naval commands, and the group’s ships and their
teams working ashore. The early establishment of this communications network
proved particularly important, saving much time and allowing humanitarian relief
efforts to be carried out with greater efficiency.
But it took a long time for Utapao to acquire global communications, so the advance
team was “walking into a black hole themselves.” In addition to hooking up unclassi-
fied but sensitive Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) and clas-
sified Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) communications, dozens of
commercial cell phones were purchased from local Thai companies: “Local Thai cellu-
lar phones are the convenient way to go,” argued Marine colonel Medio Monti, who
installed the communications system. Utapao also constructed a website, which
allowed other militaries and aid groups to monitor the U.S. military’s activities. By
making information available through the website, the planners at Utapao hoped to
avoid “duplication and waste.” Lieutenant General Blackman especially encouraged
“his deputies to consult other nations regularly to avoid overlap.”34
One problem proved to be moving communications equipment to Utapao. The high-
speed, shallow-draft catamaran WestPac Express left Okinawa on 4 January for Thailand
carrying 630 tons of equipment, including communications gear. After a 2,300-mile
journey, WestPac Express arrived in Chuksamet, Thailand, on the 10th.35 Along with
thirty-five vehicles, including seven-ton trucks, “Hummers,” and forklifts, it unloaded
thirty pieces of communications equipment and thirty Marines of 7th Communica-
tions Battalion, III Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group.36
In light of the fact that U.S. humanitarian operations in Thailand were wrapped up less
than two weeks later, on 22 January, this was a clear example of too little, too late. By
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contrast, the sea-based communications network worked well; Abraham Lincoln
arrived on station with unified communications, command, and control already up
and running. Otherwise, structural differences interfered with rapid communications
both vertically and horizontally. While there were hundreds of people working on
organizing the mission in other places, there were only a handful of people at the
“point of the spear.”37 As one critic was quick to point out: “Not much value [was]
added by hundreds of people at PACOM, while only 40 people on the ground were
doing all the real work. JTF structure might not be right.”38
Many other problems occurred when chat rooms used different software. Some used
Asyncrony and Vogue, but they were “extremely painful” in a naval context, since they
involved Web-based messaging. Problems
appeared with accessing chat rooms; also,
any message over a megabyte in size was too
big to transmit. Some groups, including peo-
ple on shore or on Mercy, tried to use
Webex. Unfortunately, this system was gen-
erally not used on ships because it required a
3.1-megabyte applet download. Once down-
loaded it was “found that the chat room was
password protected and the only person . . .
who knew the password was on leave, so
they could never get in the room to use it.”39
As for horizontal communications, some
were surprised how long it took to get
mobile communications into the theater,
forcing shore parties to use cell phones and
telephones. Shore establishment communi-
cations was particularly important for
ensuring clarity: “For every layer of com-
mand and control that information went
through, it became distorted or changed in one way, shape, or form.” There was a need
to “streamline that whole hierarchy.” One solution to this confusing communications
picture would have been to eliminate unnecessary nodes and “flatten” the hierarchy.
This would have allowed Abraham Lincoln to communicate directly with Pacific Com-
mand: “E-mail would have worked better if they could have sent it straight to PACOM,
rather than through the CSF as intermediary. This slowed the information flow. Also,
Internet Relay Chat was being used like radios, but without the discipline inherent in
traditional radio communications.”40
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* * * * * * *
Throughout the operation, the inherent disconnects caused by Abraham Lincoln’s reli-
ance on SIPRNET and Utapao’s reliance mainly on NIPRNET caused notable commu-
nication problems. Even when Utapao acquired full access to the unclassified net it was
sparsely utilized. Only on 15 January was CSG-Indonesia in Medan up and running on
SIPRNET, and on 18 January CSG-Indonesia Forward in Banda Aceh acquired both
SIPRNET and NIPRNET. Almost by default, this meant that the forces afloat could
often communicate more quickly and easily with Pacific Command than within the
theater of operations, which undermined the vertical and horizontal command struc-
ture. In hindsight, Admiral Doran admitted that it might have been easier to make
Abraham Lincoln the operation headquarters.41
Miscommunication and rumor were still rampant. One incident that exemplifies this
problem involved a large box of dried noodles that accidentally fell from a helicopter
onto the tarmac at Banda Aceh airport. No one was injured, but as this story went
through the rumor mill it expanded into a pallet crushing several people. The immediate
effect was that aid workers no longer wanted to fly in the helicopters, and it took several
days for everything to return to normal. This problem was certainly linked to insufficient
horizontal communications, not always dependable even when available. Thus, a seem-
ingly trivial story could spread and become exaggerated beyond all proportion. The
spread of other such malicious rumors was to affect the medical mission as well.
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The Medical Mission
USNS Mercy Signals Political Will
This was the biggest natural disaster in the history of Indonesia, bigger
even than Krakatoa. . . . There are those who compare us with Thailand
and how quickly they acted. The scale and magnitude are different. The
local government collapsed, the infrastructure was destroyed, there was
no electricity, fuel, communication or transportation. We mobilized
what resources we had but needed help from outside nations, and I give
them our greatest thanks.
SUSILO BAMBANG YUDHOYONO, PRESIDENT OF INDONESIA
17 JANUARY 2005
The USNS Mercy, one of two U.S. hospital ships in the Military Sealift Command, was acti-
vated by presidential order on 1 January 2005.1 When its commanding medical officer, Cap-
tain David Llewellyn, was informed during late December that Mercy might be activated, he
and his crew began logistics and medical planning: “Both were a challenge.”All this was
accomplished in record time, however, and the ship was soon ready to embark on its
humanitarian mission: “Getting underway for a six-month deployment in less than a week
was both a monumental challenge and a monumental accomplishment.”2
By 8 January Mercy had loaded hundreds of active-duty and reserve physicians, nurses,
technicians, and other military and civilian medical workers and was on its way from
San Diego to Indonesia. On board the ship were twelve operating theaters, magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) equipment, and four seventy-five-thousand-gallon-per-day
evaporators with “1.2 million gallon holding capacity.”3 The ship and medical staff
eventually treated more than 9,500 patients in humanitarian missions in Indonesia,
East Timor, and Papua New Guinea before returning to San Diego on 8 June 2005. This
story was especially remarkable because the Mercy had not been deployed for thirteen
years, not since DESERT STORM, and yet it encountered no significant engineering
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The hospital ship Mercy became an important symbol of how the United States could
help countries in distress. Admiral Thomas Fargo saw Mercy as not just a medical asset
but a golden opportunity to reengage Indonesia politically. He had lobbied DoD to
activate Mercy to improve U.S. and Indonesian relations. Given the time it took to
arrive in Indonesia, Fargo perceived, the primary mission of Mercy was not just to pro-
vide emergency care but also, and even more importantly, to help guard against epi-
demics by reconstituting the “Indonesian medical infrastructure.”5
Political Considerations
Captain Llewellyn, head of Mercy’s medical treatment facility, who was visiting his
father in San Francisco during Christmas vacation, later recalled that there had been
no news of Mercy’s deployment until he received a call in late December from the Mili-
tary Sealift Command and another from the Third Fleet surgeon asking him “to send a
PowerPoint presentation to PACFLT [the staff of Commander, Pacific Fleet] explaining
the capabilities of USNS Mercy.”6 The crew and medical staff of Mercy began preparing
on 31 December 2004 for deployment.
Opinions were mixed as to how much use the ship could be, considering how long it would
take to reach Indonesia. The decision to deploy came “directly from the President”; Captain
Tim McCully was to observe that he had “never in his career seen any deployment that had
this level of interest, from CNO’s [Chief of Naval Operations] office on down.” Even when
the ship was ready to leave, there were “discussions even at that time at the 4-star level
deciding whether to get the ship underway.”7 Mercy is a “deployable ‘national asset.’ As such,
only the highest authority can authorize its deployment. Once deployed, the world is put
on notice especially in time of war (e.g., DESERT STORM).” On the day the ship left port,
Captain Smith talked with three different people on the phone: “One told him to get
underway. The other told him not to get underway. The third person did not know but
said he would find out.” Nobody in the DoD wanted Mercy to get under way only to turn
around and “come back to San Diego a few hours or a few days later.” When Mercy did
depart from San Diego, it sent thereby a strong message that the United States was fully
“committed to tsunami relief efforts in South Asia.”8 Once on station Mercy quickly
proved both its medical and political worth.
Captain Nathan Smith, commanding officer of the USNS Mercy, credited “Fargo and
his vision for making deployment happen.”9 Admiral Walt Doran agreed, recalling that
once Fargo made up his mind, he “never wavered.”10 In addition to the clear political
benefits of deploying Mercy, had there been large-scale epidemics in Indonesia, “having
that resource in theater would have been hugely valuable.” Also, Abraham Lincoln
would eventually redeploy, and Mercy would help fill the “vacuum when the carrier
steamed out of the area.”11
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The Situation in Indonesia
The Indonesian government apparently either did not know that Mercy was coming or
simply could not decide what to do with it. As a result, when Mercy arrived, the ship
and its crew were not permitted to go to work immediately;12 a five-day delay ensued,
while the ship sat off the coast of Banda Aceh.13 An advance party led by Admiral Bill
McDaniel (Ret.) had arrived in Banda Aceh ahead of the ship to identify potential
patients to send back to the ship for medical care.14 According to Captain Timothy
Bemiller, however, from the very beginning it was unclear exactly what Mercy would be
doing. As a result, “the mission evolved and so did our planning. We had to be flexible.
. . . [W]e never had clarity on what the mission was.”15
Mercy was eventually sent to northern Sumatra, and Commander Marquez Campbell, a
medical planner, was one of the first to go ashore, inspecting the hospital, airport, and
potential landing zones. He would recall, “Seeing the damage and destruction from a heli-
copter was staggering.” On board, the Operations Center was run like a “battle watch,” as
helicopters took volunteers from the ship to shore and brought patients back to the ship.16
Unfortunately, the time it took to reach Aceh Province and then delays in getting started
meant that by then many seriously ill or injured patients had already died. In fact, even in
early January it was already clear that the “likelihood of saving sick patients still stranded
in remote areas was fading.” As one Australian doctor, Alan Garner, explained, “Even
some of those who arrive now would have a tough time surviving. A 20-year-old guy
brought in today said he was the sole survivor of his village. He was washed out to sea,
walked for two days and was picked up by the American helicopter. But I suspect he’s
going to die, and he will be the last of his village.”17 One dramatic success story,
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however, was an eleven-year-old boy named Iqbal who was found clinging to a piece of
driftwood over a mile out to sea. All the rest of his family had been killed. He was
brought to Mercy by helicopter and treated for a respiratory illness known as “tsunami
lung,” caused by swallowing bacteria-laden water. A week later Iqbal was on the road to
recovery, and within four weeks he was able to leave the ship.18
Since Mercy arrived many weeks after the tsunamis, “very little was used” of its huge
capacity.19 Captain Llewellyn later stated that due to delays “there were not very many
acute cases to treat. Instead, most medical cases were nonacute but necessary and
important. Because of the widespread destruction of local hospitals, Mercy treated
mostly chronic diseases, and also head and neck tumors.”20 That is, what Mercy mainly
treated were not emergency cases linked directly to the tsunamis but more long-term
health concerns. The head of radiology, Lieutenant Commander Stephen Ferrera,
described the first day on station after being cleared by the Indonesian authorities to
treat patients: “Did operation on person with appendicitis. More patients started arriv-
ing quickly. Things went well as they were brought onboard by helicopter. Working
with other nationalities was at first stressful but all adapted. Civilians and organiza-
tional standpoint also caused some discomfort but all adjusted. Good PR for Navy
medicine.”21 Mercy, which has superior laboratories, conducted over five thousand labo-
ratory procedures during a six-week period from early February to mid-March 2005.22
Helicopter operations became the crucial lifeline between Mercy and the shore, and
during the transit repairs were made to the flight deck.23 Captain Llewellyn had to
coordinate constantly with the other ships, since the helicopters his ship would fly
actually belonged to the USS Essex and Fort McHenry.24 Helicopters in fact made the
sea-based medical mission possible, flying over 1,100 helicopter sorties during Mercy’s
deployment: “The helicopter ride to and from the ship was around 15 to 20 minutes
long. . . . If a stretcher and patient were onboard, the stretcher took 3 seats so only 8
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The Military Sealift Command (MSC) hospital ship USNS Mercy off Aceh
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persons could be transported.”25 The ship also was visited by many other American and
foreign helicopters, including a CH-53 from Essex, an H-3 from Germany, a Huey from
the Spanish Navy, and an SH-60 from the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.26
Mercy and Project Hope
Admiral Fargo thought coordinating with private relief organizations should be an
important goal of UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, since nongovernmental organizations could
use Mercy as a base of operations: “This may be an opportunity to use Mercy in a very
creative way.”27 Coordination between Mercy and Project Hope had first been suggested
several years before at the senior government and military level. When he heard about
the Southeast Asian tsunami, Admiral James Lyons (Ret.) immediately called the Chief
of Naval Operations, Vernon Clark, and urged him to get in touch with John Howe,
director of Project Hope.28 He did so, to discuss this “novel idea”—UNIFIED ASSIS-
TANCE would be the first Project Hope–U.S. Navy mission.29 Admiral Clark then met
with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to convince him of the importance of this
civil-military program; Rumsfeld told him to “go for it.”30
Following intense discussions, Project Hope, based in Millwood, Virginia, agreed in a mem-
orandum of understanding to locate and select medical volunteers to serve on board Mercy.
Project Hope was able to pick from some of the best doctors and nurses in the country.
The word went out to health professionals across the nation that Mercy would be dis-
patched to care for survivors of the tsunami and that volunteers were needed to help
staff the ship in one-month rotations. Project Hope was inundated with applications;
within a matter of days, it had received over four thousand applications to fill the 210
openings for doctors and nurses.31 For the first of three planned rotations, ninety-three
highly qualified professionals from dozens of the country’s leading centers of medicine
and education were picked.32 Massachusetts General Hospital, in Boston, Massachu-
setts, alone sent “30–40 people.”33 Project Hope leaders General Harold Timboe (Ret.),
former head of Walter Reed Hospital, and General Bill Bester (Ret.), former head of the
Army Nurse Corps, boarded Mercy at Honolulu. Mercy received its first volunteer
group of sixty nurses and thirty doctors at Singapore.34
This cooperative civil-military program was of great help to the U.S. Navy, since embark-
ing sufficient naval medical personnel in San Diego was a major problem. Pulling staff
from the local Naval Medical Center would have been very expensive and could have
left it with insufficient staff to carry out normal duties. So allowing Project Hope vol-
unteers to come onboard in their place was a cost-saving measure and also enabled the
Naval Medical Center at San Diego to avoid service interruption.35
W A V E S O F H O P E 8 3
T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NP28\Printer\NP28.vp
Tuesday, January 23, 2007 3:10:12 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
Due to shortness of time, Project Hope volunteers conducted short, one- or two-day
orientation tours on board a similar hospital ship, USNS Comfort, stationed in Balti-
more, Maryland. Not having completed a lengthy shipboard orientation, many had to
undergo an additional orientation upon arrival on Mercy itself.36 Later in the deploy-
ment, when new Project Hope volunteers replaced the first set, there “was no time for
any [orientation-related] training and teambuilding.” Commander Jean Comlish was in
charge of keeping track of the Project Hope volunteers. Their numbers constantly
changed, but eventually volunteers were assigned primarily to three areas: the “Emer-
gency Room, Intensive Care, and the Wards.”37
The numerous Project Hope volunteers meant that “the ship had to work out berthing
and other issues related to the additional crew members.” Yeoman 2nd Class Daniel
Konzek later recalled that “his department was tasked to develop a process to track
crew members on the beach and on the ship” as well as to “track the patients who came
on board.”38 After a month, when a new Project Hope team arrived, everything started
all over again with new training.39
At first, the relationship between the military and volunteers was described as “awk-
ward,” because the volunteers knew so little about the military. For example, the volun-
teers would not show up for muster on time. After a while, however, this all changed,
and “we got comfortable with them and they got comfortable with us.”40 The naval per-
sonnel were “very impressed with [the volunteers’] professionalism.”41 According to
Commander Kurt Hummeldorf, “the benefits of HA/DR missions are many and are
well worth the cost. . . . Navy medicine combined with NGO support is a powerful tool
to win the hearts and minds of people around the world.”42
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Injured child being airlifted to medical facility, Aceh Province.
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Long-Term Medical Impact
In addition to providing emergency medical assistance, Mercy provided Indonesia lon-
ger-term medical benefits: “Once on station, we made oxygen and filled tanks. We had
laundry capabilities. We had electricians who could fix equipment. There were many
other examples as well. And of course, we primarily provided medical HA/DR.”43 In
addition, the ship’s optometrists saw about two hundred patients a day, and the oph-
thalmologist performed cataract surgeries on board.44
Mercy would ask, “How can we help?”; this “approach endeared us to the hospital staff
at Banda Aceh and to the Indonesian people in general.”45 One way to help was medical
training at the hospital at Banda Aceh. It soon became clear that many of its personnel
had been killed by the tsunami; foreign NGOs were manning the hospital. Instead of
just providing medical care, therefore, Mercy also assumed responsibility for training.
So many Indonesian medical instructors had perished in the tsunami that the Ameri-
can doctors “filled the instructor void while we were in Banda Aceh.” Lieutenant Com-
mander Suzanne Clark took over medical training: “While there, she looked at the
education and training opportunities that we could provide to the Indonesian medical
staff. When we arrived, the Australians were conducting training. After the Australians
left, we continued the training and education that they had been conducting.”46 She
taught for an average of three hours a day.
One limiting factor was translators. Most translators worked around the clock. Many of
them were medical personnel from Indonesia, and probably from ten to twenty were
on board at any one time, living in the enlisted
berthing spaces.47 Before there were sufficient
translators, “many of the patients who came
onboard were scared. [But] after their surgery
and post-operation care, the patients cried and
hugged us when they left the ship.” The friend-
ship was even deeper with the local translators,
without whose help little or nothing could have
been done.48
Due to force protection constraints, none of the
Mercy personnel could stay overnight in Banda
Aceh; everyone had to return to the ship at the
end of each day. There was also great concern that
no Indonesian patients die aboard Mercy, for fear
that the ship and crew might be blamed for the
death—there might have been malicious rumors,
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perhaps official accusations, that the foreign doctors had killed them. However false, they
might have sparked anti-American feeling or even riots. Therefore, as a matter of policy,
terminally ill patients were returned home so that they could die with their families.49
The Mercy mission was scheduled to last for ninety days. According to Commander
Karen McDonald, “the Indonesian government had given us a set date to leave Banda
Aceh. We had to adjust our patient flow and treatment to meet that deadline. Com-
mander McDonald stated that it was hard when mothers would beg you to take their
child to the ship, and you could not.50 Mercy left Indonesian waters on schedule and
continued on to its next mission, in East Timor.
* * * * * * *
Sending Mercy to Indonesia was clearly a humanitarian success. When Admiral Fargo
briefed him in mid-January 2005, President Bush was “tremendously pleased.”51 But
Captain Smith’s own assessment was that it was little short of a miracle that nothing
bad happened: “The analogy is taking a twenty-year-old vehicle, re-build the engine,
and drive the vehicle from San Diego to New York City and back. Luckily, we didn’t
lose any medical equipment.” As it happened, however, the maintenance that had been
performed during the ship’s years of inactivity by the Reduced Operation Status crew
and the Military Sealift Command’s project manager proved to have been just right,
and “the ship held up well.”52 As a result, Mercy became a potent symbol of American
assistance to Indonesia.
As throughout UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, communications was key to success. According to
Lieutenant Commander Erik Threet, communications at the beginning of their stay in
Aceh Province were problematic, but “after awhile, we worked out all the issues and
communications were fine for the remainder of the Banda Aceh mission.” If a patient
needed to be taken to the ship, “we could communicate the patient’s condition while
the patient was in-transit to the ship. Once the patient arrived at the ship, the ship’s
medical crew knew what the patient’s condition was. This helped save time and lives.
Communications were paramount.”53
According to Captain Llewellyn, the Indonesian deployment established what has since
been called the “Mercy model,” in which the mind-set of the ship’s crew was to ask,
“How can we help[?] . . . How can we contribute and help the recovery process?” The
first lady, Laura Bush, sent a letter to Project Hope and Mercy, telling them that they
represented the “compassionate heart of America.” Llewellyn reiterated that it was
“hard to imagine what it was like to have endured such a disaster and how gratifying it
was to help.”54
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Wrapping Up the Mission
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
This is the largest natural disaster of my lifetime and it changes the rule
set. It can’t help but be positive, in my view.
REAR ADMIRAL DOUGLAS CROWDER, LINCOLN STRIKE GROUP COMMANDER
2 JANUARY 2005
After less than six weeks, the U.S. military forces accomplished their primary mission.1
America’s humanitarian response to the tsunami crisis had been unprecedented. In the
words of Andrew Natsios, Agency for International Development (USAID) administra-
tor, “The response of the American private sector has been extraordinary. I am told
that in terms of dollars pledged or donated, this is the second-largest disaster response
in American history, second only to 9/11. America responded to our own tragedy and
we are equally concerned about tragedies elsewhere.”2
The Indonesian government appreciated U.S. aid, but it asked that all American mili-
tary forces be withdrawn by March 2005. Some Indonesians were concerned at an early
withdrawal, but Rear Admiral Crowder disagreed: “The bottom line is: I don’t share
that same concern. We’re reaching a point where there’s going to be a transition to sus-
tain relief and not an acute emergency got-to-have-it-now relief that we saw in the first
couple of weeks.”3
Following the departure of Abraham Lincoln and its support ships on 10 February
2005, CSG-Indonesia was shut down, followed by the Combined Support Force 536
headquarters on 12 February 2005. JTF 536 was set up again to serve temporarily in its
place; finally, it too was closed down, on 23 February 2005, and UNIFIED ASSISTANCE
officially ended. The operation lasted less than two months from beginning to end, but
many valuable lessons had been learned, in particular the importance of tsunami early
warning systems and accurate damage reporting, rapid and flexible sea basing, robust
logistical trains, helicopter access, efficient communications, and world-class medical
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Warning and Reporting
An Indian ocean tsunami early warning system could have saved many lives. After the
tsunamis hit the biggest problem was inaccurate reporting; local governments and the
international press at first badly underreported the number of dead and missing. Had a
more accurate picture been immediately available, the U.S. Navy’s arrival, rapid as it
was, could have been accelerated by a full day if not more, which would have made a
huge difference to many tsunami victims.
The poor reporting was not strictly the fault of the media, which were constrained to
report what reporters themselves either saw or were told by local officials. The almost
total destruction of local communications infrastructure meant that few reports were
ever received from the hardest-hit areas. Still, more accurate numbers provided earlier
by the press could have made the international response both faster and more focused
on areas that needed help the most.
The U.S. Navy’s decision to send over two dozen large and capable ships, including the
carrier Abraham Lincoln, was made to allow the response to ramp up as the scope of the
disaster became clear. This was not an accident or afterthought; the possibility of escala-
tion was factored into the decision-making process from the very beginning.4 This made
possible the rapid arrival of highly flexible sea-base ships to coordinate the humanitarian
relief mission.
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Rapid and Flexible Sea Basing
Sea basing merged capability with cultural awareness and proved to be particularly
important because the destruction throughout Aceh Province was so widespread; it
was later to serve as a model for the post-Katrina cleanup on the Gulf of Mexico.5 One
participant who had contributed to damage control after 9/11 compared that response
with the tsunami relief mission: “Initial reaction on going ashore . . . flying over the
area and seeing the devastation was mind-boggling.”6
Abraham Lincoln provided a unique capability, one that is “unmatched anywhere in the
world” and gave the United States the greatest possible range of operational choices
and capabilities.7 Some critics, pointing to the six-million-dollar-a-day price tag,
argued that an aircraft carrier was “not a particularly efficient vehicle for delivering aid
and succor to scattered, ravaged villages.”8 High-speed ships like WestPac Express, and
perhaps even the new Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), could have arrived at the disaster
area in far less time and operated at a far lower daily cost.
Or, as General Mike Hagee, Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, later put it, “What
are your sea connectors and how fast can they go? Can we take some of the ships on the
drawing boards, which are quite fast, relatively small, maybe don’t have all the protec-
tion that a gray-bottom would have, and could we use that as part of the sea basing?”9
Depending on the nature of the crisis, such vessels could have been quickly reconfig-
ured for roll-on/roll-off to respond to specific humanitarian missions.
But such criticism generally ignores the enormous psychological impact of sending an
aircraft carrier. As Admiral Fargo emphasized, “You have already paid for the fixed
costs, like fuel for the nuclear reactor. . . . Nobody sat around thinking that we will do
this if there is a supplemental.”10 While many other countries assisted under the aus-
pices of the United Nations, and in doing so exerted “soft power,” their contributions
were limited in comparison to the U.S. Navy’s hard-power assets.
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The carrier was much more than just a delivery system but the focus of virtually all
decision making, logistics coordination, communications, and support for a myriad of
diverse activities: “Sea-basing was required, not really delivery from the sea.”11 For many
victims the American “carrier projected not only power but hope”; in particular, the
“UN people were appreciative of what the ‘big grey house’ provided.”12
According to Rear Admiral Crowder, sea basing also allowed the U.S. Navy to “low-key
our presence,” reduce the “footprint,” and thereby minimize cultural friction.13 Sea bas-
ing provided by Abraham Lincoln was “less intrusive”—“such missions are more likely
to be welcomed by nations concerned with the presence of United States military per-
sonnel ‘occupying’ bases ashore.”14
Finally, sea basing combined well with force protection, since the ability to return all
personnel each night from Banda Aceh to their ships helped prevent “the relief mission
from becoming a potential target for terrorists.”15 During UNIFIED ASSISTANCE only
about 2,500 American troops, about 15 percent of the total force, were based on land
throughout the entire region.16 According to Admiral Fargo, “The sea base means you
don’t have the force protection, and you solve a lot of political issues. . . . These are sov-
ereign nations who have a great deal of pride. And the fact that you don’t have a great
number of people on the ground 24 hours a day is a great advantage.”17
The U.S. Navy’s rapid arrival, long-term presence, small “footprint” on the land, and
sensitivity to the local culture showed Indonesians that Americans cared about them as
individuals. In this way, “Abraham Lincoln was the face of America.”18
Creating a Robust Logistical Train
Sea basing could coordinate and funnel essential humanitarian supplies. While the
total tonnage of supplies delivered was one measure of the operation’s success, the
coordination required to deliver it to the right locations was even more important:
“Sea-based relief efforts capitalize on the efficiencies gained from the existing support
infrastructure of ships (communications, food, shelter, medical facilities, and fuel).”19
With regard to the size of the logistical flow, UNIFIED ASSISTANCE in some ways rivaled
a Berlin Airlift at sea, conducted over forty days rather than four hundred. After only
two weeks, military logistics had moved sixteen million pounds of relief supplies.20
According to Admiral Fargo, from late December through mid-February the U.S. mili-
tary delivered over twenty-four million pounds of relief supplies.21 As the prime coor-
dinator of this mission in Indonesia, Abraham Lincoln and its carrier strike group
together “flew 1,800 sorties, delivered 2,700 tons of food, water and medicine and evac-
uated 3,000 people.”22
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While the sea bases were efficient, the logistics interface with the local government was
not so smooth, making that aspect of the effort often chaotic and ad hoc. Tim Con-
nolly, adviser to the World Food Program, reported at one point, “Planes are just drop-
ping out of the sky unannounced.”23 Due to the confusion, there were concerns that aid
might be sold instead of being given away free. Some Indonesians trusted the Ameri-
cans more than their own soldiers to deliver the aid fairly. As Idris Rusli, who lived in a
destroyed neighborhood of Banda Aceh, warned, “They [Indonesian personnel] will
sell it themselves because they are very bad. . . . I worry about that. I really, really worry
about that.”24 That points to a problem that may need to be addressed in the future:
keeping U.S. military on sea bases leaves local government officials in control of the
distribution of aid. As one senior agency official reported, “We’ve had some reports of
TNI [Indonesia military personnel] . . . hoarding supplies—up to 30 per cent in some
places.”25 Ambassador Pascoe later acknowledged, in response to a question from the
press, that the “high level of corruption” in Indonesia was a “very serious problem.”26
Foreign coordination of humanitarian relief needs to take local corruption into
account and take positive measures to deliver supplies directly to those who really need
them the most.
Helicopter Access to Disaster Areas
Once humanitarian supplies were in-theater they had to be delivered, usually by helicop-
ter. Andrew Natsios acknowledged, “I don’t know where this relief operation would be
without the ships, airplanes, helicopters, manpower, and can-do attitude provided by the
U.S. military.”27 The emphasis on helicopters, however, put extraordinary demands on the
pilots, their crew, and maintenance. At least eight pilots on Abraham Lincoln flew over a
hundred hours, and maintenance personnel worked “unbelievable hours.”28
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Even at that, had there been opposition on the ground the mission might not have suc-
ceeded as it did. As we have seen, simply dropping supplies from safe altitudes would
not have been the answer. Brigadier General Paul J. Selva, operations director of the
U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, later reflected that “air drops were
considered, but food without water leads to dehydration. Water containers dropped
from a plane tend to break.”29
Americans fluent in the local languages were especially needed. People like Michael
Bach, one of the USAID representatives, “made everything happen . . . spoke seven lan-
guages.”30 On many occasions a “language barrier between helos and the tower” arose,
and the pilots would have to work by “sight rather than communication.”31 To interact
with people on the ground, the helicopter crews would write up handbills with short
messages, mainly safety related, such as STAY AWAY FROM HELICOPTERS, or DON’T
THROW THINGS AT THE HELOS. They would then find a native speaker to make up a
batch of these signs.32
During UNIFIED ASSISTANCE,
sea-base platforms were per-
haps overly dependent on
helicopter access. Had a hos-
tile power wanted to disrupt
the sea-base mission, the
helicopters would have been
an obvious target. Although
such occasions were rare,
helicopter pilots and their
crews did sometimes feel
threatened by desperate sur-
vivors. In future operations
of this type, the sea-base ship
should not become tied to helicopters solely but establish other forms of access as well.
Communications Promoting Efficient Coordination
Communications increased coordination but not necessarily command. Rear Admiral
Crowder described his relationships with other militaries and organizations as “not a
command relationship,” since there was no “combined military chain of command.” Each
nation made its own agreement with Indonesia. The U.S. Navy helped by providing
maps, pictures, and course rules for helicopters, but there was no “command relation-
ship.”33 According to Admiral Fargo, it was “coordination vice command or compel”; still,
he was convinced, “[you] must have some structure that allows you to prioritize.”34
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For many U.S. Navy officers, this type of coalition was completely new. In fact, as
Captain Bob Aronson pointed out, “it was not a coalition at all.” In hindsight, the mis-
sion coordinators should have set up an unclassified chat server, but even that would
not have solved the problem of people not wanting to coordinate at all: “I wouldn’t
look at it like collaboration was a failure. . . . [I]t was a collection, not a coalition.”35
Throughout UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, then, coordination with Indonesia remained key.
The U.S. government communicated constantly with the Indonesian government
through its embassy in Jakarta and the CSG-Indonesia headquarters in Medan. The
absence of a status-of-forces agreement can severely constrain “the scope of the assis-
tance provided by the foreign military.” After the disaster, nations throughout South-
east Asia were urged to develop a regional network of status-of-forces agreements,
based on a single standard document rather than a series of bilateral agreements.36
Finally, ship-to-shore contacts were often more difficult than global communications,
and differences in networks—such as those between the unclassified NIPRNET and the
classified SIPRNET—interfered with information sharing. The one exception was the
information website made available on the Utapao Web server, which could be down-
loaded by anyone, virtually anywhere. This was one of the most information-friendly
developments to come out of Utapao. What was required in addition was a similarly
unclassified and open system that would have allowed personnel on ships or moving
helicopters or in shore parties to communicate with each other.
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The Medical Mission
The comparatively late arrival of the USNS Mercy limited its potential benefits. Mercy
did not treat patients until well over a month after the disaster, by which time most of
the tsunami victims had either died or already received rudimentary medical attention.
Mercy lacked the range of specialists available on other Navy ships and so needed con-
stant support from them. For example, it had no helicopters of its own, and none of its
crew were trained in how to operate a flight deck.
There were also some unexpected problems mixing civilians with naval personnel; in
one case a Project Hope volunteer and a U.S. Navy sailor were discovered engaged in a
sexual relationship. The sailor was returned to the parent command, while the Project
Hope volunteer remained onboard. In another case, one of the Project Hope volun-
teers, who was openly gay, repeatedly complimented same-sex military personnel about
their appearance.37
Nevertheless, the arrival of Mercy and its extended civil-military medical mission to
provide long-term health care sent a strong message to the Indonesian people and gov-
ernment. According to Captain Nathan Smith, Mercy’s mission was a successful combi-
nation of “Navy medicine, U.S. Public Heath Service, NGOs, and others.” When the
Indonesian military leader in Banda Aceh thanked Mercy there were “tears in his eyes,”
proving that a “hospital ship can be the best diplomat of the 21st century.”38
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Helicopters delivered injured Indonesians directly to modern medical facilities.
T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NP28\Printer\NP28.vp
Tuesday, January 23, 2007 3:10:33 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
Recommendations
In order to prepare for a future naval humanitarian mission similar to UNIFIED ASSIS-
TANCE, several changes should be considered. As we have seen, insufficient and gener-
ally inadequate disaster reporting by the local governments and international media
delayed accurate planning by many days, forcing commands to plan and execute simul-
taneously. New forms of information management are required as an adjunct to, per-
haps even a substitute for, local reporting.
Sea-base platforms like Abraham Lincoln were criticized as only “marginally useful”
compared to vessels able to function well in shallow, intertidal zones.39 Although they
provide the widest range of capabilities and represent high prestige, the size and oper-
ating cost of aircraft carriers would normally militate against their being sent as first
responders to crises. In the speed-versus-capability equation, speed will almost always
win out in a humanitarian disaster response. In future crises more mobile ships,
including possibly the LCS, may prove faster and cheaper first responders.
Although the Transportation Command efficiently deployed prepositioned ships and
moved many supplies by sea, the cost was high. In the future, air delivery in combina-
tion with air drops would be more cost-effective. The problem remains how to drop
fresh water in bulk. While in the Indonesian case helicopter access appeared preferable,
especially since local corruption might have otherwise undermined the proper delivery
of supplies, such logistical problems will need to be examined and solved prior to
future aid missions from the sea.
Helicopter pilots and crew were generally overworked and overstressed. Alternative
delivery capabilities are clearly needed. Force protection was also a concern, since the
helicopter pilots and their crews were generally unarmed and so vulnerable to attack.
Ship-based communications were particularly useful, especially between Abraham
Lincoln and PACOM. However, regional and local communications were more diffi-
cult, and ship-to-shore communications could be problematic at best. Interestingly,
communications problems seemed most acute not between various ships within a sin-
gle strike group but among different strike groups trying to coordinate with each other.
Finally, while the medical mission embodied the best of intentions, it came on the scene
far too late to help many of the sick and wounded. Faster response and greater mobility,
perhaps through ultra-fast catamaran ships outfitted with containerized medical mis-
sions, should be seriously considered. Rapid supply of medicines specifically intended for
a humanitarian mission would be easier if a modular system were adopted.
Despite various problems related to sea basing, logistics, access, communications, and
medical assistance, the UNIFIED ASSISTANCE model worked very well in northern
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Indonesia. Sea basing, by keeping American military forces away from civilian areas,
especially at night, helped to decrease the chance of any cultural or religious friction,
making this operational model particularly appropriate for future humanitarian mis-
sions in other highly sensitive regions. As it was, the positive impact on local public
opinion was enormous. The operation had, in turn, a far-reaching impact on the global
war on terror, increased good will between the American and Indonesian governments,
fostered respect and appreciation by the Indonesian people, and so produced signifi-
cant political benefits for the United States, both regionally and globally.
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The Political Benefits of UNIFIED ASSISTANCE
Some of our students who used to be quite aggressive [in their anti-
American beliefs] have become more moderate now.
DR. FADIL LUBIS, STATE INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC STUDIES
MEDAN, INDONESIA, 6 JANUARY 2005
Although the bulk of American troops were gone after only six weeks, UNIFIED ASSIS-
TANCE dramatically improved U.S.-Indonesian government-to-government and military-
to-military relations, and so furthered the goals of the global war on terror and of
regional cooperation.1 From the very beginning, the American response to the tsunami
crisis set up conditions for improved relations. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
argued that renewing full U.S. military ties with the world’s largest Muslim nation was
an essential part of winning the war on terror, since traditionally Indonesians practice
a moderate form of Islam.2
The final relief numbers provide compelling evidence of the impact of UNIFIED ASSIS-
TANCE on Southeast Asia in general, and Indonesia specifically. The United States gov-
ernment donated $950 million; Australia was the second-largest aid provider, at $750
million in grants and loans, followed by Germany at about $680 million; Japan pledged
$540 million, the European Union $624 million; China was far behind at $82 million,
with Taiwan close on its heels at $50 million in aid. According to Andrew S. Natsios,
this made the United States’ pledge “the largest for a single disaster in the country’s his-
tory.” In addition, American citizens “have given $700 million to charities for the relief
effort.”3
But one senior Asian military official, who requested anonymity, warned the United
States to be cautious in its attempts to improve relations with Indonesia too quickly. “I
recognize from an American perspective, this is a great opportunity to restore their
image and to make a real contribution. Nobody can match the resources the Americans
are bringing in. But America does carry a certain baggage in these parts and it doesn’t
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American forces at arms length and out of sight, especially at night when visiting mili-
tary personnel would normally have a chance to mingle with locals, allowed the United
States to retain the Indonesian citizenry’s good will, even while improving political ties
with a key country in the fight against terrorism.5
Sea basing was also particularly appropriate in a country where Muslims predominate
in the population. One newspaper pointed out that “with the exception of Indonesia,
the hardest-hit areas are not Muslim. Sri Lanka’s separatist Tamils are mostly Hindus
and its ruling Sinhalese mostly Buddhists. India’s southeast coast is largely Hindu, with
many Christians. Most Thais are Buddhist, and in that country, about half of the tsu-
nami’s victims were foreigners. The wave virtually missed the heavily Muslim shore-
lines of Bangladesh and Malaysia.”6 U.S. troops could be based ashore without any
apparent concern in Thailand and Sri Lanka, where the local cultures and religions
were not antagonistic toward Americans, but in northern Indonesia sea basing was
clearly a preferable option.
Once cultural tensions had been assuaged, the U.S. government could take political
advantage of UNIFIED ASSISTANCE to halt its embargo of military goods to the Indone-
sian government and reopen normal diplomatic relations. One early example of
improved military-military relations was the American decision to supply Indonesia
with parts to repair their C-130s, assistance that had been denied to them previously,
by the Clinton administration.7 Prior to the arrival of these spare parts, only eight of
Indonesia’s twenty-five C-130s were fit to fly.8
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AMCS Ray Adams and AD3 Jason Shireman with grateful Indonesian children, Kreung Sabe,
Aceh Province.
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During February 2005, Washington also resumed IMET, the International Military Edu-
cation and Training program, for Indonesian military personnel, as well as the sale of
nonlethal military equipment. Later, in May 2005, President Bush stated that “the re-
sumption of normal military relations would be in the interest of both countries.” Indo-
nesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who had graduated from the IMET
program and once called the United States his “second home,” supported this shift in
American policy. On 22 November 2005, President Bush lifted an embargo on military
exports and foreign military financing to Indonesia and allocated a million dollars in aid
to the Indonesian Navy for 2006. This change in policy, argued Dr. Greg Fealy, an Austra-
lian National University lecturer, was primarily a product of UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, since
the “tsunami spurred unprecedented cooperation with Indonesia’s military.”9
The creation of U.S.-Indonesian institutional bonds supporting the war on terror was a
major by-product of the good working relations developed during the humanitarian
relief operation. The sea-based humanitarian mission of OUA thus had a truly global
effect. As Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter stated on 13 June 2006, “We have
seen significantly positive impacts in Indonesia, Pakistan and the Horn of Africa as a
direct result of our and other nations’ humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.”10
Within Asia, the presence of the U.S. military during UNIFIED ASSISTANCE also helped
to reassure regional allies that a rapidly rising China would not slip in and fill a
geopolitical vacuum. Prior to December 2004, the viability of the continued American
presence in the region had been questioned, especially by the spectacular rise of
China’s “soft power.”11 The Chinese armed forces’ logistics organization was called
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Indonesian refugees waving goodbye to American aid providers.
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upon to help tsunami victims, and for the first time China played a role in assisting
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Myanmar, but its total aid was low, especially in
dollar terms—only $82 million in government aid and another $35 million in private
donations. One author noted, “The government of Norway, by way of comparison, has
pledged $180 million.”12
Meanwhile, the U.S. decision to send “hard power” assets, like Abraham Lincoln, pro-
duced substantial “soft power” benefits.13 Since UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, assessments of
China’s “soft power” throughout the region have subtly changed, with some scholars
now arguing that “while China’s soft power is increasing, Beijing faces serious con-
straints in translating these resources into desired foreign-policy outcomes.”14 Among
other things, China’s inability to support large numbers of humanitarian forces over-
seas undoubtedly reemphasized to the Southeast Asian governments the importance of
retaining the U.S. military as the primary security provider.15
When viewed in terms of the Confucian concept of ren, or “humaneness,” Washington
was able to outshine Beijing by far. China is clearly aspiring to become the regional
superpower by using a whole range of government powers, including its military
forces, but when put to the test its naval forces failed. In recent articles discussing
whether or not China should build its own aircraft carrier, Chinese researchers have
highlighted a carrier’s ability to conduct “disaster relief, and rebuilding.”16
It was evident to all countries in the region that whereas the U.S. government could
quickly dispatch a carrier strike group and an expeditionary strike group to assist in the
humanitarian operations, and Japan tasked its maritime forces to assist, the Chinese did
not order their navy to sea. China’s humanitarian efforts following the tsunami were
modest; according to Admiral Fargo, the Chinese “haven’t quite figured out how to
work effectively in these multinational or coalition situations. They don’t have the
structure or the training.”17 As Jeffrey Bader, a National Security Council Asian expert
during the Clinton administration, noted, “This gives us an opportunity to remind the
countries in the region that there are things that we can do that no one else can do—
and, in particular, China can’t do.”18
This operation may have also sent an unintended military warning to China, since the
USS Abraham Lincoln’s daily routine also included flight operations off the western
mouth of the Malacca Straits. As Captain Raymond Ginetti later recounted, every night
Abraham Lincoln would move about fifty miles out from shore, to return the next day
and resume the humanitarian mission.19 One reason Abraham Lincoln had to move so
far offshore was that under U.S. Navy rules, carrier-based pilots who do not train (as
pilots of the carrier’s fixed-wing aircraft could not, under these conditions) for two
weeks straight must undergo extensive retraining; the Indonesian government,
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however, was hesitant to allow the ship’s fighter pilots to use Indonesian airspace. But if
this training was conducted outside of Indonesia’s sovereign waters, it took place in a
highly strategic part of the world—the westernmost end of the Straits of Malacca—
just where U.S. naval forces might choose to establish a blockade in a serious Sino-
American conflict.20 Therefore, the training missions clearly showed China how
quickly U.S. forces could reach the area, and how efficiently they might be able to inter-
dict Chinese trade. This lesson can be applied, in particular, to oil purchased from the
Persian Gulf, 80 percent of which passes through the straits on its way to China.21
Prior to UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, the U.S. government’s image in Indonesia clearly needed a
boost. Following the invasion of Iraq, the popularity of the United States in Indonesia
sank from 61 percent to only 15 within just a year, according to a poll by the Manhattan-
based Pew Research Center. However, in one poll conducted after Abraham Lincoln and
Mercy had left Indonesia the “results were a 39% favorable increase in how the Indone-
sian people view the United States. That’s a significant increase, and this type of mis-
sion is wonderful for diplomacy.”22
More importantly, in a survey taken in June 2005, 59 percent of the Indonesian people
agreed that the United States paid a “great deal or a fair amount of attention to their
country’s interests,” placing it among only four countries to hold that view (one of
them being the United States itself) out of sixteen surveyed.23 As R. William Liddle, an
Indonesia scholar at Ohio State University, noted, during UNIFIED ASSISTANCE
Internet postings in Indonesia became remarkably friendly, including one that read:
“Welcome Uncle Sam!”24
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Commander Carrier Strike Group 9, Rear Admiral Douglas Crowder, points to
sailors gathered on the flight deck while holding a framed photo of an Indonesian
woman holding a sign that states “U.S. Soldiers Don't Leave.”
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Afterword: Maritime Strategy and Naval Responses to Nonmilitary Threats
Since men live upon land and not upon the sea, great issues between
nations at war have always been decided—except in the rarest of
cases—by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and
national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for
your army to do.
SIR JULIAN CORBETT, BRITISH NAVAL STRATEGIST, 1911
While Sir Julian Corbett accurately highlighted the traditional function of navies
assigned to support land forces, it is perhaps not surprising that he did not foresee the
need for navies to respond to nonmilitary emergencies, let alone large-scale humani-
tarian relief missions like UNIFIED ASSISTANCE.1 Humanitarian and military operations
have usually been considered mutually exclusive. Only at the end of World War II, and
then only by default, were militaries used to engage in nation-building operations. The
Berlin Airlift of 1948–49, for example, was a humanitarian relief mission in response to
a direct military threat, as the Soviet Union blockaded access to Berlin. Operation
UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, by contrast, responded to a purely natural disaster.
What assets or special capabilities can navies provide in times of war and peace that the
other services cannot? Theorists of military strategy have focused on two naval mis-
sions: “the establishment of control of the sea” and “the exploitation of the control of
the sea toward establishment of control on the land.”2 While Alfred Thayer Mahan
emphasized the many dimensions of “control of the sea,” Corbett, in his Some Princi-
ples of Maritime Strategy, provided a structurally complete analysis of sea power, one
that the leaders of the U.S. Navy read with great interest and soon made part of its
intellectual tradition.3
Historically, the navies of sea powers have been doctrinally most comfortable with sea-
control missions that actually take place on and concern the sea itself. The mission of
influencing events on the land from the sea has been more challenging. Arguably, the
technology and methods needed to obtain this goal did not become truly available
until the middle of the twentieth century, between the great European wars. The 6 June
1944 D-Day landings of vast armies, with their weapons, ammunition, and armor, were
perhaps the ultimate proof that this broader kind of sea control could be obtained.
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Yet many people at the time considered that development exceptional and unlikely to
be repeated. In October 1949, General Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, stated, “I predict that large-scale amphibious operations will never occur
again,” while President Harry S. Truman’s secretary of defense, Louis A. Johnson,
reportedly told Admiral Richard L. Conolly, “We’ll never have any more amphibious
operations. That does away with the Marine Corps. And the Air Force can do anything
the Navy can do nowadays, so that does away with the Navy.”4
The 15 September 1950 Inchon amphibious landing during the Korean War demon-
strated again the importance to the land of sea control. UNIFIED ASSISTANCE’S sea bas-
ing further showed that supplies can be transported directly from the sea to temporary
points of distribution ashore. As General Hagee later explained, with sea basing “you
erase the line between the sea and the land.” During World War II and in Korea, the
American military first had “to build up a logistics on the beach before we could move
inland.” With sea basing, that was no longer necessary.5
Clearly, navies that enjoy both aspects of sea control now have leverage that other ser-
vices do not have. Corbett’s discussion of sea control focused on the importance of
interrupting enemies’ sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and denying them the abil-
ity to use the sea—in other words, the imposition of a policy of naval blockade against
another country. He did not foresee that the reverse might some day become equally
important: the augmentation of another country’s maritime lines of communication,
so as to deliver humanitarian supplies in times of need.
In this regard, Corbett’s definition of a naval blockade embodied the twofold nature of
sea control: “By occupying her [in this case the enemy’s] maritime communications
and closing the points of distribution in which they terminate we destroy the national
life afloat.”6 This definition included three distinct goals: taking control over sea lines
of communications, closing points of distribution, and destroying national life at sea
and, by extension, on the land as well.
Naval humanitarian relief operations also appear to embody these three goals, but with
the reverse impact in mind. In terms that are parallel but have precisely the opposite
intended effects: By occupying the affected country’s sea lines of communications and
keeping open the points of distribution in which they terminate we sustain the national
life. Many elements of naval humanitarian relief operations are therefore similar to
those required for naval blockades, although naval relief missions hope to help whereas
blockades aim to hurt. Instead of draining away logistical supplies, a sea base creates
new and more robust logistical supply lines that reach temporary points of distribution
in order to sustain a country’s national life, even while restoring that country’s infra-
structure, trade, and commerce.
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Of all military forces, only a navy can, by operating in the neutral world oceans, estab-
lish a “subtle, benign, ubiquitous presence” that gives it “a peacetime as well as a war-
time employable usefulness to the nation.”7 From this perspective, naval relief missions
can make use of many of the same “hard power” strategic assets as a naval blockade to
produce significant “soft power” effects.8
* * * * * * *
What role have navies played to date in nonmilitary operations, particularly humani-
tarian relief missions? The primary functions of a navy can be “conceived as a trinity,”
embodying “the military, the diplomatic, and the policing functions.” The first includes
either the “threat” or the actual “use” of force. The second includes the use of naval
forces in the “management of foreign policy short of the actual employment of force.”
The third, focusing on the internal matters of a state, is “rarely concerned with the
armed forces of other states,” but rather “with extending sovereignty over the state’s
own maritime frontiers.”9
The one nonmilitary exception is nation building, in which naval forces can contribute
to the internal stability and development of another country. Historically, the U.S.
Navy has played major roles in humanitarian crises, beginning with its response to the
1906 earthquake in San Francisco. Soon afterward, in 1908, as noted above, the “Great
White Fleet” assisted Messina, Sicily, after an earthquake and tsunami killed more than
seventy thousand people. During World War II, the Lend-Lease program was another
nonmilitary (at least, noncombat) naval operation that provided both humanitarian
and military supplies.
Arguably, during the Cold War the humanitarian mission lapsed into secondary
importance, the U.S. military being focused on the Soviet threat. Only after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was the Navy once again tasked to carry out
high-priority humanitarian duties. Brigadier General Selva noted in 2005 that “the
[U.S. Transportation] command has aided in 35 previous disasters worldwide since
it was established in 1991.”10 Beginning in the spring and summer of 1991, the U.S.
Navy received repeated humanitarian taskings. In May 1991, during Operation SEA
ANGEL, American naval and Marine personnel assisted Bangladesh after Tropical
Cyclone Marian killed between 139,000 and 152,000 people.11 SEA ANGEL has been
called a textbook civil-military operation in support of a humanitarian mission.12
During Operation FIERY VIGIL, in the wake of the Mount Pinatubo’s 15 June 1991
eruption, a number of Seventh Fleet ships evacuated American military and fam-
ilies. The Navy’s oldest aircraft carrier at the time, USS Midway (CV 41), and the
newest, Abraham Lincoln, brought the evacuees to Cebu, from where they took
Air Force and commercial planes to Andersen Air Force Base on Guam or to
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Hickam in Hawaii, and then on to McChord Air Force Base in Washington or to
Travis in California.
The joint U.S. Navy/Air Force Operation PROVIDE PROMISE (July 1992–March 1996)
protected humanitarian relief efforts in the besieged cities of the former Yugoslavia.
Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Europe, was responsi-
ble for supplying humanitarian relief to Bosnia-Herzegovina via air-land and air-drop
missions. Beginning on 28 February 1993, the United States began an air drop of relief
supplies aimed at Muslims surrounded by Serbian forces in Bosnia.
On 2 December 1996, President Bill Clinton announced the participation of U.S. mili-
tary personnel and aircraft in Operation GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE to augment United
Nations humanitarian assistance to refugees in Rwanda and the lakes region of eastern
Zaire (in 1997, Zaire became the Democratic Republic of the Congo). This humanitar-
ian relief mission involved U.S. naval aircraft overflying parts of the lakes region.
On 25 August 2000, President Clinton reported to Congress that the United States
would participate in the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor. The U.S. mili-
tary maintained personnel in East Timor to conduct humanitarian and civic assistance
missions. In particular, Operation WARDEN included the use of four Marine Corps
heavy-lift helicopters, an Army communications team, and 1,836 Marines and naval
personnel afloat in the assault ship USS Belleau Wood (LHA 3).
In each of these humanitarian missions, the U.S. Navy participated in what would nor-
mally be called a “nation-building” operation. The Navy was not alone in these efforts,
and indeed they were only possible through joint operations with the Army, Air Force,
and Marine Corps. The naval contribution depended on the nature of the theater and
the proximity to the sea. For geographical reasons, nation-building functions cannot be
performed on an extensive scale by navies, but navies can make worthwhile contribu-
tions after natural disasters or during civil wars.
* * * * * * *
Based on an analysis of factors of time, space, and force, six naval humanitarian relief
missions—to Bangladesh, the Philippines, Yugoslavia, Zaire, East Timor, and Indonesia—
have certain unifying characteristics.
Naval humanitarian missions have many of the same characteristics as blockades. Like
blockades they can be partial or total in terms of their overall ability to create tempo-
rary points of distribution to deliver and disperse supplies. Similarly, humanitarian
missions can be distinguished as “near” or “far,” in reference to the distance of the the-
ater of operations from the country providing the naval platforms and the supplies,
with UNIFIED ASSISTANCE being a good example of a “far” U.S. mission.
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The rate of implementation and duration of a humanitarian relief mission can influ-
ence effectiveness. Implementation can be rapid, gradually increasing, or intermittent,
while the duration can be short, medium, or long. Rapidly deployed relief missions
tend to be most suited to provide such basic necessities as water, food, and medicine,
while gradual or intermittent relief missions are more suited for rebuilding basic ser-
vices, such as roads, sanitation, communications, and long-term medical care.
The duration of a humanitarian mission can also indicate what its main focus will be.
In UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, which lasted only about six weeks, the primary goal was to
provide life-sustaining water, food, and medicines. Due to severe time constraints, U.S.
military forces did not emphasize rebuilding basic infrastructure, although the hospital
ship Mercy was able to assist in rebuilding Indonesia’s emergency medical services.
Geographical limitations include access to the sea, riverine access inland, and the trans-
portation infrastructure on land. Aid relief via naval vessels makes economic sense only
under certain circumstances. For the U.S. Navy to take the lead role in a humanitarian
relief operation, the afflicted country must be relatively isolated from its neighbors,
especially neighbors that share contiguous land borders near the site of the disaster.
Otherwise, relief is more efficiently delivered overland. For obvious reasons, island,
peninsular, or coastal countries and those that are separated from their neighbors by
natural obstacles, such as high mountain chains or extensive bodies of water, including
lakes and rivers, are the most susceptible to naval assistance. The nation must also have
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ample landing areas for helicopter access—which was not an issue in Indonesia, due to
the extreme damage.
Finally, countries with minimal transportation infrastructures, or more highly devel-
oped countries that have suffered catastrophic devastation, potentially benefit the most
from the basic services that a modern naval force is able to deliver. In cases of internal
natural disasters (such as earthquakes) where crucial transportation and communica-
tion infrastructure is destroyed, or large-scale coastal disasters (including tsunamis and
typhoons) where boats, docks, and dock equipment are destroyed, responders must
provide their own logistical flow, access, communications, and medical services, and
only sea-based naval forces can do so.
After time and space, force constitutes perhaps the most critical dimension of humani-
tarian relief efforts. In the modern era, the ability to conduct a naval humanitarian
mission requires surface ships, fixed-wing airplanes, and helicopters; joint or combined
operations among naval, land, and, increasingly, air assets; and delivery of humanitar-
ian supplies directly into the affected country’s sovereign land, sea, or air space. The
duration of the humanitarian mission also has an impact on force levels, since protrac-
tion can either deplete a fixed force or require reinforcements.
In the past, humanitarian missions conducted from the sea in the absence of major
land operations were rare, usually involving simple air drops. Many recent naval
humanitarian missions, like the Mount Pinatubo evacuation and OUA, have entailed
joint and combined operations coordinating sea, land, and air operations. As fixed-
wing aircraft and helicopters have become more available and dependable, they have
been used in place of naval or land forces to deliver needed supplies.
1 1 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
Because fresh water had to be delivered along with food, air drops from planes
were not an option in Aceh Province, requiring aid delivery by helicopter.
T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NP28\Printer\NP28.vp
Tuesday, January 23, 2007 3:10:53 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
Technological breakthroughs have greatly influenced the cost, execution, and feasi-
bility of all types of humanitarian relief missions from the sea. Joint and combined
operations have also played an increasingly important role, with sea-air operations
substituting for land-sea operations in the modern period. This has limited the size
of the footprint ashore. Humanitarian relief missions by sea can also be executed
unilaterally or in combination with a coalition. UNIFIED ASSISTANCE showed that
some missions might also work best with a “collection” rather than a formal coali-
tion, although without proper communications such an assemblage can rapidly
devolve into chaos.
Humanitarian missions are a means to an end. At the operational level, they are sim-
ply a way to assist with transportation and communications so as to enable the flow
of aid. At the strategic level, however, they can—sometimes alone but more often in
combination with other actions—provide a means to achieve an overarching
national goal that provides the rationale for providing assistance. Strategic goals can
include, but are not limited to, improving diplomatic relations, increasing military-
to-military cooperation, and fostering public good will. As this study has sought to
show, UNIFIED ASSISTANCE clearly attained all of these strategic goals in the relations
of the United States with Indonesia.
* * * * * * *
Evaluating the effectiveness of a humanitarian relief mission has three parts: Did the mis-
sion achieve its operational goal? Did this contribute to the achievement of strategic suc-
cess? Were the benefits commensurate to the costs? Factors influencing effectiveness
include availability of alternative lines of communication and of cheaper substitutes for
relief supplies, and the size of the area receiving humanitarian assistance.
Table 2 shows that historically the most effective naval humanitarian relief missions
focused on isolated regions that could readily be accessed only by the sea, were imple-
mented rapidly, and were of short to medium duration. Of these six humanitarian relief
efforts, three responded to civil wars—Yugoslavia, Zaire, and East Timor—while the
other three were the result of natural disasters—Bangladesh, Pinatubo, and Indonesia.
Success rates for the three natural disasters appear to be higher overall than for those
undergoing civil wars, with East Timor being one possible exception, perhaps because of
its relatively small geographic size and the operation’s medium duration.
The absence of organized security threats to humanitarian forces following natural
disasters helps make them succeed, while natural disasters tend to make afflicted popu-
lations extraordinarily receptive to donor nations. However, unlike the two other cases
of natural disaster, Bangladesh and the Philippines, the Indonesian case provides a
model for humanitarian aid in a disaster area that also has an active insurgency.
W A V E S O F H O P E 1 1 3
T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NP28\Printer\NP28.vp
Tuesday, January 23, 2007 3:10:53 PM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
UNIFIED ASSISTANCE was arguably the first American naval humanitarian mission con-
ducted successfully despite a constant need for force protection.
Another important inhibiting factor in Yugoslavia and Zaire was the existence of alter-
native land lines, for which reason naval relief forces could play only a relatively small
role, even over the long and medium terms. Reasons for lower success rates also appear
to be connected to the size of the area involved, which in turn is often connected to the
nature of the theater. In five of the six cases—East Timor being the only exception—
the affected areas were huge.
The effectiveness of sea-based humanitarian relief missions is a function of the size of
the affected area, the rate of implementation, and the level of cooperation of the local
populations. The smaller the region and the less interconnected it is by land, the
greater the impact of a naval power. Thus, the most obviously successful naval humani-
tarian relief missions involved sea powers assisting islands or isolated areas, such as
Aceh Province, where the operation had the dual effect of replacing basic infrastructure
and communications even while assisting people in need. The four most successful
naval operations—Bangladesh, Pinatubo, East Timor, and Indonesia—closely fit these
characteristics. Rear Admiral Crowder has effectively acknowledged this point: “This is
a once in a generation, if not once in a lifetime, natural disaster that has occurred in
this area of the world.”13
As technology has changed, so too have the ways in which such missions acquire access
to the afflicted countries. Over time, naval relief missions have shifted from sending
surface ships to access port facilities to relying on aviation. Thus, helicopters played a
particularly important role in UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. With the coming of the V-22 tilt-
rotor, a new era of airborne relief missions may be imminent.
Future relief efforts from the sea will probably be conducted by multinational coali-
tions: the projected “thousand-ship navy,” informal “coalitions of the willing,” or UN-
sponsored groupings. In such a multinational atmosphere, communications, including












Bangladesh none huge rapid short operational—high
Philippines none huge rapid short operational—high
Yugoslavia land lines huge intermittent long both—medium
Zaire land lines huge rapid medium operational—medium
East Timor none limited rapid medium both—medium
Indonesia none huge rapid short both—high
TABLE 2
U.S. Naval Relief Operations, 1991–2005
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unclassified cell phones, Internet chat rooms, and satellite communications, will play
ever more important roles. Given these changing circumstances, seapower will remain
essential for conducting humanitarian aid missions, even though access and communi-
cations platforms will more often be in the air or even in space, as the importance of
helicopters and satellite communications during OUA showed.
* * * * * * *
During UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, aircraft carriers, with numerous helicopters, and helicopter-
capable amphibious ships were particularly effective. Although not a particularly cheap
means for delivering aid, these “floating cities” provided many of the basic supplies
required in the initial stage of the humanitarian relief operation, including fresh water,
food, medical supplies, and building materials for temporary shelters, as well as in the
widest variety of humanitarian activities on land.
To support the carriers and amphibious ships, forward logistical bases like the landing
field at Utapao and the U.S. Navy’s logistics center at Singapore worked closely with
naval logistics ships provided by the Military Sealift Command. Together they trans-
ported enormous quantities of relief supplies, as well as the manpower and equipment
needed to offload them. MSC ships provided an invaluable service, especially in the ini-
tial phases of the operation before the opening of reliable air distribution routes.
Due to the crippling damage to the infrastructure of the affected countries, as well as to
the general lack of functioning central government organs and to widespread corrup-
tion, it was crucial that fixed-wing and rotary-wing platforms take relief supplies
directly to the affected areas, avoiding the more normal permanent points of distribu-
tion in favor of temporary points.
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Communications were an essential part of the mission, both up and down a vertical
chain of command linking the sea-base ships with the CSF headquarters in Utapao and
PACOM in Honolulu, Hawaii, but also horizontally, linking all of the ships participating
in the operation, including a wide range of non-U.S. naval and air assets, NGOs, and
other contributing nations. Continuous contact between the sea bases and the aerial plat-
forms was also a basic requirement, as was communication with the parties on shore.
Naval hospital ships, like the USNS Mercy, represented an extremely important second-
wave capability by providing world-class medical care in case of epidemics. Not only
were these vessels self-sustaining when it came to water, light, and electricity, but they
were well stocked with medical supplies. Helicopters were able to fly patients directly
from shore to the ship for tests, operations, or long-term medical care.
The UNIFIED ASSISTANCE model appears to be particularly useful in situations where
the normal functions of governments and local service providers have been disrupted
or when local conditions—due to cultural and religious differences—make sea-basing
American military personnel preferable. Otherwise, these extremely costly sea-based
capabilities can be redundant. The price disparity between local goods and those pro-
vided by the United States suggests that while navies might be one of the best first
responders in a wide variety of humanitarian disasters, they will be most effective only
when the disaster in question creates large-scale, systemic failures of central and local
government services.
The strength of sea basing is in combining mobility, reliability, and flexibility at sea with
cultural and political sensitivity on land. In OUA, mobility was necessary to bring the
naval platforms to the scene of the disaster. However, in contrast to the time it took for
the CSF 536 headquarters to stand up at Utapao, reliability (in terms of logistics and the
access provided by fixed-wing and helicopter operations) and even more importantly
flexibility (of command, control, and communications networks) allowed Abraham Lincoln
to begin humanitarian operations quickly once it reached Indonesian waters.
Key capabilities in naval humanitarian relief missions include aircraft carriers or
amphibious ships providing sea bases that can be positioned to reach deeply into
afflicted regions; naval logistics ships and cargo airplanes that can transport enormous
quantities of manpower, equipment, and humanitarian supplies uninterruptedly over
long SLOCs; helicopters and fixed-wing airplanes that can fly in almost any weather
and land where needed, not just on airfields; communications networks capable of
linking a wide range of American and other naval ships, with shore stations, and the
local authorities; and naval hospital ships that are linked by helicopter lift and can pro-
vide world-class medical care.
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During the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries, the very thought that sea
powers might regularly use naval platforms to deliver humanitarian aid, as opposed to
cutting off and starving an enemy’s supply lines, would have seemed alien. In the
twenty-first century, however, national power and prestige are more and more charac-
terized by “soft power.” UNIFIED ASSISTANCE showed that “hard power” assets like air-
craft carriers can also be the best providers of “soft power.” This lesson is especially
relevant as the “thousand-ship navy” is taking shape. The UNIFIED ASSISTANCE model
developed in northern Indonesia was a real-life example of how such a “soft power”
humanitarian relief operation can work in practice.
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Appendix: Chronology of the Tsunami Disaster and Humanitarian Response
All dates are U.S. time.
CHRONOLOGY OF THE TSUNAMI DISASTER AND HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE
2004 26 December: 9.0 earthquake/tsunami
28 December: C7F directs CCSG-9 to get under way from Hong Kong
29 December: JTF-536 HQ established at Utapao, Thailand
30 December: MPSRon ordered to sortie from Guam
2005 1 January: CSG-9 arrives Banda Aceh; USS Abraham Lincoln provides aid
2 January: CJTF-536 arrives Utapao
January: Combined Support Group Indonesia (CSG-Indonesia) HQ stood up in
Medan, Sumatra
ESG-5 arrives Medan; USS Bonhomme Richard takes on supplies
6/7 January: CSF-536 HQ establishes SIPRNET/NIPRNET connectivity
NavFor exceeds 500,000 pounds aid delivered (250 tons)
ESG-5 repositions IVO Meulobah, begins delivering aid
8 January: USNS Mercy under way from San Diego
9 January: Thailand and Sri Lanka move to recovery phase; Indonesia remains in cri-
sis phase
10 January: ESG-5 begins LCAC ops IVO Meulobah
NavFor passes one million pounds aid delivered (five hundred tons)
14 January: First UN assessment teams go ashore from Abraham Lincoln
Naval forces pass two million pounds aid delivered (one thousand tons)
15 January: CSG-Indonesia in Medan up on SIPRNET
16 January: CSG-Indonesia up on VTC
18 January: CSG-Indonesia FWD in Banda Aceh up on SIPRNET and NIPRNET
ESG-5 departs, USS Essex arrives
CCSG-9 assumes duties as CSG-Indonesia
Naval forces pass three million pounds aid delivered (1,500 tons)
20 January: First coordination meeting among CSG-Indonesia, UN, USAID, NGOs
CSG-Indonesia creates SPARK Team to facilitate NGOs SA
22 January: Combined Support Group–Thailand disestablished
Naval forces pass four million pounds aid delivered (two thousand tons)
25 January: All U.S. forces out of Medan
28 January: All U.S. forces out of Sabang
Naval forces pass five million pounds aid delivered (2,500 tons)
29 January: Combined Support Group–Sri Lanka disestablished
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CHRONOLOGY OF THE TSUNAMI DISASTER AND HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE
2005 30 January: USNS Mercy arrives Singapore
3 February: Mercy relieves Abraham Lincoln CSG, which returns to United States
9 February: Essex completes relief ops, proceeds to Persian Gulf
12 February: CSF-536 in Utapao is disestablished
14 February: Naval forces pass 9.5 million pounds of aid delivered (4,750 tons)
16 March: Mercy departs Indonesia, en route to Singapore
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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
A ABFC chief aviation boatswain’s mate (fuels)
ACB amphibious construction battalion
ACOS assistant chief of staff
ADF Australian Defence Force
AFMIC Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
AIP Antisurface Warfare Improvement Program
AIS Automatic Identification System
AMC Air Mobility Command
AO1 Aviation Ordnanceman 1st Class
APAN Asia Pacific Area Network
APS afloat prepositioning shipping
B B2C “Bravo to Sea” [embarkation of an additional helicopter
squadron in a CSG]
C C2 command and control
C3 command, control, and communications
C4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
C7F Commander, Seventh Fleet
CAG civil affairs group; carrier air group commander
CAT crisis action team
CCC Combined Coordination Center [Utapao, Thailand]
CCSG Commander, Carrier Strike Group
CDRC Combined Disaster Relief Center [used instead of CMOC]
CENTRIXS Collaborative Enterprise Regional Information Exchange
System
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CFAC combined force air component
CFACC combined force air component commander
CG commanding general
CJTF combined joint task force
CLF Combat Logistics Force
CMOC Civil Military Operations Center
CNA Center for Naval Analyses
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
CODS carrier onboard delivery [aircraft]
COS chief of staff
CPR cardiopulmonary resuscitation
CSF combined support force [in UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, the JTF be-
came a CSF]
CSG carrier strike group; combined support group
CSG-9 Carrier Strike Group 9
CSL cooperative security location
CSO chief staff officer
CTF Commander, Task Force
CVW carrier air wing
CWO3 Chief Warrant Officer 3
D DART disaster assistance response team [USAID]
DCAG deputy carrier air group commander
DesRon destroyer squadron
DET detachment
DHS demographic and health survey
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
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DR disaster relief
DRAT disaster relief assessment team [U.S. Navy]
DRRS Defense Readiness Reporting System
E EEI essential elements of information
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EODMU explosive ordnance demolition mobile unit
ESG expeditionary strike group
ESG-5 Expeditionary Strike Group 5
F FAST fleet antiterrorism strike team
FCE Forward Command Element
FEC facilities engineering center
FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FISC fleet and industrial supply center
FLOT forward line of own troops
FSSG force service support group
G GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka [Free Aceh Movement]
H HA humanitarian assistance
HA/DR humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
HM2 Hospital Corpsman 2nd Class
HOC humanitarian operations center
HQ headquarters
HS helicopter antisubmarine squadron
HSL helicopter antisubmarine squadron light [U.S. Navy]
HSS health service support
HSV high-speed vessel
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I IMET International Military Education and Training
IOM International Organization of Migration
IR intelligence requirement
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IT1 Information Technology Technician 1st Class
ITC Chief Information Technology Technician
J J/NMETL joint/Navy [or naval] mission-essential task list
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFAC joint force air component
JFMCC joint force maritime component commander
JICPAC Joint Intelligence Center Pacific
JMETL joint mission-essential task list
JMFU joint meteorological and oceanographic forecast unit
JPAC Joint Prisoners of War/Missing in Action Accounting Command
JTF joint task force
L LCAC landing craft, air cushion
LCS Littoral Combat Ships
LCU landing craft, utility
LFA lead federal agency
LNO liaison officer
LOCC logistics operations coordination center
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelem [Tamil Tigers]
M MA1 Master-at-Arms 1st Class
MarDiv Marine division
medevac medical evacuation
MEF Marine expeditionary force
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METL mission-essential task list
METOC meteorological and oceanographic
MEU Marine expeditionary unit
MNF multinational force
MPA maritime patrol air
MPAT Multinational Planning Augmentation Team
MPF maritime prepositioning force
MPSRon maritime prepositioning ship squadron
MRI magnetic resonance imaging
MSC Military Sealift Command
MSD mobile security detachment
MSS mobile security squadron
MTF medical treatment facility
MUSE mobile utility support equipment
N NavFac naval facility
NEHC Navy Environmental Health Center
NEPMU Navy environmental and preventive medicine unit
NGO nongovernmental organization
NIPRNET Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
NLL Navy lesson learned
NLLS Navy Lessons Learned System
NMETL Navy [or naval] mission-essential task list
NTA Navy [or naval] tactical task
NTIMS Navy Training Information Management System
NTTL Navy [or naval] Tactical Task List
NWDC Navy Warfare Development Command
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O OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OPDS Offshore Petroleum Discharge System
optempo operating tempo
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OUA Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE
P PACOM Pacific Command
PAO public affairs officer
POM preparation for overseas movement
PTWC Pacific Tsunami Warning Center
PWPT potable-water pillow tank
R RFID radio frequency identification
RMSI Regional Maritime Security Initiative
ROA relief operations area
ROWPU reverse-osmosis water purification unit
RSAF Republic of Singapore Armed Forces
S SAF Sri Lankan Armed Forces
SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SJA staff judge advocate
SJFHQ Standing Joint Force Headquarters
SLOC sea line of communication
SOP standard operating procedure
STAR scheduled theater airlift route
T T-AH hospital ship [MSC]
TACMEMO tactical memorandum
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TRAP tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel
TSC theater security cooperation
U UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UCT underwater construction team
UJTL Universal Joint Task List
UN United Nations
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNJLC United Nations Joint Logistics Center
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID/OFDA U.S. Agency for International Development/Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance
USDAO U.S. Defense Attaché Office
USG U.S. government
USMC U.S. Marine Corps
USN U.S. Navy
USSG U.S. Support Group
UTC Coordinated Universal Time [effectively, Greenwich Mean Time]
V VAQ tactical electronic warfare squadron
VFA fighter squadron
VTC video teleconference
W WFP World Food Program [UN]
WHO World Health Organization
Y YN2 Yeoman 2nd Class
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